Hung’s many books, and one suspects that at some points the concept of ruins was a fetter rather than a compelling thematic focus. What Wu Hung might have been seeking to elucidate is something grander than the history of ruins: behind this book, perhaps, is another, waiting to be written: a study of how human awareness of the passage of time was given form in Chinese art.

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Introduced by Wang Guowei’s 王國維 characterization of the turn of the twentieth century as the “age of discovery,” this impressive work is an account of the Chinese discovery of “Western knowledge.” Kurtz characterizes the process metaphorically as a change in the “discursive landscape,” loosely the “conversion” of intellectuals to the norms of Western philosophical thought. Western thinkers divided “thought” (學 xué learning not 心理 xīnlǐ psychology process) into philosophy and religion. By Wang’s “age,” it became a tripartite division including science. Of the three manifestations of “love of wisdom,” philosophers distinguished their thought using concepts of reason or logic vs. faith and experiment. Chinese “conversion” to the logical strain of thought began with religion advocates (Jesuits) was later made urgent by impacts of science (Western military technology) and completed by returned overseas students (Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Hu Shi 胡適 . . .).

Kurtz plots this “discursive” conversion by focusing on translation processes and outcomes. One cannot help but be struck by the parallel of the third century’s process of translating Buddhism and blending it into the Classical Chinese discursive landscape by a process barely accessible today. One could only wish for a similarly impressively detailed account of that prior Discovery!

Kurtz’s unpacks his ambiguous title as (1) Chinese discovery of (Western) logic and (2) Chinese discovery of Chinese logic. He addresses what I will call the historical issue, i.e. whether the change effected by the discovery of Western logic was necessary for the second discovery? I would restate (1) as the discovery of the strand of thought defined by the centrality of logic, i.e. Western philosophy and I would note that (2) begs a controversial philosophical question—was there Chinese logic? Or might the “discovery” be widely, but falsely, believed, an invention? The
historical and philosophical issues are intertwined and Kurtz faces his problem early and explicitly.

The emergence of a discourse on “Chinese logic”—a term used throughout this study to denote evidence of explicit logical theorizing in ancient Chinese texts, not of any peculiar Chinese ways of thinking. (p. 2)

Chinese thought may be logical without their having theorized about the norms of logic. Kurtz does not further spell out what logical theorizing is. Its subject matter is the proof (exemplified in pre-Socratic geometry) or argument. (The ambiguous English term also refers to quarrels.) An argument/proof consists of a series of sentences (propositions, statements, thoughts etc.) which we divide into premises and conclusions. The conclusion should follow from the premises. When it does, we call the argument valid. We understand validity mainly (e.g. in deductive logic) as a matter of form. Syntactic structures of the premises (classically described in terms of subject and predicate plus quantifiers all, none, and some, later including sentential connectives and, or, if . . . then and not) generate a more complex argument structure or form (conveniently represented symbolically—P \(\therefore\) Q; P \(\therefore\) Q). An argument form is valid if consistent substitution for the symbols yields a true conclusion whenever it yields all true premises. Logical theories elaborate and explain valid forms of reasoning in this sense of argument. Logically valid arguments are found many places in the classical philosophical texts. The philosophical question is whether a paragraph like this one can be found there.

Kurtz’s magnificent product is a stunningly rich and detailed historical study of scores of monographs, translations, books, texts, courses (lecture notes), and dictionaries from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century that sought to foster this flowering of Chinese intellectual interest and attraction to the Western philosophical branch of thought, hence to those concepts and conceptual structures informed and shaped by Western logical theory. The elaboration of a logical conception of reason informed Socratic method in Plato, Aristotelian syllogism and was continuously blended into Western understanding of mental faculties, e.g. deliberation, belief, desire, will, semantic notions like meaning and definition, metaphysical ideas and truth, and epistemological conceptions of knowledge, belief, and experience and even ethical theories of laws and principles & theology—proofs and disproofs of God. Kurtz’s nineteen tables of translations accordingly include many of these of logic-related concepts that cropped up in these Western works being rendered into Chinese.

He focuses on the problems of translation and the evolution and spread of translation choices. He starts the account with Jesuit missionaries trying to stimulate interest in Western thought as a means of converting Chinese to Christian religion in the seventeenth century. Then he turns to Wang’s “age of discovery” proper. A
related interest by protestant missionaries was given greater urgency when Western powers inflicted confidence damaging defeats on traditionalist Confucian China. The de-legitimization of Confucian intellectuals accompanied by growth of respect and appreciation of Western thought, he argues, only gradually spread through the Chinese “discursive landscape.” Similarly shattering defeats at the hands of Japan, which had more effectively adopted Western learning, led to educational reforms mimicking Japanese translations of logical and philosophical terms. It also led to students choosing Japan for their overseas studies then spreading their appreciation to other intellectuals.

This process led, famously, to adopting the Japanese translation for *philosophy* (哲學) as distinct from science and religion. That (and other of philosophical categories) became analytical tools with which to re-evaluate traditional Chinese thought. The model of philosophy led to sifting through classical thought to sort out the religious and science-like from the philosophical. This produced a shift in focus to the heterodox “Hundred Schools” that had been marginalized in Confucian accounts. The most immediately compelling examples of philosophy emerged in the most reviled schools of Mohism and the “School of Names” with their explicit and undeniable focus on linguistic analysis.

A related but less prominent effect was a rekindling of interest in the more philosophically guided reflections found within parts of Buddhism. In theory, of course, Kurtz’s account could have started with Indo-European Buddhism which shares both some of the related concepts (*truth, idea, reason*) and vague echoes of Aristotelian syllogistic. That would represent the epistemic rupture more accurately than treating Buddhist *Yin-ming* 因明 logic as another “native” system alongside the Classical discourse on names and reality.

Kurtz’s title focus on *logic*, then, is both a convenient shorthand and a way to narrow the scope of his massive and exhausting survey. It works precisely because Western logical theory does play a particularly central role in Western philosophical thought. Its mastery by Chinese intellectuals would be pivotal to their understanding other concepts and theories. Difficulties in translation were manifest in stutters, false starts, inaccessibility, inconsistency, variation, and inelegance of attempts along the way. This struggle illustrates the difficulty of the “translation and naturalization” of the concepts of Western logic which was in turn required for the “discovery of what we have since come to understand as its Chinese counterpart” (p. 10). Kurtz characterizes this struggle as an “epistemic rupture,” a discontinuity in Chinese thought. His historical opponents take such talk as anathema. They either ignore or understate the struggle to find correct translation in their rival accounts of the alleged “discovery.”

Kurtz’s historical thesis seemingly takes the philosophical issue as settled. Chinese thought had logic, lost their access to it, then learned Western logic and using
that rediscovered what they had lost. His opponents deny that it was lost or that it
needed the internalization of Western logic to be rediscovered. The philosophical
issue raises a third possibility. The alleged rediscovery is mis-described due to over-
enthusiasm combined with an agenda of finding Chinese origins of Western things
deemed valuable and wise. Chinese writers thought *logically* but never about the
subject matter of logic, logical theory, or its theory-laden concepts. This possibility
motivated the stricture Kurtz had laid down above.

In the late twentieth century, Western *analytic* philosophy’s self-conception
would also have included theory of language—particularly semantics. We may
discover logical arguments about genuinely philosophical (e.g. semantic) topics
although the concepts and structure of those arguments are not products of an earlier
knowledge of or commitment to any theory of logically valid argument structures.
So we may find in disputed *philosophy* where we do not find “logical theory.” The
*Analects* 13:3 says “if names are not rectified then language will not flow” (Not A
then not B) and continues Not B then not C; Not C then not D; Not D then not E and
leaves implicit the conclusion: Not A then not E. That is a valid argument form and
may make an interesting philosophical claim about names, though no one at the time
could have characterized the passage as a “valid argument” or formulated the norm
of validity it follows—or even formulated the observation that the argument had a
suppressed conclusion. Kurtz correctly uses appropriate caution in formulating the
second *discovery*—as he does above. It could be expressed with more confidence as
we have discovered *philosophy* among Chinese teachings—e.g. theory of knowledge,
language, heart-mind, ethics, politics, where the concepts used need not be elaborated
in terms of *proof*, *valid*, *premise*, *truth*, or *sentence structure*.

Kurtz’s introduction surveys mainly the relevant textual materials from the more
heterodox Hundred Schools that were both a major target of the second “discovery”
and crucial material evidence of philosophical issues in Classical Chinese. Kurtz
observes, however that the obviously non-religious interest in semantic issues from the
Classical period was buried under the moral condemnation of Confucian orthodoxy.
The upshot creates the central puzzle of Kurtz’s analysis. When Western philosophy
was being discovered in the seventeenth century and later in the nineteenth, no one
even hinted at any continuity between the core of Western philosophy and the ancient
Chinese studies of names. The alien classification of the subject persisted until the
collapse of the imperial order and the adoption of a new intellectual tool-kit—the
translations used in rendering Western logic, epistemology metaphysics, syntax, etc.
This conceptual tool-kit was used then to find and extract the philosophical lode
buried within neglected schools of traditional Chinese thought.

The following chapters then fill out details of the translation process. Kurtz
surveys in Chapter one several publications from the seventeenth-century Jesuits,
constructs tables of their translations of Western (essentially Medieval Aristotelian
analytics) and speculates on the significance of what he treats with some reservations as a failed attempt at conveying the upshot of logic to the Chinese world. On the positive side, he argues, the Jesuit attempt “proved that the conceptual lexicon of European logic could be represented in Chinese terms by sufficiently imaginative translators and, thus, that the transmission of logic was not hampered . . . by a general incommensurability of Chinese and Western languages or ways of thinking” (p. 7). He puts the same point later with a critical addition, they “proved beyond doubt that it was possible to find or create a language to represent logical notions in Chinese, even though the translators were unable to identify an indigenous context that would help them or their prospective readers to situate the subject” (p. 87).

The juxtaposition of theoretical possibility and practical failure in translation is his key sub-theme of the historical project but a seemingly discordant one. The philosophical issue is whether there was such an indigenous context in which to situate the subject. If not, the optimistic possibility boils down to the ability to invent and introduce new words into Chinese. Finding correct counterparts of logic-theory-laden words in Chinese presupposes the existence of the Chinese theory in which they have a similar use. Otherwise, the arbitrary new creations would make sense only for those who have already mastered the Western subject matter.

Then in Chapter two, Kurtz tackles the nineteenth-century Protestant attempts in the wake of the explosion of Western military might to spread their “enlightenment” faith and its conception of knowledge—here less centred on deductive logic than on empiricist epistemology (scientific method) with its philosophy of ideas, vision, and perception, and with an emphasis on “inductive” reasoning from empirical foundations (experience) to knowledge. This formed a cornerstone of fashionable enlightenment age “natural religion” with its reliance on the argument from design. Thus he notes the sciences they emphasized were chemistry, earth sciences, and physics but pointedly did not include Darwin (nor presumably Hume’s classic Dialogues on Natural Religion). Deductive logic “ranked near the bottom of their agenda” (p. 94).

The translations included an actual logic primer (tr. Joseph Edkins) and a book on philosophy of mind/psychology (tr. Yan Yongjing 顏永京) which used logic in explaining human psychology (laws of thought in its second sense above). Kurtz faults the former’s translations for relying on paraphrases or not using prior translations (e.g. from the Jesuits) while the latter did attempt to coin meaningful two character equivalents. Both acknowledged the impossibility of straightforward translation—contradicting strong versions of the optimistic sub-theme. They take these alternative routes to translation precisely because there are no correct translations in Chinese language—since there is no equivalent subject matter in Chinese thought.

Kurtz doesn’t object to this diagnosis nor revise his possibility theme. That theme thus appears a rather trivial one—new terms can be introduced into Chinese
language in various ways. It says nothing about the existence of an “indigenous context” in which the correct Chinese translation of logical notions have their home. Kurtz doesn’t repeat this earlier criticism but does credit Yan pragmatically for using the same neologism consistently for the English as well as for introducing an orthographic convention marking a phrase as referring to an English term. The former is a virtue only the English term is not ambiguous or used equivocally—consider how one should translate the ambiguous argument correctly. The convention does not unpack the ambiguity as a paraphrase would, but does valuably remind the reader that this term inserts a foreign concept into the Chinese flow. He also credits translators, somewhat curiously, for anticipating later nomenclature (the ones that people eventually catch-on to and continue to use) and criticizes lack of “a clearly defined translation strategy” (p. 123), a charge I don’t fully understand.

One might observe that it is hard to predict which words will catch on while others do not—it might rarely be that the term is an accurate rendering of a Western logical concept. But it is hardly an indication of a “correct” translation in the sense of “having the same meaning.” Edkins’s choice, attempting to insert definitions (paraphrases) works if his definitions are correct. However they are unlikely to the kinds of things that “catch one” in a linguistic community the way a word might. It’s not clear that should be a criticism.

The final writer, John Fryer, of the period did attempt to write an original treatise on Logic for Chinese culture. All had limited impact, Kurtz argues, because the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats “remained in control” of the intellectual space (p. 8). With China’s defeats at the turn of the century, especially at the hands of the Japanese who had adopted Western science and technology more readily, this Confucian domination collapsed.

Chapter three starts with this loss of legitimacy and the ensuing search for new sources of certainty. Kurtz highlights Yan Fu 嚴復 as the central spokesman for adopting the new intellectual approach and the entire chapter is devoted to his activities both as a translator and popularizer of “logic.” Yan taught that logic inspired science through definition and thus amounted to the “Science of Names.” “According to Yan Fu, the first necessary step prescribed by logic was to link perceptions and empirical data through clearly defined ‘names’” (p. 156). Yan did understand deduction but scientific induction based on definitions remained his central focus. So the most successful advocate of logic was actually promoting the scientific method of induction and dismissive of the central subject matter of logical theory—the study of forms of valid deduction.

Chapter four details the acceleration of this process of discursive change incorporating logic training into the university curriculum using translations of Japanese textbooks. The official Qing policy followed the slogan of Chinese substance
Western function. Logic’s perceived role in Western science protected it under the conservative formula relative to the bulk of Western philosophy. The Japanese translation alternatives accompanying this curricular change completed the Chinese tool-kit that is still ushering in this new age of Chinese intellectual history. The Japanese terms, famously and paradigmatically, included the totally new terms 哲學 zhé-xué philosophy and 邏輯 luó-jí logic into Chinese discourse. The importation of logic floundered for lack of competent teachers—an analysis summed up with a charming anecdotal account from Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 of his struggles with the subject.

The policy did result in a frenzy of publication of logic texts. Translations of Japanese dominated the choices despite the prior history of Chinese attempts. Kurtz notes that the use of Japanese translation choices is explained by the speed and ease of simply including their kanji rather than translating. They acknowledged that Japanese understanding of Western philosophy and logic represented more mature insights than did the prior Chinese renderings. It was partly a result of Japan’s display of effective power in the wake of its more rapid adaptation of a Western-dominated modernity.

He then turns to the highlight, as usual, the translation issues. Kurtz traces many of the in’s and out’s of the heated disputes about translation (most interestingly arguments for using transliterations like 邏輯 luoji for logic vs. novel compound terms that have no prior meaning in Chinese though the components may be insightfully related—哲學 zhexue (sagacious learning) for philosophy and the importance of aesthetic considerations in translation. The upshot of this very involved and rich chapter is that the Japanese translations dominated what have become accepted translations particularly in those officially favoured areas of philosophy that are related to scientific learning, such as logic.

Chapter five then details writings that turn this vocabulary and appreciation of Western philosophy back to the project of giving new accounts of the philosophically more reflective thinkers from the classical period. This “discovery,” Kurtz correctly notes, is partly textual—specifically aided by the recovery of the textual keys to ordering the Mohist “Canon” and linking it to their “Explanations.” It is also partly the shift in perspective effected by intellectuals having gradually accepted the value of Western philosophical rigour and analysis. Kurtz addresses who should be credited with this discovery then looks for similar possible claimants in Japan. Finally, he considers under separate subheads four important Chinese advocates of the existence of classical “Chinese logic.”

All seem to confuse logic with semantics, philosophy of mind, and/or epistemology and seldom include evidence of logical theory vs. examples of reasoning which is logically describable. Kurtz is quite even-handed, records and even highlights when his sources are sceptical of the philosophical thesis. What Kurtz shows
is that Western philosophy’s self-understanding introduced analytic tools which were 
used to reinvigorate the understanding of classical Chinese philosophy liberating it 
from Confucian quasi-religious orthodoxy. The reference to logic is slightly mis-
leading.

Despite clear restatements from nearly all the principals that, while they find 
epistemic and semantic analysis in various texts, they find no logical theory in the 
sense Aristotle had a logical theory, Kurtz asserts in his summary, that all found 
“explicit evidence of logical theorizing” (p. 335) seemingly violating his earlier com-
mitment to avoid conflating logical theory with examples of logically valid theorizing 
on other subjects, e.g. epistemology and semantics.

An epilogue then notes that his account of the translation process is but a 
“genealogy” of that process from which he hopes we can gain some meaningful 
insight (p. 339). We must all respect and value the contribution the detailed account 
gives—particularly when it gives us the arguments we can use to challenge the au-
thor’s historical and philosophical analysis. This is the mark of truly the best his-
tory and a sound reason to recommend it enthusiastically to those interested in the 
modern intellectual history of China.

I enthusiastically agree with the author’s historical agenda, but with this nuanced 
wish that his “reserved” statement of the philosophical thesis (there was logical 
theory in China) were more consistent. He targets mostly his historical opponents in 
the epilogue. He contrasts his epistemic rupture view with that of the Marxist school 
which he describes as emphasizing continuity. Then, however, he goes on to criticize 
all his contributors from Matteo Ricci to Hu Shi as being in the grip of “Western 
dominated discourse.” “It seems to me that they have not yet radically enough 
questioned the way in which the history of Chinese logic has come to be written. One 
reason for their reluctance to raise even more fundamental objections may be that 
they share with their opponents certain basic assumptions about the nature of logic, 
the forms in which it is expressed, and the purpose of writing its history” (pp. 353– 
62). In the final five pages, he spells out his proposal for how to restart the study 
Chinese logic, i.e. by tracing what now and historically makes Chinese people in 
general (judges, examiners, etc.) accept certain claims, reasons, analogies, persuasive 
devices, etc.

I reiterate my strong recommendation of his richly detailed account of a fasci-
nating historical process of translation that informed a huge swath of modern Chinese 
intellectual history.

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