Representing the Local in a Global Age: The Case for a Confederal Solution to China’s Territorial Conflicts

 

*By Michael C. Davis, Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong (mcdavis@cuhk.edu.hk),.

Conference on “Globalization and Its Challenges in the 21^st Century,”International Studies Association, Hong Kong Global Conference, July 2001.

 

INTRODUCTION

Why federalism? In any discussion of federalism and China this question confronts one immediately. Some would argue that China has always been a unitary state and a federal structure contradicts territorial conceptions that are deeply ingrained in the Chinese mind. This claim has sometimes been elevated to a cultural myth, which urges that a unitary system is deeply rooted in 5000 years of Chinese history. It is argued that a federal structure may tear at the fabric of the Chinese state and undermine stability. The Chinese Leaders are simply not interested. More than this, they are sometimes violently opposed.

A short answer to the above claims might include the argument that the cultural myth of a unitary state may explain more about the historical imperatives of maintaining a form of authoritarian control over China proper and imperial respect at the periphery than it does about Chinese cultural constraints. The fabric of the Chinese state is already experiencing the stresses of both regional and peripheral interests that may propel it to better rationalize the orderly expression of local interests. Such rationalization will contribute measurably to the fight against corruption and contribute to the reform and unification process. In the first part of my argument I will note the form of these interests, both in the regions of China proper and at the periphery. I will simply sidestep the claim that China’s leaders are not interested, by noting that this is a discussion of reform and unification. It is imperative that scholars look beyond the political constraints of the moment and envision better alternatives. In this conference that focuses on globalization and the 21^st Century it is important to consider a range of problems that tear at the fabric of the modern Chinese state and also a range of solutions that may help China to fit better into the emerging global order.

            China’s economic reform processes of recent years have produced increased regionalism and  diversity across Chinese societies. Less understood overseas, this diversification has been accompanied by a marked tension in the relationships between the Beijing government and its assertive peripheral and regional communities. While China has resisted political reform, and supposedly clings to an authoritarian unitary or centrally dominated system, China’s regions and some peripheral communities have been undergoing economic and sometimes political liberalization.

            In the face of central political intransigence, decentralization and out-of-control regionalism have accompanied economic liberalization and marketization on the mainland. The contrast is even greater between the authoritarian center and the movement toward full-scale liberal democracy in the peripheral communities of Hong Kong and Taiwan. All of these forces have combined to produce tremendous pressure for relaxation of authoritarianism and a better rationalization of China’s territorial political structure. This essay will consider how this structural tension has played out in four key territorial policy sectors, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet and the mainland regions. Taking account of China’s Hong Kong and Taiwan policies and certain regional developments, I will suggest a combination of federalism and confederalism as the best path forward. This territorial reconstruction has important implications for the foreign policies of China’s overseas partners, especially policies regarding Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet. It also has important implications for China’s political reform process. As a preliminary matter, this essay first addresses the legacy underlying the unitary system and its alternatives.

Competing Territorial Paradigms

            It is important to consider the adequacy of China’s claimed unitary system in addressing the political reform issues on the horizon. In this regard it is important to bear in mind that the alleged importance of a unitary system in China has sometimes been elevated to a cultural myth. This myth asserts that this is the way China has always been organized territorially and that such structure is culturally ingrained in the Chinese identity. But this myth appears to be a false one that explains more about the historical imperatives of maintaining authoritarian central control than Chinese culture. Much of contemporary China in Central Asia was in ancient times made up of tributary states or protectorates where central control from the Chinese imperial capital was minimal or non-existent. In several thousand years of war and conflict both these peripheral communities and forces emerging from the Chinese heartland would frequently compete with the regime at the center for control, often splitting China into competing kingdoms. Since these regimes all offered autocratic or authoritarian rule the myth of a strong central leadership of a unitary state emerged. According to the unitary myth an authoritarian regime that relinquished strong central control may be perceived as weak and have its territory seized or its government toppled.

            In the age of the strong state and political reform, this myth presents serious problems for the modern Chinese state. While China has had provinces and autonomous regions throughout the communist period, real political power is effectively vested in the central government, under China’s unitary constitutional system. Such central control is always at risk of slipping away to regional or peripheral forces. The enormous power of the modern state has meant that central leaders may at times be extremely overbearing or even terrorize the population, as they seek to achieve or retain a high level of central control. This was especially evident from the 1950s through the 1970s, reaching its high point during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, in the 1980s and 1990s, it has presented problems for advocates of political reform, as it is difficult to imagine such a high degree of central control in a large democratizing state.

            China’s current commitment to an authoritarian and unitary political system forms the premise for a number of political conflicts in and with the Chinese state. China’s “one country, two systems” formula offered for Hong Kong and Taiwan, while originally designed to separate a socialist from a capitalist system, has, in the age of China’s economic marketization reforms, come to merely distinguish authoritarianism on the mainland from permitted democratization on the periphery. This is evident in the Sino-British Joint Declaration in the two-systems formula providing for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong, while these are to be denied in the mainland. Proposals regarding Taiwan evidence the same formula with some modification. In the face of regionalism on the mainland and pressures to reform from these peripheral communities, a continued commitment to an authoritarian unitary system at the center is hard to justify and a source of continual political tension.

            This tension has not only implicated the relationships between the Chinese central government and peripheral communities but has become a constant theme in China’s foreign relations, as the regime seeks assurances that foreign powers will not split China or meddle in its internal affairs.  In the age of the democratic peace and global trade China’s commitment to a highly centralized unitary state may be an aspiration that should be reexamined.

            These issues have been coming to a head on many fronts, but on no other front are they presented more starkly than in the emerging relationships with the peripheral communities of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet, all matters of intense international and domestic concern. In many respects Hong Kong is held out as a model for Taiwan’s unification with China. Tibet is refused the application of this model, though the Dalai Lama has sometimes expressed sympathy for this option. Hong Kong and Taiwan are likely to serve as models for mainland regional communities as they reach a higher degree of economic success. The pressing question for these peripheral communities relates to the viability of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula, embodying local autonomy with an authoritarian center. China is under pressure to reform politically. But it is doubtful whether democratizing political reforms can be accomplished in a country of China’s size and complexity without affording an appropriate territorial political structure for representation of local interest and systematic national attention to cross regional interests and policies. Without reform, peripheral communities are faced with the issue of the reliability of local institutions guarantying democracy, human rights and the rule of law in an authoritarian national system. At the same time, this formula presents the Beijing government with the issue of the continued viability of its authoritarian practices in the face of highly successful peripheral democracies, which present a challenge to that system.

            This essay considers the perspectives of these peripheral communities in relation to the construction of the greater Chinese community. In the next part it considers four aspects of the dilemma facing the key actors in this unfolding historical drama: first, how these tensions and contradictions have been evident in the central government’s attempts to contain democracy in the Hong Kong transition; second, the basis for Taiwan reluctance to take talk of unification seriously, pending a more reliable political formula that takes account of concerns derived from both the Chinese domestic and international orders; third, the dilemma that Tibet presents China, as it attempts to expand its international status and the difficult circumstances Tibetans face; and fourth, the tensions concerning China’s political reform and territorial political structure, as manifest in the related debate over local regionalism. Constituent communities in China may question whether the unitary system promoted by Beijing is simply the structure of continued authoritarianism. In this sense, the ongoing debates in Hong Kong and Taiwan may be the first tentative steps in China’s political reform and restructuring. It should be stressed that policies in these four areas do not merely reflect tensions produced by the unitary myth but also reflect evidence of subtle but insufficiently acknowledged emerging changes in the unitary paradigm.

            These concerns, I argue in the final part of this essay, point to the merit of a territorial political structure embodying both federal and confederal institutions, as a way to address the territorial and political problems of China’s constituent communities. In this regard, there appears to be no agreement on a clear demarcation between federalism and confederalism. In the present discussion confederalism will simply be understood to signify a higher degree of independence with a more enforceable status. It may reflect a coming together by agreement -- as is evident in the European Union. Confederal communities may even have substantial international status --in the European case, even state status-- or the right to opt out. Federalism, on the other hand, in comparison with confederalism, will be understood to include a lesser degree of local autonomy and a stronger center with broader authority.  In the United States federalism evolved over time from a states rights orientation to a substantial level of central power. In a federal system, as understood here, the right to opt out may be eliminated and little or no international relations role allowed. The following discussion will consider, in the four key areas noted, the problems that have plagued the current system and suggest why these federal and confederal institutions may be indicated in the Chinese case.

 

PRESSURES TOWARD FEDERALISM

The Hong Kong Transition Process

            It is in the Hong Kong transition process that many of the above noted tensions between an authoritarian center and a liberalizing region have been on full display. As the prototype example of China’s “one country, two systems” formula in practice, it is helpful here to examine the Hong Kong case in greater detail than should be necessary for the other peripheral communities under discussion. In this respect, Hong Kong may afford a concrete example justifying concern about maintaining autonomy under an authoritarian top-down unitary model. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration,[1] signed in the early more euphoric period of China’s reform policy, promised Hong Kong various liberal democratic guarantees. In addition to maintenance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, these promises included a high degree of autonomy within China and the right to conduct its own “external affairs” in regard to commerce, culture, sports, the arts, science and related areas. China retained control over defense and “foreign affairs”. The welcoming of Hong Kong back into the Chinese fold under these terms fundamentally restructured the nature of the Chinese state. Without formally providing much of an overarching umbrella, Beijing has essentially recognized the international legitimacy for certain purposes of two territorial governments in China. This has likewise fundamentally altered the internal territorial map by politically diminishing the claimed unitary quality of the Chinese state. A local government, by international guarantees, has been elevated to a partially confederal status by its ability to credibly demand politically, and to some extent legally, compliance with these guarantees.

            The implications of these developments, along with Hong Kong’s democratic challenge, have been politically troubling to the authoritarian center in Beijing. This produced a consistent and pervasive resistance to Hong Kong’s assertions of both democracy and autonomy from almost the day the ink dried on the Joint Declaration. True liberal democracy in Hong Kong was and still is viewed as a threat to the authoritarian center. The Chinese leaders, while seeking to capitalize on the advantages of a successful Hong Kong, have sought to contain this threat at every turn. This containment policy has especially focused on the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong.

            It is important to note the liberal constitutional starting point the Joint Declaration affords and to recall the ways that these guarantees have been eroded in the implementation process. The Joint Declaration promises Hong Kong the essential elements of liberal constitutionalism: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Regarding democracy, it provides that the legislature is to be chosen by elections and the chief executive by elections or consultations held locally. Approximately sixteen liberal human rights are promised, of which half relate to freedom of speech; at the same time the leading international human rights covenants are promised to apply. On the rule of law, it is specified in the agreement that the courts are to be independent and final, the existing common law legal system maintained and that citizens can challenge the actions of the executive in the courts. It is now widely accepted, that the latter promise includes constitutional judicial review of legislation. The Joint Declaration stipulates the content of its various guarantees into the Basic Law, a document which, after a lengthy drafting process, was promulgated in April 1990 and is now in force.[2]

            While the Hong Kong Basic Law faithfully contains much of the required content of the Joint Declaration, it falls short in several respects. It has especially served as the vehicle to erode and contain liberal democracy, both explicitly in its provisions and in the subsequent policies. Regarding democracy, Chinese policies have consistently sought to erode the power of the pro-democracy camp. Especially beginning with the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen related demonstrations in Hong Kong (where a million demonstrators led by the pro-democracy leaders took to the streets in support of the democracy movement in China), China has warned that Hong Kong not be a base of subversion. Leaders of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong have specifically been accused of subversion and China has aimed to contain their influence. A substantially, though not fully, democratic election for the Legislative Council was finally achieved in 1995, the last election under British rule. The Chinese government was so displeased by the democratic formula and democratic victory that they set about undoing the electoral results.

            Upon the handover a Beijing appointed Provisional Legislature, excluding the democrats, was established for the first year of Chinese rule. As an appointed body, the Provisional Legislature arguably violated the requirements for elections specified in the Joint Declaration. The vast majority of China’s appointees to this Provisional Legislature and to the numerous other appointed transitional bodies came from the business and pro-China sectors. This appointed Provisional Legislature enacted the undemocratic electoral laws under which the first post-handover election for the Legislative Council was conducted on May 24, 1998. With some legislative redistricting, in accordance with the gradual pace of democratization specified in the Basic Law, that same electoral law was the basis for the second Legislative Council elections which took  place in September 2000.

            The 1990 Basic Law affords legality to much of Chinas’ democratic containment policy. The Basic Law specifies that half of the sixty Legislative Council seats are to be filled by narrowly drawn functional constituencies, made up of voters in various commercial and professional sectors. Under the Basic Law formula the number of directly elected geographical seats are to be increased from twenty in the first Legislative Council, to twenty-four in the 2000 election, to thirty (half of the total) for the 2004 election. The possibility of establishing full democracy in 2007 depends on a two-thirds vote in the Legislative Council and the approval of the Chief Executive. With the same reform limitations, an even more conservative model provides for the selection of the Chief Executive by an 800-member Election Committee, which is to be elected largely from the same narrow functional constituencies. Furthermore, the Basic Law largely dis-empowers the Legislative Council, by limiting members’ rights to propose bills, without the consent of the Chief Executive, to matters not respecting government policy or expenditure. Furthermore, the legislature is divided into two groups. Any members’ bills or members’ amendments to Government bills require the approval of a majority of the thirty, largely conservative, functional constituency legislators. The other half is made up variously of the directly elected geographical constituency members and some (initially ten, then 6 in 2000 and then none for 2004) chosen by the Election Committee.

            The electoral law for the first Legislative Council that was enacted by the Beijing appointed Provisional Legislature for the May 24, 1998 election (and in large part continues for subsequent elections) provides for a system in the geographical constituencies of district-based proportional representation. This system is designed to give minority parties further representation and further water down the electoral position of the popular democratic camp. This, in combination with a system of corporate votes (widely subject to abuse) and small voter numbers in some functional constituencies consigns the more popular democrats to a permanent opposition status. In the first post-handover Legco election conducted in 1998 Hong Kong people, with a fifty-three percent voter turnout, expressed a resounding rejection of China’s democratic containment policy, giving sixty percent of the popular vote to candidates of the pro-democracy camp. In spite of this popular support, under the perverse electoral model, pro-democracy candidates only secured nineteen of the sixty seats available, including fourteen of the twenty directly elected seats. Attempts to capitalize on their popularity were doomed by the above noted restrictions on members bills and Basic Law amendments. This system has bread discontent and encouraged discord in the democratic camp, which has in turn tended to undermine their credibility, encouraging some  erosion of their position in the September 2000 elections.  A electoral system that undermines the credibility of elected officials in both camps is hardly a good thing for Hong Kong people.

            When it comes to human rights protection, the Basic Law rights chapter was reasonably well written and appears to incorporate the guarantees of the international human rights covenants as constraints on any rights restrictions. The substantial threat to rights in the Basic Law is again concerned with containment of opposition. Sections outside the rights chapter of the Basic Law, requiring the enactment of laws on subversion and sedition (Article 23) and allowing for unilateral mainland interference during times of “turmoil” (Article 18), reflect this concern. During the handover, the Chinese government and its local supporters in various transitional committees sought to reverse earlier reformist legislation that better protected free speech and associational freedoms, declaring such reforms a violation of the Basic Law. More conservative post-handover replacement laws were enacted by the Provisional Legislature and remain in place.

            The rule of law, one of the brighter spots in the system at the handover, has become the area of greatest concern, illustrating again Beijing’s determination to constrain independence in local institutions, this time the courts. On the bright side, the post-handover Court of Final Appeal has clearly determined that local courts have the power of constitutional judicial review of legislation. In a landmark decision the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal declared that it had the power to examine both local and NPC legislative acts for conformity to the requirements in the Basic Law.[3] In the Ng Ka Ling decision the Court made clear that it would pursue a purposive interpretation of the Basic Law and a “generous interpretation” of the guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms. At the same time the Court of Final Appeal enforced the requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as required under Basic Law Article 39, and refused to pursue a requested referral to the National People’s Congress for interpretation of Basic Law requirements.[4] This judgment was widely applauded in Hong Kong as an attempt to put the rule of law on firm ground.

The bad news followed in several stages. Mainland officials subsequently attacked the Court for ruling that it could examine acts of the NPC for conformity to the Basic Law, accusing the Court of trying to put itself above the NPC.[5]  These officials and their supporters argued the judgment needed to be “rectified.”[6] The Hong Kong Government took up the mainland concern by filing an extraordinary motion to “clarify” the judgment on this issue.[7] The Court then issued a clarifying judgment, which merely restated what it had in substance originally ruled, that the Hong Kong Court is not above the NPC and that the Court cannot question “the authority of the NPC and its Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein.”[8]  The attacks on the Court’s judgment of both the mainland and Hong Kong governments put the rule of law and the independence of the local judiciary under severe political pressure.

The problems did not stop there. A second more serious attack on the judgment and the rule of law was launched in May 1999, when the government issued a report claiming the judgment would produce a flood of 1.67 million migrants to Hong Kong (a figure that has been widely criticized). This time the government made a request to the Standing Committee of China’s NPC to reinterpret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law. The NPC Standing Committee issued the requested ruling, effectively overturning the CFA judgment.[9] In a subsequent case the CFA carried out this NPC mandate, ruling that the NPC Standing Committee’s power of interpretation is “general and unqualified.”[10]  As a result of the NPC overturning of the outcome of a CFA ruling and judicial acknowledgment of the NPC’s unqualified power to do so, judicial independence and the finality of judgments in Hong Kong have clearly been called into question. These events will certainly have a chilling effect on assertive judicial defense of the rule of law in Hong Kong.[11]

            At the heart of all these Beijing policies appears to be a principle of defending the current mainland system, both as an authoritarian regime and a unitary state. Hong Kong stands as the example for Taiwan, and even Tibet, of the type of tension which is likely to persist in any subordinating relationship with the mainland, as long as the authoritarian unitary system continues at the center. This would appear to suggest an optimistic scenario if the center advances fundamental reforms. With political and structural reforms, the current policies of containing democracy in Hong Kong would no longer be necessary and the above noted tensions would be reduced. On the other hand, if these mainland reforms are not pursued then tensions evident in the execution of these policies will become increasingly evident as democratization goes forward in Hong Kong.

 

The Case of Taiwan

            If Hong Kong stands as the example of the difficulties in execution of the mainland policies, Taiwan represents the target, which would stretch the mainland territorial fabric beyond its current elasticity. Taiwan is an even more serious challenge to Beijing’s preferred authoritarian unitary system. To date Taiwan has given a rather chilly response to the mainland offer of the “one country, two systems” model for unification. The current President of Taiwan, consistent with the policies of his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has refused to accept the “one China” policy as a matter of principle and a condition of negotiations. While he has not reemphasized the “state to state” rhetoric of his predecessor, he seems more or less committed to the substance of existing policy which holds that Taiwan is a separate state. It is noteworthy that former President Lee Teng-hui  has now declared substantial support for Chen. To avoid antagonizing China, the more assertive DPP position on independence is not being pursued through any formal action but, nonetheless, one can expect that a DPP-based President is not about to surrender Taiwan’s existing independence. Over the years, essentially, both sides of the Strait have made overtures favoring improved legal arrangements for their blossoming trade and other private sector relationships, but neither side has made any commitments that would substantially meet the other side’s concerns when it comes to formal political status.

            Using its “one country, two systems” formula, the mainland government insist as a matter of principle on Taiwan’s submission to one China, dominated under the unitary system by the current government in Beijing. It goes so far as to impose this view on its foreign partners, as was evident in former US President Bill Clinton’s articulation on the “three nos” US policy -- no support for Taiwan independence, no support for Taiwan’s entrance into state-based international organizations and no “two China” policy. With acceptance of its “one China” principle, Beijing has indicated that anything else is open to negotiations. But, under its “one country, two systems” formula, it has already defined what it will accept as an outcome to such negotiations. It has indicated a willingness to concede a slightly higher degree of autonomy for Taiwan, allowing even local military defense and “certain rights in foreign affairs,” along with the other elements enjoyed by Hong Kong of local self-rule and control over external affairs. But it has shown a great reluctance under present circumstances to allow Taiwan the security of substantial international relations and has expressed resistance to the confederation idea..

            Taiwan, on the other hand, has shown no confidence in the “one country, two systems” formula, with its basis in the same authoritarian regime at the top. It has pursued a policy of democratic reform at home, while seeking to enhance its international status. While the new government has implied some change in emphasis and strategy, there has been no clear move away from this posture.[12] In past negotiations with Beijing, Taiwan has limited its overtures largely to securing trade and various private exchange arrangements. Recent surveys in Taiwan show that a substantial majority of the people favor such policy and would not support unification in the absence of democratic reform on the mainland. The constituencies for both open declarations of independence and for unification fluctuate occasionally but remain in the minority.[13] Taiwan shows little current interest in unification. That interest is even less under the present government, given that the DPP was historically committed to openly declared independence, a policy that it has now moderated and, at least temporarily, abandoned.      

It is understandable that the current structure of mainland overtures offers Taiwan little incentive to respond favorably to unification proposals. People on Taiwan undoubtedly have an historical affinity for Chinese culture and civilization. Even the DPP-based President has noted this. Both personal and economic contacts are highly valued. Nevertheless, the current mainland regime is looked upon with considerable trepidation. While the benefits of more secure mainland trade and the promise of non-interference in Taiwan’s conduct of external trade relations are attractive, they are clearly not a sufficient basis for a relatively successful democratic community to surrender its independence to an authoritarian power. The price of being a formal part of China is considered too high in Taipei.

            In addition to issues of democracy and security, there are international systemic reasons for Taiwan’s tough stance. Changes in the international system regarding the nature of the state and other effective territorial actors and regarding participation in the non-state global sphere make it easier for Taiwan to carry on with the status quo. At the same time, changes in the international system will shape any optimal unification formula in ways that have profound implications for China’s unitary paradigm. If one assumes that the affinities and shared cultures of the Taiwanese and mainland peoples weigh in favor of Taiwan seeking a status within the Chinese community in some form of “unification,” then the search must be for a formula that responds to the numerous anxieties that attach to this complex relationship. Any arrangement must be one that will instill confidence in Taiwan’s status in the reconstructed Chinese state. Some flexibility as to what unification means seems imperative.

 

The Tibet Dilemma

Recent commentary and books on Tibet have emphasized the serious dilemma facing the Dalai Lama.[14] Well-meaning accounts have noted the reality that China’s policies in Tibet have not only denied Tibetan self-rule but may eventually result in the displacement of the Tibetan people, as China provides economic incentives for increasing numbers of Han Chinese to move to Tibet. Exiled Tibetans are sometimes advised that, given China’s unbending position, they should return as soon as possible, even if substantially on China’s terms, or they will become a minority in their own homeland. According to this view, while principled resistance may be satisfying it is futile. Under Chinese terms, described as the best they are likely to get, local control would remain with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), though Tibetans loyal to the Chinese government would be allowed a role in governance. The only suggested gain for this surrender to the “inevitable” is that China may be persuaded to cut off and reverse the flow of Chinese migrants. The “one country, two systems” option is not offered to Tibet, revealing the power component of putting this model on offer.

While analyst often pose these issues as a dilemma for the Dalai Lama they fail to appreciate the dilemmas both he and the present circumstances have created for China. The Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile have been extremely effective in highlighting the imperialist and oppressive quality of China’s occupation of Tibet. This has brought forth protest and embarrassment in nearly every diplomatic outing of Chinese leaders. The situation in Tibet has deeply troubled China’s international partners and foreign leaders have been pressed to urge Beijing to come up with a more satisfactory solution. The Tibet issue often overshadows others that the Chinese leaders would like to address. It provides justification for advocates of hard-line policies toward China. As a consequence, diplomacy for China is made more difficult. While China has tended to look at its Tibetan policy through rose colored glasses made of reconstructed history,[15] it should be able to understand the international sympathy for Tibet. China, a country that has sometimes led the Third World’s struggle against imperialism, finds itself accused of committing the same colonialism that previously visited its own shores. This poses an immediate dilemma for China as to whether to soften its Tibet policy or to continue to incur global wrath.

While Tibet presents a dilemma for the Chinese government, it is doubtful whether the Dalai Lama really faces a dilemma over submission versus violence. Although he faces issues as to what baseline for autonomy might be acceptable and strategic questions as to how to get there and beyond, neither submission nor extreme violence are realistic options. Strategically, Tibetans have been quite effective in creating a dilemma for China. To heighten international pressure on Beijing they may want to better appeal to China’s own commitments made to Tibet. Tibetans can highlight the fact that it is the Beijing government, which uses the word  “autonomy” in describing its rule of Tibet and which has publicly stated that it will discuss anything except independence. As with the Taiwan offer, the use of the term “anything” must be viewed with suspicion.

No one can doubt the resolve of the current Chinese leaders to hold on to power and not relinquish any territory. But even for these leaders the use of sheer coercive power to subjugate the Tibetan people is not without difficulty. Forcing Tibetans to accept arduous terms will likely reverberate back to China’s long-term disadvantage.  As recent internal territorial conflicts in such places as Chechnya, Kosovo and East Timor amply demonstrate, the dominant parties in seemingly one-sided conflicts often face more profound issues than are initially evident. A more far-sighted view is required. Pressing the Dalai Lama to accept terms where the CCP continues to control every aspect of Tibetan public life, as a price of cutting off the flow of outsiders, will produce a feeling of hopelessness in the Tibetan community. In the long term, this will breed resentment. In the face of continued subjugation, Tibetans are more likely, either now or in the future, to choose intensified resistance and ultimately rebellion.

No matter what argument China makes to paper over the situation in Tibet, it is apparent to the world that China has essentially subjugated an ethnically and territorially distinct community. It does no good to note, as China does in its 1999 White Paper on National Minority Policy and Practice, that China has generously set up numerous autonomous regions for fifty-five recognized “national minorities.” If there is no meaningful self-rule at the bottom, then this system of top-down rule through local party secretaries becomes merely an efficient system of control and a denial of autonomy. To highlight the special privileges of Tibetans and claim that they are better off under Chinese rule also fails. Such was one of the primary claims of European colonialism, to spread an allegedly superior civilization. It likewise does no good to draw analogy to the overseas territorial possessions of other countries. Colonialism is no longer acceptable, wherever it takes place. There has been no plebiscite on self-rule in Tibet. China has not been politically able to offer true autonomy and the result of its Tibet policy has been a giant black spot in China’s international reputation.

While the immediate concern is to work out an acceptable baseline for Tibetan autonomy, in doing so it is important to bear in mind that China’s own political reform process is likely to shape and be shaped by any sensible long-term solution to the Tibetan problem. China’s own reform process has increasingly become a hostage to its harsh policies in respect of its peripheral communities. For China, the bogeyman in recent years has been the Soviet Union and it ignominious disintegration. China is, nevertheless, pursuing exactly the same kind of harsh policies towards its peripheral communities that the Soviets pursued for seven decades. This is a breeding ground for the same types of resentments that emerged. China’s harsh policies toward its peripheral communities have not only held China’s own reform processes hostage but they have shaped China’s global role and have thus become a global concern. Reasonable opinion holds that China’s reluctance, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to support humanitarian intervention in places where serious humanitarian disasters have occurred is substantially shaped by the fear that such intervention will someday be directed at its own peripheral communities, especially Taiwan and Tibet.  One can only hope that the circumstances of these communities need not become as dire before appropriate policies alleviate the situation.

China is called upon to step back and consider both a sensible short-term policy that will treat the Tibetan people with the dignity and respect they disserve and a long-term policy that will address the centrifugal tensions likely to emerge in China, as its reform process unfolds. The federalism proposal, discussed in the final section of this essay, provides a more visionary view of a truly autonomous Tibet as part of China’s long term democratization prospects. The present discussion sets aside the difficult question concerning the appropriate territorial boundaries for a future Tibet.[16]

 

Regionalism and the Territorial Structure of the Mainland

            In considering the reconstruction of China’s unitary system, it is important to consider the ways in which regionalism on the mainland encourages political federalism and the ways that this issue relates to the confederal aspect. In this regard, as a preliminary matter, it should be noted that regionalism is not the only force propelling China toward political reform. The diverse social and economic interests created by economic liberalization encourage a search for formal channels of interest representation. But regionalism is a related force, which should be reckoned with.

            The economic reform policies have produced a rapid increase in the rate of economic decentralization that has been insufficiently matched by constitutional structural change. In many respects it appears that decentralization and regionalism have produced a form of economic federalism in mainland China. Regional initiative has had to supply the guidance the economy needs in the face of an overtaxed central regime. The negative results of regionalism, in the Chinese context, have included, for example, regional protectionism, courts and other legal institutions being captured by local political forces, corruption on a grand scale, interference with and harassment of non-local trading partners (an effective denial of equal rights); out of control bank lending practices, social security issues and a general denial of human rights protections. There have also been various fiscal and tax problems that the central government has endeavored to address with limited success. In regard to tax reform it appears that the tax system has also been partially federalized.

            Economic federalism, however, has not been accompanied by the formal constitutional rationalization of political institutions to facilitate the performance of political tasks important to a federal system. These tasks include provision of public goods, economic redistribution, fiscal stabilization, the protection of national commerce from regional protectionism and the maintenance of equal rights for individuals and corporate entities across the zones of regional difference (the level playing field).  The transition from a socialist economy where state owned enterprises were primarily responsible for social welfare has also spawned a growing social welfare crisis and competitive difficulties for companies in the new market economy.

            The most fundamental deficiency has been the lack of constitutional institutions that may serve to engage the populace in the kinds of structural decisions the country faces. In a country of China’s size constitutional federalism may be essential to meaningful democratization. Given the need in the current market system to concentrate initiative at the local level, the prospect of effectively recentralizing economic and institutional control without loosing economic gains seems remote. Under WTO the country is heading in precisely the opposite direction, making related political reform even more urgent. The presence of economic activity and problems at the local level likewise favor democratic institutions that are responsive to local interests and which insure policing of local official actions. It is important for the national government to be fully engaged in securing the political and legal institutions to facilitate democratic activity and a reliable constitutional checks and balances. Such a constitutional order, in addition to democracy, should insure equal rights, free discussion and the rule of law.

            In China’s emerging mainland political system the absence of democracy at the center presents the same types of problems that have plagued the Hong Kong transition. There is concern alternatively with the reliability of promises of autonomy under authoritarianism and with the dangers of an inadequate national constitutional structure to sustain reliable systems of commerce within greater China. While Hong Kong represents the high-water mark of autonomy under Chinese authoritarianism, China’s track-record in this regard in relation to other autonomy commitments on the mainland raise serious doubts. Clamoring demands of economically successful regions in China’s heartland for more reliable local and national systems, even when not articulated in the explicit language of democracy and federalism, are just one more challenge confronting China’s insistence on an authoritarian and unitary system. In this regard, China might be expected to get its own house in order before a substantial democratic community such as Taiwan might consider unification.

 

LOOKING AT FEDERAL SOLUTIONS

The above discussion points to the notion of federalism as an avenue to address the multifarious issues raised in respect to China’s regional and peripheral communities. It is worth considering in a preliminary way what federalism might mean in China. This section will consider in two parts the federal and confederal components of this proposal. While one can easily construct ideal types of federal and confederal structures that constitution drafters may aspire to achieve, it is much more difficult to imagine the path of orderly change reformers might promote in an effort to democratize and federalize China -- the “how to get there” problem.

            Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identify the chief functions of federalism as either “coming together” or “holding together”.[17] In the present proposal for a mix of federalism for the core of the Chinese mainland and confederalism to bring in peripheral communities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, one can detect stronger elements of holding together in the former and coming together in the latter. While these are the main tasks that federalism must perform, they are not a full account of why federalism might be of interest. The why for Chinese reformers appears to be democracy.[18] Linz and Stepan note that it is not meaningful to speak of federalism under authoritarian or other dictatorial systems. Such systems tend to overwhelm the local or regional self-rule and bottom-up self-enforcement, upon which federalism depends. Corruption often fills the power void. But it has been observed that merely launching national elections without meaningful democracy at the regional level, as occurred in Russia, may likewise lead to a failed federalism.

 

Federalism on the Mainland

            One might argue that China’s authoritarian decentralization on the mainland is an attempt at economic federalism without democracy. Authoritarian leaders might sensibly resist political federalism under the current system because it would denude the center of its last remnants of control and be divisive when the regime is challenged. On the other hand, when China aims to take democratization on the mainland seriously, federalism may facilitate that process. Stepan points out that the largest democracies in nearly every part of the world are federal. Logically, the democratic notion of popular control seems to suggest small enough units to allow a degree of immediacy to the conditions in the lives of the electors.[19] The key is to provide the institutions to achieve this, while still maintaining good government, human rights and the rule of law.

            Federal institutions in a democratizing China should insure politicians have reasons to be committed to the autonomy of the regional sub-unit while being solicitous of the interest of the broader political community. A fairly standard legislative configuration for a federal system may involve a bicameral legislature with one assembly being made up of legislators representing the sub-units equally and the other directly elected on a popular basis. Alternatively, a single legislative assembly may simply have members who represent the sub-units (through proportional representation or party list, etc.) and rely more directly on sub-unit support. In addition, studies have shown that having substantial numbers of local and regional electoral offices, in addition to those for the national legislature or executive, affords a ladder for political advancement, thereby encouraging a kind of dual loyalty. [20] 

            The emphasis on local or regional control in a federal system usually favors reserving most powers to the state or provincial sub-unit governments, with further local distribution. The federal government should be particularly concerned with provision of public goods (defense, unified monetary system, etc.) and a regulatory system to protect national commerce and human rights. The commerce aspect especially involves regulating areas where the interests of individual regional sub-units may be contrary to the larger good of the federation as a whole or where the economic burdens and difficulties of sub-units are better addressed by a national policy. For example, in a country of China’s size switching to a market based system, one might imagine that a major concern, to which the central government could provide a uniform response, would be in the creation of a retirement system to replace enormous burdens in this regard faced by State Owned Enterprises (SOE) under the old system. There have been recent reports of experiments in this regard in Liaoning Province. The central government will also want to provide a regulatory framework for areas of commerce between individual sub-units and with outsiders. These are areas where the absence of a federal legal and political structure in China has resulted in fiscal difficulties, regional protectionism, suppression of minorities, lack of economic reliability for outside investors and lenders (often resulting in a surcharge), the suppression of information vital to corrective actions and corruption.

            In addressing these concerns independent federal courts are also important. Federal courts, if not under the thumb of regional officials, may serve the function of integrating the system and implementing federal guarantees, by reviewing regional and national laws and official actions for conformity to constitutional and other legal requirements. In a civil law country such as China, a separate federal constitutional court may be important for constitutional rights decisions and to police jurisdictional boundaries. Local provincial courts can also be employed to foster a commitment to local jurisdiction and laws, within appropriate constitutional constraints on recognition of the judgments emanating from other sub-units.

            While one may generalize about what institutions a federal system should include, the local historical conditions will undoubtedly shape the way forward. While some constitutional theorists have favored a clean break for newly democratizing countries, the social costs of such a course for China seems prohibitive. China’s piecemeal reforms noted above have already moved the system partially along in a federal and reformist and constitutionalists can take advantage of this. If one assumes, based on current circumstances, that reformers in China will attempt to get to federalism in an orderly fashion without fomenting a major crisis, then the current economic reforms, decentralization and moderate political and legal reforms may point the way forward. Democratization should clearly be part of this trajectory. In this regard, China has already instituted village elections and talks of expanding this to the county and provincial levels. But even at the village level a democracy deficit remains. There is still plenty of room for CCP or other elite interference and multi-party contest are not allowed. Recent surveys have shown that 60-70 percent of local officials in less developed provinces have a “tense” or “relatively tense” relationship with the people.[21] China might be well advised to reduce manipulation of outcomes by loosening associational freedoms and encouraging the formation of genuine opposition political parties. Media reports allege that applications in the late 1990s to register an opposition party, the China Democracy Party, were met with rejection and arrest.

            Under this gradual scenario it may be wise to initially retain the National People’s Congress (NPC) as the national legislative body, out of which the national government can be formed, though it may be better to decrease its size substantially below the approximately 3000 members it now has. Under the current system the NPC is formally chosen by people’s congresses at the provincial or equivalent levels in a pyramid-like structure. If democracy with direct competitive multi-party elections were instituted at the provincial level and the provincial assemblies still chose the national legislature there would be incentives for new parties to organize on a national level or form political alliances so as to acquire influence in the national body. Under the existing system the government is formally (if not in practice under the top-down system) subordinate to the NPC and a future democratic government could accordingly be formed by an NPC resulting from such provincial elections.

            China has made other institutional moves that would pave the way toward a federal democracy. It recently signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), indicating the possibility of a national commitment to basic rights and freedoms. In recent years there have also been proposals put forth for a constitutional court. Beyond this, a national court system already exist. A division of this system to create local provincial courts and federal courts could be considered. If the mainland government were merely to cut back the special status of the CCP and carry out all of these steps they would arrive at a position just short of formal federal democracy on the mainland.

            Once a national democratically elected body and minimal legal institutions were in place there would be time to consider more substantial formal constitutional steps toward federalism. This might include addressing such issues as, for example, the calling of a constitutional convention for further reform, bicameralism, reforming the legal and judicial systems, reducing the size of the NPC and alternative methods for forming future governments. Elected provincial assemblies could likewise take necessary steps toward reconstituting provincial governments. This may be the sensible route toward democratization on the mainland.

 

The Confederal Component

            The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic evolution in the role of the nation-state and in the structures and rights of international status and participation. Empires fell and various forms of territorial communities emerged to enjoy a form of territorial citizenship in the international system. At the same time there was a dramatic increase in private and other international activity beyond the immediate control of single states, sometimes referred to as globalization. In regard to the formal state system, since the end of World War II there has been a dramatic increase in the number of sovereign states. Such states have ranged from mammoth traditional empires, with one-fifth of the world’s population, such as China and India, to little island states of a few thousand citizens. The international or inclusive order has expanded to reduce the prerogatives of states, while the exclusive zone of internal affairs has contracted. More and more activity is subject to international control. At the same time, a number of non-state (not formally recognized as such) territorial communities such, as e.g. Palestine, Hong Kong and in some respects Taiwan, have emerged to enjoy considerable international status and participatory rights. Moreover, within states, constitutional rights of autonomy and local self- rule have become matters of international concern, if not yet significant international law. In this respect China’s peripheral communities have often been the subject of international solicitude and political pressure.

            In this emerging world system traditional nineteenth century positivist views of sovereign exclusivity have been replaced with increasing emphasis on participation in international forums and processes of decision. The mainland Chinese official view on the nature of the state and the boundaries between the exclusive prerogatives of the state and the inclusive international order stands in stark contrast to this emerging twenty-first century practice. Applying a nineteenth century legal positivist view of sovereignty, the Chinese government is prone to rebuff its critics by declaring its human rights practices or its treatment of domestic autonomous communities, such as Hong Kong, Tibet or Taiwan, as internal affairs. Nevertheless, there is evidence in practice of greater Chinese flexibility in this regard. China has begun to sign various international human rights treaties and enter into dialogue with other countries regarding human rights. At the same time, in practice, it has effectively internationalized the Hong Kong formula, by committing it to an international agreement upon which it invites its international partners to rely.

            In terms of solving problems in peripheral communities such as Taiwan and Tibet, both the evolving international system and China’s evolving more practical response to it offer space for constructing the potential meaning of an acceptable form of national unity that takes account of peripheral concerns. It would be useful for Beijing to recognize that affording an autonomous constituent community on its periphery a continuing degree of international effectiveness enables that community to have sufficient bargaining leverage to instill confidence in any agreed arrangement. With such confidence, the potential for conflicts and tensions between partners would be reduced. For leaders from Taiwan, or even Tibet, to agree to anything less would be irresponsible.

            Beyond the state-focused changes, the global non-state sector raises a whole range of new possibilities that shape choices in the international and national systems. This non-state global system also shapes the satisfaction of any peripheral community with any options offered. Taiwan’s satisfaction with the status quo is also shaped by these global conditions, as are its status options and effectiveness in a unified or reconstructed China. John Ruggie describes the global space in two dimensions: a non-territorial global functional space; and a space constituted by the emergence of new territorial collectives such as the European Union.[22] The non-territorial global space includes activities concerned with commerce, the environment, science, human rights, the arts, flows of information, and human society more generally. In its unification formula China precisely seeks to offer the local partner the power to conduct “external affairs” in this non-state global channel. In many respects, perhaps in part because of its exclusion from the formal state system, Hong Kong has become a super-player in the non-state global space.

            While states are but one constraint in this non-territorial global space, the ability of states to attract and regulate such activities depends on the reliability of their institutions. Communities such as Taiwan or Hong Kong, with sound institutions, may operate very effectively in the non-state global space. For this reason China’s ability to isolate Taiwan is limited and it would face considerable international pressure if it completely ignored its commitments to Hong Kong. Confidence in these communities already translates into advantages for China, to the extent that they make a considerable contribution to China’s economic development. Successfully harnessing these advantages for peripheral communities should be a part of any solution to these territorial conflicts and tensions.

            Ruggie’s other global notion of territorial collectives such as the European Union, may, as China’s political reforms progress, offer some vision for accommodating its diverse peripheral communities in ways that allow the desired security for any constitutional arrangements. Ruggie describes Europe as a “multiperspectival polity” that will likely continue to be multinational rather than constitutive of a single federal state. This suggests a confederal arrangement that can address common concerns and supply certain common public goods, while allowing a sufficient degree of international participation as security for collective arrangements.

            In a community of China’s size a confederal arrangement in relations between the mainland and select peripheral communities may offer certain advantages. Given long histories of common trade and collective security, an economic community and defense arrangements that respond to any particular anxieties of constituent members may be to the advantage of all. China’s offer of Taiwan maintaining its military defense reflects an acknowledgment of  Taiwan’s unique security concerns. International participation arrangements for confederal members could allow for substantial international status. The history of membership in international organizations (including continued European Union constituent membership in the United Nations) demonstrates a wide degree of latitude in this regard. There could even be variability in international status among China’s confederal members.

            In this sense, unification with respect to Taiwan ought not require the complete surrender of the prerogatives of statehood. Tibet and Hong Kong may likewise acquire some such status. These solutions should aim at the construction of a genuine Chinese community where confederal members can work together to define the parameters of common interests. Without the necessity of a hegemonic authoritarian center, as under the current unitary system, this formula may also permit greater interaction in the development of democracy and the rule of law. The interesting aspect of this is that by offering Taiwan the Hong Kong formula (which already includes some “external affairs” power), plus substantial self-defense and some foreign affairs rights, Beijing has moved substantially on the course toward this confederal formula. Beijing’s tough official stance on its unitary quality, on classic notions of statehood and sovereignty and on the boundaries of internal affairs serves to undermine its vision. China has long pursued policies of promising a high degree of autonomy to peripheral communities. If these policies were fully executed and adequately secured in the international stature of its constituent peripheral communities much of a confederal structure would be in place.

            Confederal arrangements commonly involve the coming together of territorial communities by consensual agreement. The purposes of confederation usually include commerce and trade, though other tasks such as, for example, security, defense, public health, human rights and monetary concerns may be included. Given the looseness of confederal arrangements, they usually emphasize both an internal and external role for constituent subunits. In regard to internal operation, the terms of consensus are usually subject to the unanimous agreement of the confederal partners, though this may be reduced to a supermajority requirement in a confederal representative body for more routine subjects, as time goes on and trust is built. The operative body for such consent may initially be composed of a council with a representative of each partner. A directly elected legislative assembly or parliament may be employed in advisory capacity, though the representative council is unlikely to concede its final authority. These representative bodies may be served by some executive authority or secretariat, to provide administrative services in the drafting and implementation functions.[23]

            Recent scholarship has especially emphasized the importance of a judicial organ for triadic dispute resolution and to implement and integrate confederal requirements. A confederal judicial role may encourage penetration of confederal law, both treaty and secondary law, into the domestic law of the subunits and produce a spill-over effect from the narrowly economic into other subject areas of law and politics.[24] This reduces the politicization of many issues and allows for incremental change. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) offers as a good model. The ECJ, by ordering the direct effect of community laws in national courts and allowing referral to the ECJ for preliminary rulings, has encouraged a system where self-interest operates to police the system and develop confederal jurisprudence. This has especially served to consitutionalize and integrate the European system. Furthermore, the routing of member state submissions to the European Commission before submission by the Commission to the ECJ tends to reduce conflict. To insure members of the court do not favor any one state the ECJ has employed a system providing for secrecy of deliberations and no dissenting opinions.

            Given the relative difference in size and socio-economic condition between the mainland and the smaller constituent communities of Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong, the institutions and substantive jurisdiction of the confederation might initially be simplified. An initial arrangement might confine itself to specifying and policing trade and investment rights. As the mainland democratized and liberalized its system, in ways noted above, and experienced further economic development, confederal jurisdiction might be expanded over new subjects or territory by consensus. The institutions initially might just involve a joint council, an executive authority, and a judicial body. The council would insure unanimous consent for any decisions and the staff of the authority could produce any regulatory material and reports requested. The authority could also investigate member official complaints before any submission to the judicial organ. The judicial organ could adjudicate such official complaints and private complaints referred from the subunit courts.  The latter could be referred for preliminary rulings on confederal requirements and jurisdictional conflicts. If the confederal requirements are directly enforceable by individuals in the courts then the confederal judicial body may contribute to the development of the rule of law in China’s subunit territories by offering authoritative interpretations of rights, jurisdictional and choice of law requirements in individual cases. Secrecy of deliberations and the non-use of dissenting opinions may likewise be employed to insulate judges from political pressure. If these arrangements work in ways satisfactory to the center and Taiwan then they can be considered as a basis for insuring autonomy in other peripheral communities.[25] Of course domestic development on the mainland of many of the democratic and federal institutions noted above will be essential to any serious commitment to these confederal institutions.

            The success of this formula and its acceptability to China’s peripheral communities will depend on political reform at the center. As discussed above in respect to Hong Kong, an authoritarian center with a liberal democratic peripheral community may produce intractable tensions and contradictions in the execution of political and territorial policy. In watching the Hong Kong policy unfold, Taiwan has certainly noticed the operative contradictions between an authoritarian center and Hong Kong’s liberal democratic aspirations. The specter of the mainland government’s all encompassing and constant resistance to democratic aspirations in Hong Kong will have produced considerable anxiety about any unification formula in Taipei. While for Tibet anything would be better than the status quo, ultimately addressing these same concerns is imperative.

 

Conclusion

            China seems to have reached a stage where restructuring to establish a combined federal and confederal system would go a long way to achieving its territorial goals and toward establishing confidence at home and abroad. Historically, a unitary state structure in China was more of a mechanism for autocratic regimes to sustain power and a measure of their success, not a deeply held cultural value that should be binding on a democratic China. The reform process is propelling China to reconsider this unitary paradigm. While a certain level of liberalization and inexpensive labor combined to successfully initiate China’s economic reforms two decades ago, much more will be required to sustain the developmental process in the twenty-first century. The central government in Beijing finds itself facing formidable pressures from different sources and in different forms, throughout the country, to reform its central authoritarian political practices and to open up structures of local and central governance, to achieve greater representation of diverse interests in a national system of order.

            For peripheral communities like Hong Kong, Tibet and Taiwan, Beijing’s resistance to their democratic aspirations is counterproductive. While the Hong Kong transition has enjoyed a substantial degree of success, the political problems that have been evident mirror those visible in different manifestations on a national scale. These problems with the reliability of the authoritarian center also plague the cross-straits relationship. Taiwan is bound to take notice of the fundamental political tension that plagues the Hong Kong case and is evident in local central relations throughout the country. On the Tibetan front, merely subjugating a peripheral community will, in the long term prove unacceptable to a China with democratic aspirations.

            Rather that an occasion for confrontation, this might better be an occasion for cooperation in finding solutions. Some of these solutions are evident in the emerging role that territorial communities of various types play in international political and economic processes. Solutions to the various problems within China discussed herein cannot be isolated from each other; nor can the ongoing practices of the outside world be ignored in negotiating effective solutions. With their peculiar status and the influence it brings, Hong Kong, Tibet and Taiwan can be very much a part of the process of negotiating solutions to the structural problems China faces.

             The problems discussed herein suggest that China is being propelled toward political reform and structural change. A confederal model encompassing Hong Kong, Tibet and Taiwan could contribute to China’s understanding of democracy and the rule of law. Such openly established confederal system with genuine empowerment in democracy at home and participation abroad can secure mutually beneficial relationships between Beijing and its peripheral communities. If handled in a timely manner, before more serious problems emerge, these solutions can strengthen the central system, while allowing security for peripheral and local communities. Without meaningful commitments of this nature it is doubtful that Taiwan would be willing to take the Hong Kong model seriously. For peripheral communities such as Hong Kong, Tibet and Taiwan, as an ultimate solution, wide-scale international participation can be to China’s advantage. Such model may ultimately offer solutions to conflicts that have emerged in the Western autonomous regions.

            Until China comes to grip with these structural issues it might be expected to pay a price in local and international confidence. The center finds itself asserting a degree of central control that thriving democracy would not allow and the peripheral and regional communities are asserting a degree of autonomy, and in some cases democracy, that authoritarianism will not allow. Without structural reform, China’s mainland regions are likely to continue to be plagued with problems of coordination and interest representation, making other political and legal reforms difficult. For communities such as Hong Kong, the tensions already evident in its relationship with an authoritarian center are likely to intensify and persist, as local democratization goes forward. For Taiwan the persistence of authoritarian practices at the center makes unification untenable. A subjugated Tibet will simply remain a thorn in China’s diplomatic flank. China’s international partners are likely to prudently continue their resistance to endorsing any mainland formula until these intractable problems are addressed, though they may continue to play a constructive role through international exchange.