Beyond Identity and Alterity? – From Heidegger’s Viewpoint

WANG Wen-Sheng (National Chengchi University, Taipei)

I. The extension of Husserl’s conception of the “transcendental” from an epistemological to an ontological sense

It is well known that Husserl’s conception of life-world has caused many discussions about identity or alterity among our different cultures. Is there a certain universal ontology of life-world (CM §51) as the ground for our manifold life-worlds? Can we attain this universal ontology of life-world by way of an eidetic intuition regarding material conditions in our factual life? Such questions are further related with these following considerations: How can we, despite coming from and living in different traditional cultures, understand ourselves and each other? Is there a basis for such an understanding? Should the basis be that universal ontology of life-world or any one universal essence among our different cultures? Or is our understanding ourselves and each other not based on an identity, but on an alterity in our life-worlds? Maybe we need lastly another basis for understanding, namely tolerance and respect. So this universal one is something not outside, but inside, namely immanent for us.

Transcendental subjectivity is for Husserl universal. Does the transcendental subjectivity imply some meanings like tolerance or respect? It is an old issue that under the radical performing of epoché it is not the transcendental ego, but the immanent time-consciousness which remains the last residuum (Ideen I 182). Related to this time-consciousness, the concept of “Ur-Ich” comes up for discussion and one of its meanings is revealed as the inner intersubjectivity (Held 156). Here,
we will not discuss in detail whether the problem of intersubjectivity can be solved through the way of investigating the concept of the “Ur-Ich” or through another way. But we know that the condition of empathy (Einfühlung), of which Husserl earlier already spoke, and the condition of any of his later conception of intersubjective understanding really lay in something immanent. Only this “something immanent” is finally illustrated in the genetic or ontological sense.

What does this “something immanent” mean and how can it be the genetic or ontological sense? I want to explain it through the term of “transcendental”. It is well known that for Husserl the transcendental subjectivity serves for the foundation of validity (Geltungsfundierung). The validity refers to every thing and matter in the world. A valid thing means a true one, and it means that this thing is given as itself in our consciousness. The theory of intentionality, which characterizes the consciousness, shows that Husserl in principle follows the truth theory of correspondence. But he doesn’t stick to this conventional, epistemological truth theory. The later Husserl provides us with an ontological truth theory.

At first, the condition of the epistemological truth just lies in the identical pure ego which is conscious of something. This intentional performance of the pure ego is active. But when Husserl later investigates the conditions of the pure ego and the active consciousness, for example a perception, he uncovers a field of the transcendental subjectivity. In this field, a passive intentionality is ongoing. Regarding this field, Husserl takes some topics like time-consciousness, kinesthetic consciousness, intersubjectivity, life-world and history etc. as the very issues for understanding the subjectivity in genetic or ontological sense. This field of subjectivity is on the one hand transcendental, on the other hand ontological. The concept of “transcendental” is extended from an epistemological to an ontological sense. What does it mean?

With the investigation of the condition of the identical pure ego, Husserl reveals how the pure ego is constituted. It is namely constituted as an identical ego out of all real and possible lived
experiences (Erlebnisse). Every lived experience is located at a “hic et nunc” in a whole consciousness stream. When we turn our attention from the level of the identical ego to the level of the stream, we find out a kernel of this stream called the Ur-Ich or the living present. This stream is extended from the living present in boundless time and space to all the other parts which are grounded upon the living present. But it is just from the epistemological point of view that the living present serves for the foundation of validity (Geltungsfundierung) for all implicit lived experiences.

When we turn to the ontological point of view, we know what is grounded and explicated upon the living present stayed in the background of the living present before. But this implicit background serves as the condition of the possibility of an explicit experience. I would like to say that the explicit experience here is carried out from the living present, not from the identical pure ego. Although Husserl already in the Ideen I spoke about the consciousness-background (Bewußtseinshintergrund), he didn’t see this inactive background as the condition of an active consciousness. He just said that the consciousness-background belongs to the essence of the consciousness. For this consciousness pertains to the identical pure ego. The pure ego statically covers the whole consciousness (Ideen I § 35). This thinking is modified in Husserl’s later period. Since the background now serves for the genetic foundation (Genesisfundierung) of an active experience, the latter must sit at a different time location than the former. We turn our attention to these both sides from the level of the pure ego to the level of the field of the transcendental subjectivity over which the living present is to extend. So the implicit background serves as the genetic condition of the possibility of the living present.

In other words, the living present is on the one hand adequately evident (CM § 9), and this is from the epistemological viewpoint. On the other hand, and from the genetic viewpoint, that evidence must be presented by its background. The living present will bring the background in the foreground. But this process is endless. What is in the background can not all be brought into the
foreground. We must even accept that an ontological ground-figure (background-foreground) structure always lies before any epistemological activity, which brings the implicit part into light (APS 130-141). We can not get away from this ontological sphere. The issue of life-world is important, not because the life-world is an unavoidable part to which we face in the natural attitude before we establish sciences, but because the life-world can be just expressed as that ontological ground-figure structure which can never be reduced to the living present. The life-world is a part of transcendental subjectivity and lets the whole transcendental subjectivity in its epistemological character be enriched with the ontological character.

This reminds me of two sections in the Krisis where regarding the problem of “paradox of the subjectivity – the subject is in and for the world” the problem of the living present is once again discussed. This discussion aims to solve that paradox, because the intersubjectivity is implied in the transcendental subjectivity and a radical performance of epoché could bring this implication to light; the intersubjectivity is constituted by the living present. But the process of a radical reduction from the intersubjectivity to the living present is, so says Husserl, very difficult. We may say this process is endless, because the ontological ground-figure structure always stands before the epistemological activity of reduction (Krisis §§ 53-54).

We know also that in the Cartesian Meditations the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity is to be solved with the theme of “pairing (Paarung)” (CM §§ 51-56). The pairing reflects the ontological ground-figure structure. The constitution of intersubjectivity is ongoing in the genetic phenomenology. Namely our understanding ourselves and each other is based on an ontological co-existent situation which covers ourselves and others. But what is that ontological situation? Do we in view of such a situation speak of tolerance, respect or even love? In this paper, a detailed discussion can’t be carried out. Regarding this question, I want only to indicate some points: 1) Husserl’s conception of pairing shows that our understanding ourselves and each other is based on the ontological structure made up of two counterparts: me and the other. 2) It points to an
ontological foundation of Husserl’s earlier epistemological truth theory.

So as we have said, Husserl’s truth theory is to be transformed from the epistemological to the ontological sense. The transcendental subjectivity, which once served as the condition of the epistemological truth, is now extended in an ontological sense. The ontological ground-figure structure is to be accepted as the last foundation of the truth. From the above discussion, we can conclude that the term of “transcendental” is explicated not only in the epistemological, but also in the ontological sense. And in regard of this, I am going to leave Husserl and turn to Heidegger, for the latter conceives the “transcendental” in an ontological sense too.

II. Heidegger’s conception of “transcendental” in an ontological sense

Heidegger also extends and deepens the epistemological truth theory in the ontological one and investigates the genetic conditions of the former truth theory. The ontological genesis of the epistemological truth theory like that of correspondence is in detail explicated (SZ § 44). In other words: The epistemological truth grounds on the ontological truth. But we have already heard of this from later writing of Husserl. What is then the similarity and difference regarding this point between Heidegger and Husserl? A simple answer to this question is: Husserl’s ontology would be based on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. When an ontological truth in general means the condition of truth is not subjectivity, but in the world, then the assertion of the ontological truth indeed gives priority to the world. But Husserl and Heidegger just conceive two different relationships between man and the world. The former thinks the subject must struggle from being in the world to being for the world, while the latter emphasizes Dasein as Being-in-the-world. This difference results in that the world which Husserl constitutes is not the same as the world which Heidegger discloses.

Now in view of the theme of this paper and according to Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, I want to explain the two different worlds in another way: the world regarding the significations
(Bedeutungen) and the world regarding the meaning of Being (Seinssinn). Within the former world, Heidegger would discuss the problem of identity or alterity among our different cultures in a manner that approaches Husserl’s way. In view of the latter world, what Heidegger concerns stands beyond any identity or alterity among our cultures. This idea could finally help resolve some critical questions about identity and alterity.

I refer the terms “identity and alterity” to the cultures and put the cultures in relation with the world of significations. While regarding the meaning of Being, the world would be beyond or transcend the sphere of cultures. For me, there is a special term of “identity” in view of the meaning of Being which transcends any identity and alterity among our cultures. This new concept of “identity” is absolute, while our conception of the “identity and alterity” referring to the world of significations is always relative. I want to first discuss this idea in detail according to Heidegger’s ontological conception of “transcendental”, but by way of a new interpretation of the concept “transcendental” in Husserl’s philosophy:

a) As the pure ego was for Husserl the epistemological foundation of validity, the transcendental character of the pure ego meant that this ego is free from the world which we live in. The foundation of the world must be found out beyond the world itself. But this “beyond” or “transcendental” pertains to the second order, although it is in the authentic sense. What is the first order and inauthentic concept of “transcendental”?

We do not live in the world only in the way of “hic et nunc”, but also in the way of memory and expectation. We do not only have simple sensual intuition, but have fantasy or imagination which refers to something beyond the “hic et nunc”. This “beyond” is the first order of the term “transcendental”. Owing to it, we can temporarily escape from the real now. Yet how can I be aware that this is merely “temporarily escape”? How can I namely make a difference between reality and fantasy? By means of the authentic transcendental ability! I mean that to be the Husserlian pure ego
or the Kantian transcendental apperception which, as Kant says, must be able to accompany (ap-) all representations (perceptions) (*KdrV* B 132). With this apperception, I am aware of what and that I perceive. In order to explain the transcendental ability of differentiating reality and fantasy sufficiently, we must turn our attention to Husserl’s theory of the immanent time. So the reason why the pure ego serves for the foundation of validity relies on a deep investigation of the pure ego itself – on the uncovering of the field of the transcendental subjectivity.

Indeed, the living present functions as the first evident basis for the continuous extension of time and space. According to the extension of time for example, the living present is made of the original impression, retention and protention (*ZB* 34, 35, 38, 100). We follow some rule or type among them, which guides us to know or to do something in a continuous way. We can differentiate what is real or fantastic by means of our lived experiences, so that something which is real stands in a continuous, typical relationship with the original impression, but a fantastic image doesn’t. So the ground of the authentic transcendental ability, by which we can judge whether we are in reality or fantasy, lies in the field of the transcendental subjectivity. In this field, as we have said, the transcendental character is extended from the epistemological to the ontological sense. It means that the pure ego presupposes the living present which on its side presupposes the figure-ground structure. The latter ontological structure serves for the genetic foundation for our judgment of reality or fantasy, and for our knowledge. The ontological structure always transcends the living present. This is the “transcendental” character in an ontological sense.

**b)** When Husserl asks the question about the genetic foundation of the pure ego, Heidegger poses a similar question about Kantian “conditions of possibility” of the Being of nature. He thinks the foundation of these conditions as understanding (Verstehen) which has the character of projection (Entwurf). The projection constitutes the Being-in-the-world in view of the disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of its Da (there) as Da of “potentiality (possibility) for Being” (Seinkönnen) (*SZ* 145; *BT* 185). So Heidegger brings the concept of the “transcendental” beyond the Kantian sense,
and refers to the term of “possibility” not merely in a (formal and transcendental) logical sense, but also in an existential sense.

This existential possibility is the most original determination of Dasein. I must point out that it has to do with the ontological determination of Dasein. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger interprets the existential-ontological Dasein as care (Sorge). The three moments of the care-structure - “in-already-being-in…” (im-schon-sein-in…), “Being alongside…” (Sein-bei…), and “Being-ahead-of-itself” (Sich-vorweg-sein) (SZ 191-192; BT 235-236) – reflect the existential possibilities of Dasein. We know also those moments correspond with the three fundamental ontological characters of Dasein: existentiality (projection), facticity (thrownness), and Being-fallen (SZ 191; BT 235). These are different ways and grades pertaining to Dasein as the possible Being (SZ 144; BT 183-184). I want to say that it is the ecstatic character of Dasein, and this is what I mean to be Heidegger’s conception of the “transcendental”.

In Husserl we have seen the inauthentic and the authentic transcendental abilities. We said the former causes fantasy or error; the latter differentiates reality and fantasy, or brings forth knowledge. These two abilities or possibilities of Husserl were separate, but now are combined in the care structure of Dasein. So Heidegger says: Because Dasein is his Da in the understanding, he can lose himself and make an error. And Dasein can find himself again in his possibility, especially the possibility of the free Being for his ownmost possibility for Being (ibid.). But this difference between Husserl and Heidegger results from their different phenomenological method.

Husserl’s performance of the epoché originally aims at obtaining the authentic transcendental possibility. In the development of his philosophy, he finds that the authentic transcendental possibility certainly comes from the pure ego, but the pure ego must submit itself to the epoché. In the sequel of its performance, as we have said, not only the living present, but also the genetic ground-figure structure emerge. Due to the uncovering of this genetic foundation, we find the
authentic transcendental possibility lastly is grounded on the ontological, if not yet the inauthentic transcendental ability. Husserl wants to exclude the general positing of the natural attitude, and any judgment about the spatio-temporal factual being. But he must accept such a radical exclusion is not successful. He would acknowledge that not excluding, but a certain awareness of the factual being (now by Husserl is the ground-figure structure) can bring forth the authentic transcendental possibility. Now, this closed relationship between facticity and possibility just shows in Heidegger’s philosophy.

I want to stress again that in Heidegger the essential character of the Dasein’s structure lies in the combination of facticity, Being fallen and existentiality. Heidegger sees the exclusion of the former two moments can’t simply generate the latter one. On the contrary, an existential awareness of the former just helps bring forth the latter. This awareness refers to the former two moments situated in a privation of the latter as possibility for Being. The privation urges the motivation to recover the possibility of Being. The concept “privation” becomes the keyword for Heidegger’s ontological transcendental thinking. According to the keyword “privation”, we will discuss how the world of significations can be transcended toward the world of meaning. And regarding the world of significations, identity and alterity are each other relatively determined; in view of the world of meaning, we could have a concept of “identity” in an absolute sense. The topic of “death” becomes the essential part of the following discussion.

III. From the world of significations toward the world of meaning

The double concept of world, world of significations and world of meaning in Sein und Zeit, is the same as another double concept, world as category and world as existential (SZ 88; BT 121). Heidegger’s analysis of the encountered being in our environment certainly provides us with profound knowledge about the world, but this descriptive analysis is only his insight about our factual world. Besides that, Heidegger discloses the “worldhood” (Weltlichkeit), the phenomenon of
world, which he sometimes expresses with quotation marks as “world” (“Welt”). We understand this as such a world, which transcends the world of significations, and which is the world of existentiality or projection.

What Heidegger at first describes, is the character and the status of our environmental beings. They are some things ready-to-hand (Zuhandene), and have the character of tool/equipment (Zeug), which is always “something in order to something” (etwas, um zu …). The one equipment is assigned to (verweist auf) the other equipment. A totality of equipments has the structure of “in order to” (Um-zu) (SZ 68; BT 97). The Being of some things ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment (Verweisung). The character of that Being is involvement (Bewandtnis), namely, with something by something. Heidegger gives an example: with the hammer as thing ready-to-hand, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection “is” for the sake of (um-willen) providing shelter for Dasein, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being (um eine Möglichkeit seines Seins willen) (SZ 84; BT 116).

For Heidegger, the totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit) itself goes back ultimately to the Being of Dasein, but not to anything ready-to-hand within the world, otherwise, there would be a further involvement. The Being of Dasein is the ultimate “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worum-willen) (SZ 84; BT 116). In this sense, the in-order-to-which follows the guidance of the for-the-sake-of-which. We have said, Heidegger describes at first the factual assignment and involvement of our environmental beings. With this description, he certainly indicates that towards-which (Wozu) is followed by those involvements, and the primary towards-which is the Being of Dasein as the for-the-sake-of-which. But besides this described factual world, how can Heidegger disclose the world of meaning or world as existential? Here the issue of understanding (Verstehen) the world plays the key role.
Understanding the world is “the previous disclosure of that for which what we are encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed” (das vorgängige Erschließung dessen, woraufhin die Freigabe des innerweltlichen Begegnenden erfolgt) (SZ 86; BT 118). This is also “understanding such things as letting something be involved” (Verstehen von so etwas wie Bewendenlassen). But wherein (worin) is the understanding? Heidegger points out this “wherein” is “that for which one lets entities (beings) be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvement” (das Woraufhin des Begegnenlassen von Seiendem in der Seinsart der Bewandtnis), and this is just “the phenomenon of the world”; further, the structure of the phenomenon of the world makes up the “worldhood” of the world (ibid.).

We see at other places in Sein und Zeit: The worldhood itself belongs to Dasein’s state of Being (Seinsverfassung) (SZ 84; BT 116), and the worldhood of the world is “the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities (beings) within-the-world to be discovered at all”. (SZ 88; BT 121) We must also pay attention: The worldhood is an existential determination of Dasein, while beings within-the-world, including things ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, can certainly only belong to the Being as category, but they should follow the guidance of the existential Being, the worldhood. (ibid.) What Heidegger takes as the character which the relationships of assigning possess, namely the signifying (Be-deuten), should be guided with the Being of Dasein. Further, a relational totality of the signifying is called “significance” (Bedeutsamkeit). (SZ 87; BT 120)

In regard to this word “significance”, I come back to differentiate the two already mentioned terms: “signification” and “meaning”. “Signification” (Bedeutung) means what beings within-the-world in their relationships signify and express. Not only things ready-to-hand with the in-order-to character, but also things present-at-hand possess significations. “Meaning” (Sinn) pertains specifically to Being and is the ultimate towards-which or the for-the-sake-of-which of the in-order-to. We have learned from Sein und Zeit that understanding the Being relies on our
interpreting meaning, time is the key meaning of Being, and Heidegger shows us nothing but the Time as meaning of the Being. So significations follow the guidance of the meaning. But only regarding the possibility of the Being of Dasein, meaning can be either authentic or inauthentic. We must further uncover our ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to disclose and express the authentic meaning of Being.

We have said that Heidegger describes at first the factual world. When we consider the Being of Dasein as condition of those beings within-the-world whose Being is not kind of which Dasein possesses, we consider namely the in-order-to-which follows the guidance of the for-the-sake-of-which, or the totality of involvements follows the guidance of the worldhood of the world, it doesn’t mean Dasein has already transcended his facticity in the world. So Heidegger says: “In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an ‘in-order-to’, and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which it may be either authentic or inauthentic” (Im Verstehen des genannten Bezugszusammenhangs hat sich das Dasein aus einem ausdrücklich oder unausdrüchlich ergriffenen, eigentlichen oder uneigentlichen Seinkönnen, worumwillen es selbst ist, an ein Um-zu verweisen.)(SZ 86; BT 119) The concept of “the worldhood of world” provides a possibility for us to think how we can transcend the world of significations toward the world of meaning, or better: transcend the world of inauthentic meaning toward the world of authentic meaning.

In Über den Humanismus, Heidegger explains again the term “Being-in-the-world” and especially what “world” and “the worldly” (das Weltliche) mean. He says: “‘World’ does not in any way imply earthly as opposed to heavenly being, nor the ‘worldly’ as opposed to the ‘spiritual’. For us ‘world’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of Being (Offenheit des Seins).” (ÜH 40; LH 252) “As the ek-sisting one, man stands out into the openness of Being”. “Thought in term of ek-sistence, ‘world’ is in a certain sense precisely ‘the beyond’ within existence
and for it (das Jenseitige innerhalb der und für die Existenz).” (ibid.)

The thinking in this work reminds me of what I have said before, that within the essential structure of Dasein, the moments “facticity and Being fallen” can bring forth the moment “existentiality”. This process is characterized by self-transcending. As both wherein (Worin) and that-for-which (Woraufhin), the worldhood is disclosed as a field of the self-transcending of Dasein. When we speak of the world of significations or the world of inauthentic and authentic meaning, we just make an analysis and abstraction from the unified and total worldhood. But instead of doing the abstraction, we are concerned with how the transcending within the field of the total worldhood is ongoing and how far the transcending reaches. But what does the totality of the worldhood mean? Is it not related to the discussion of the totality (Ganzheit) of Dasein in *Sein und Zeit*? Does Heidegger not take the topic of “death” as the way to grasp the totality of Dasein and as result the authentic Being of Dasein?

IV. “Being-towards-Death” as motivation to recover the world of authentic meaning

I want to first restate my thesis: an ontological awareness of the privation of the Being urges the motivation to recover the Being. I have said the concept “privation” is the keyword for Heidegger’s ontological transcendental thinking. We find, for example, Heidegger differentiates “appearance” (Erscheinung) from “semblance” (Schein). We must focus on the following statement of Heidegger: “Appearing is not-showing-itself. But the ‘not’ we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative ‘not’ which we used in defining the structure of semblance”. (*SZ* 29; *BT* 52) A privative “not” is an ontological awareness of what is in shortage and wanted. What is wanted is still there, but only in an absent form. Aristotele called it “steresis”. Steresis is the absent form of eidos (*Aristoteles* 1069b 34f.). Due to the ontological (not epistemological) awareness of this privation, what was absent can be recovered. So “phenomenon” can be recovered from “semblance”, but not from “appearance”.

13
In my view, Heidegger takes the topic of “death” just to discuss the above mentioned “awareness”, so that the authentic Being can be recovered from the inauthentic Being. The process of the recovery can be motivated with the awareness of two sides of privation: First, the experience of death is a self-awareness of the privation of the authentic Being (SZ §§ 50, 52). Second, the experience of death in everyday life is the privation of authentic death experience (SZ § 51). In my analysis, after Heidegger has raised the issue of the second side of privation which lets the authentic experience of death be recovered, he then presents his thinking about the first side of recovery step by step: a) He shows in an ontological level that the authentic Being of Dasein can be recovered from the experience of death (§§ 50-53); b) In a manner which is analogous to an epistemological way, he tries to give an ontical Attestation (Bezeugung) of Dasein for the previous mere showing of authenticity (§§ 54-57); c) He puts these two levels together, returns indeed to an ontological discussion, but in a closed relation with reality (§§ 58-60).

I must at first point out that Heidegger means the experience of death to be the Being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode). It is an experience which every one should have after they are born. It is also an experience that Dasein is aware of its going to break away from its relationship with the world. So as the ownmost state of mind (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) of Dasein, anxiety/dread (Angst) in the face of death is anxiety in the face of the “world as such” (SZ 187; BT 231).

In everyday life, we face many events in the world, and we care for many things and people. What we care for is constrained to a relational context. We know certainly some relationships among the context, but we can not grasp the total context of all relationships. I want to say this context is the totality of involvements which we before have characterized as the Being of things ready-to-hand. But now the “involvement” is in a broad sense to understand. It expresses not only the relationship of the in-order-to for things ready-to-hand, but also for things present-at-hand, among which for example the logical relations stay. The total things within the world construct for
me significations which they signify and express in their relationships. As already mentioned above, the totality of involvements goes back ultimately to the Being of Dasein. Now, the totality of significations also goes back to and follows the guidance of the ultimate Being of Dasein.

Which world is the anxiety in the face of? I think this world is just the relational context of all significations. This is what we call the world of significations. In everyday life, we take the world of significations for granted. We have lived on these significations. They are for us the so called “meaning of life” and are now threatened with possible death. But this “meaning of life” remains inauthentic, when we do without having the anxiety in the face of death. We can gain the authentic meaning of life again, if not only the world of significations, but also the world regarding the meaning of Being are disclosed.

From Heidegger’s discussion about the death we learn that the authentic Being is disclosed through the “nothing” (Nichts), which we become aware of in the “Being-towards-death”. In the “Being-towards-death”, “Nothing” means we are anxious that the world of significations would escape from ourselves (WM 32-33). What we are anxious about is the loss of the whole context or relationships we have accepted or established in the world with each and every thing. Only in the experience of death, are we anxious to break away from this world which we are used to living on. We have seldom or never been aware of the Being of Dasein as the ultimate towards-which of the significations. The Being-towards-death is indeed in the anxiety, but it provides the motivation for us to think about the very Being of Dasein. So Heidegger says: “Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.” (So enthält sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit.)(SZ 250; BT 294) Because the ownmost Being of Dasein transcends the total beings within-the-world, it doesn’t belong to, but transcends the relational context of the world of significations, and it can’t be outstripped by any thing within-the-world.
Heidegger says further: “That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself.” (SZ 251; BT 295) We have said the anxiety is in the face of the world of significations. This world can be understood as the inauthentic Being-in-the-world. Regarding our above mentioned thesis, this world can be regarded as the deprived authentic Being-in-the-world too. Does Heidegger reveal the authentic Being-in-the-world really by means of the awareness of the privation of authenticity? I want to show some sentences and thinking in Sein und Zeit to prove my argument.

First, these sentences “Death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost.” and “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-in-the-world.” (SZ 250; BT 294) indicate that the ownmost possibility or potentiality is recovered from its privation, by means of the “Being-towards-death”. This is also what we said: Heidegger shows in an ontological level that the authentic Being of Dasein can be recovered from the experience of death.

Second, with the themes of conscience and guilt, Heidegger gives an ontical attestation how “the they” (das Man) transcends himself from his inauthenticity. It relies on a calling of the conscience which let “the they” be modified. The caller is Dasein who is anxious in face of death, and who is, in its thrownness, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (SZ 277; BT 322). From the aspect of the care structure of Dasein, Dasein as such is guilty because of the facticity of thrownness and the Being fallen (SZ 285; BT 331). Consciousness of guilt is but the awareness of the privation of the authentic projection. Dasein is guilty because it is still in the absent form of authenticity. But through the calling to be guilty, the authentic Being of Dasein can be recovered from its privation. As to the process of the recovery, what Heidegger now discusses is a quasi epistemological way, by means of which the above ontological showing of the recovery of authenticity gains its attestation.

Lastly, Heidegger puts the ontical attestation of Dasein together with the following three ways of the existential-ontological disclosedness of Dasein: understanding, state of mind and speech. In
wanting to have a conscience (Gewissen-haben-wollen), Dasein is “constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by disclosure as reticence”. (SZ 296; BT 343) So we get the authentic disclosedness, namely: “this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety – we call ‘resoluteness’”. (das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldigsein – nennen wir die Entschlossenheit,) (SZ 296-297; BT 343) This is the process from an existentiell level to an existential level again. After Heidegger at first showed the recovery of the ontological authenticity, then gave the attestation of the recovery of the ontical authenticity, he synthesizes lastly both sides and brings forth the recovery of the ontological, but more concrete authenticity.

The totality of Dasein must be the unified ontological structure of Dasein of inauthenticity and authenticity. It must be manifested that the self-transcending within the field of Dasein is not only possible, but also actually ongoing. It relies on the above presented processes of the recovery of the authentic Being of Dasein. So the question which we asked before: “How is the transcending within the field of the total worldhood ongoing?” has been answered. But how far does this transcending reach? I want to reply: The world of significations or inauthenticity is transcended, but toward the world of the meaning of Being or authenticity. Because the world of significations and the world of meaning belong together to the total worldhood, so, as we have heard from Heidegger before, the “‘World’ is in a certain sense precisely ‘the beyond’ within existence and for it.”

The world of significations is made of our traditional cultures which we have established in the entangled context of manifold relationships. We are accustomed to it, and have lived on it. Basing an identity or an alterity within this context, we understand ourselves and each other or not. Either identity or alterity is only in a relative sense, because any signification following the meaning of Being is itself not autonomous. On the contrary, as the guidance of significations, the authentic Being of Dasein and its meaning could be an absolute identity just due to its autonomous character.
But this identity lets an analogous manner to the “world” or “worldhood” be characterized as such identity which is in a certain sense “the beyond within the ‘identity or alterity’ and for it”. This character manifests that the self-transcending toward the absolute identity is ongoing within the “identity or alterity” itself.

V. Conclusion

We come back to the question: How can we, despite coming from and living in different traditional cultures, understand ourselves and each other? Is there a basis for our understanding? Naturally, it should be an identity for us. Our understanding us each other relies on it, either as the departure point or as the final end. But we have learned from Husserl that any identity presupposes an alterity, namely, in any case, a ground-figure structure is the genetic foundation of the epistemological knowing or understanding something identical in our world. We have discussed that the Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is characterized as extending from the epistemological sense to the ontological sense. In other words, the concept of “transcendental” in its epistemological character is enriched with the ontological character.

Similarly, we have studied Heidegger’s conception of “transcendental”. It has been presented in the ecstatic character of Dasein. The essential structure of Dasein, the care structure, showed us that instead of performing the epoché with which any judgment about factual being would be excluded, Heidegger accepted facticity and Being fallen as two moments of Dasein’s structure. Self-transcending could be ongoing within the Dasein’s structure; through the ontological awareness of facticity and Being fallen, the projection or possibility could be brought forth. Because Dasein is Being-in-the-world, self-transcending occurred in the “worldhood” itself too. We differentiated indeed the world of significations from the world of meaning, but said this differentiation was just an abstraction. We should say that the transcending from the inauthentic to the authentic world is ongoing within the worldhood itself.
From Heidegger’s discussion about the “Being towards death”, we knew that in everyday life we did live on the world of significations or the inauthentic world, and that experience of death revealed our ownmost possibility of Dasein, authentic Dasein, or the authentic world. Naturally, it must rely on our consciousness of guilt, wanting to have a conscience, and the resoluteness. We have interpreted this thinking by means of our thesis: The ontological awareness of the privation of the authenticity just recovers the authenticity itself.

What we have sought is an identity and ontological foundation which this identity is based on. This foundation which has already been revealed as alterity and that identity are for Heidegger within the inauthentic world. If we are constrained to this world, our understanding ourselves and each other relies only on a relative identical basis. Heidegger’s thinking provides us with a view of the authentic world. It could be characterized with the absolute identity. It would be beyond all traditions and cultures. The experience of death could motivate and realize the ability of this transcendence. Because Heidegger emphasizes the process of the self-transcending, the absolute identity and the relative identity or alterity belong together within the self-transcending Dasein or Worldhood itself.

**Literature:**

(*Aristoteles*)


Kant, I. (1976): Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Hamburg: Meiner. (KdrV)