

The Inequality Faced by Migrants Children in China
– From the Perspective of China's Household Registration

social sub-theme

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the inequality faced by migrants from the perspective of China's Household Registration System. Inequality faced by migrants is a common problem around the world and over time. What makes China's problems different and severe is the implementation of the HRS. The HRS since 1958 has turned China into a "dual society" and caused various inequalities. After the reform, with the increase of floating population from rural areas to cities, the inequalities led by the HRS have become more perceived by individuals. My field study in an "urban village" in Beijing focuses on migrant children. They suffer not only the institutional inequalities like low-quality school education and blocked social mobility but also institutionalized inequalities including stigma and isolation. Under-qualified school education and poor family education led by the HRS directly limit the social mobility of migrant children; the two-way discrimination between locals and migrants and the consequent self-seclusion in both spatial and psychological ways, which are based on the long-term implementation of the HRS and locals' status as the host of the city and higher living standard, result in the confusion and intorsion of identification of migrants, especially migrant children. The institutional and institutionalized inequalities led by the HRS and the inward identification form a vicious circle together. The solutions to this problem may be providing equal identity and opportunities to both locals and migrants and balancing the development of both rural and urban areas.

Key words: the Household Registration System, migrant children, institutional inequalities, institutionalized inequalities, intorsion of identification

The Household Registration System and the Floating Population

Household Registration System (HRS) was founded in 1958.¹ As the HRS is formulated by the central government, the establishment of dual society and great inequalities in China becomes inevitable (Dong 2005, Table 1; Wakabayashi 1990; Fan 2004). There was a shift in policy after the fall of Mao, with a more pragmatic focus on economic development. Despite the increase of floating population from rural areas to cities and gradually loosening policies (Mallee 1995), with the hukou system unabandoned, rural peasants still cannot claim all the rights entitled to urban population even until now. Although HRS is not the only cause of inequalities and potential social instability (Kandbur & Zhang 2005; Yang 1999), without the HRS, the others cannot be carried out smoothly.

With respect to the floating population, usually in an academic research and our research as well, the floating population means those who immigrate from rural areas to urban areas, which means he/she is living in a city or a town, but his/her registered permanent residence belongs to a certain village.² According to the data from the sixth national census of China, the total number of floating population was 261,390,000. Compared with the data from fifth national census, during one decade, the number of floating population had increased by 117 million and 81.03%. Most of them are concentrated in several eastern coastal provinces (Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu) and several large cities like Beijing and Shanghai (Duan & Yang 2009). They were very young and not well-educated; and the number of migrant children was increasing. Men and women were in nearly equal proportion. Most of them worked in factories or in the service sector. The average income was 2143 yuan per

¹ The Household Registration System (HRS) is a system founded in 1958 for the government to register the basic information of its residents, including the permanent and temporary population, births, deaths, migration, etc., which aims at providing local authorities with population statistical data they need for daily administration, so as to maintain social stability (NPC 1958).

² According to the Ministry of Public Security of China, if a man/woman is living in a village, a town or a residential district in urban areas but his/her registered permanent residence does not belong to the village, the town or the residential district he/she is living in, and he/she does not in a situation of "person household separation", then he/she is counted in the floating population (the Ministry of Public Security of PRC, 2005). But in this research, we only focus on the rural-to-urban floating population, namely migrant workers.

month, lower than the average income of any of the five cities. Men earned much more than women. More than half of them never signed a labor contract. On average, they worked for 53 hours a week and 50% had to work for more than 56 hours, i.e. working for more than 8 hours per day without any day off. More than 60% of the floating population did not enjoy any social insurance. (National Population and Family Planning Commission of China 2010)

Literature Review

Most western researchers studying on inequality only focused on the institutional way, mostly the economic aspect (Shaw & McKay 1942; Quinney 1966; McDonald 1976; Blau & Blau 1982). However, China has a different situation. On one hand, there is no doubt that economic inequality is conspicuous and severe; on the other hand, the non-economic inequalities also matter here because the HRS also prevents them from equal social rights with urban residents, though they share the same nationality. Lack of social rights is usually caused by the economic inequalities and in turn intensifies and reproduces more economic inequalities. Lots of Chinese sociologists have made their contributions on the problem (Yang 1997; Zhao 2000; Lu 2004; Bai & Song, 2002; Li 2003; Lan 2005; Wang 1995, 2001 and 2006). However, most of these literature only described the miserable living condition of the migrant workers. However, Wang (2006) conducted his field study and proposed a concept called “semi-urbanization”. However, Wang took most efforts to separately illustrate the three-level integration, namely systematic, societal and psychological integration, but seldom elaborated the interactions among them.

According to the Encyclopedia of Sociology, “Inequality” is defined in terms of “relative position in social categories which determine relations of dominance” and “the distribution of

socially valued attributes” (O’Rand 1992 (4): 1850-1856). Obviously, both “position” and “attributes” can be institutional, which means “prior to, external to and limiting individuals”, and institutionalized, which means “based on the institutional inequalities but informal”. This research will discuss the inequalities faced by migrants children in China and their interactions from this classification of inequalities.

Institutional Inequalities: from the Perspective of Education

Educational inequalities is the most influential institutional inequalities faced by migrants children. Firstly educational inequalities, which are supported by a series of institutions like the HRS, unequal distribution of educational resources and the college enrollment system, are one kind of institutional inequalities. Meanwhile, education as a social capital and one vital way to success and social identification for children, the disparity of which may directly lead to differences in power, wealth, social status and cultural identity in the future, is likely to help stabilize or completely change the unequal condition (Hertz, Jayasundera, Piraino, Selcuk, Smith and Verashchagina 2007; Blau and Duncan 1967).

Children receive education mainly from schools and families. This research will focus on both school and family education based on a field work³ in two schools in a “urban village” (*cheng zhong cun*) in the suburban Beijing, the capital of China.

The village DB was an urban village of floating population mainly from Henan, Sichuan and Shandong. There were three schools in the village, one public and two private. The public school

³ The field work, conducted in the 2011 spring, included both interviews with 20 parents, 10 children and 4 teachers and questionnaire survey with nearly 200 children in two primary and secondary schools in that village called DB. Before we conducted the survey and interviews in June, we had done voluntary teaching for nearly three months by visiting and teaching the children in one school three every Friday afternoon.

only enrolled those with Beijing household registration, so almost all the floating children studied in the private two. The school P we conducted our field work had eight grades and the higher the grade was, the fewer students there were: two classes for the first to the third grade each but only one class with 20 students on average for the fourth to the eighth grade respectively. The so-called eighth grade only had 8 students. Most of the students lived in the village. P was invested by a nonlocal entrepreneur in 2003, but the school was not registered or approved with licence by the local education bureau, namely illegal. The tuition was 800 yuan per term, a little more than that of public school. However, these private schools had no one to depend on but themselves and their students. Lack of enough finance and policy supports, the education condition and teaching facilities were quite substandard and insufficient: no libraries, no halls, no stadiums and no projectors. The so-called classroom buildings were two single-storey houses with broken doors and windows. There used to be a 150-square-meter playground and two basketball stands but at the end of our work the basketball stands were pulled down and three-fourth of the playground were rented out in order to raise more funds. There used to be dozens of computers but only 3 of them could still work when we got there.

Students there studied similar curriculum with their urban counterpart. But the minor subjects like music and arts were only provided to lower-graders and were usually taught by nonprofessional teachers. All the teachers in P were female. They used to be teachers in their hometown, now they “come to Beijing with my family. However I cannot find any suitable jobs so” they “have to teach again.” They were not well-paid. When asked about their salary, a teacher said “I’m embarrassed to talk about it”. The salary was about 800 yuan a month, far lower than that of formal teachers in public schools. Because of the low salary, the school seldom had professional teachers who graduated from normal schools and the mobility of teachers was high (Table 2).

The respondent students were from fourth grade to the seventh grade. About 71% of them answered that they loved to study but they were not satisfied with the educational condition. When asked what was the most unsatisfying, 26% chose “lack of playground”, nearly 10% “lack of enough reading materials” and more than 50% “the dilapidated and unsafe school buildings” (Table 3). 57% of them had experiences of school transferring and 30% of them had transferred more than twice (Table 4). Usually (79%) the previous schools were private schools special for migrant children or their hometown public schools.

However, more than half of the parents weren’t satisfied with the present school. Actually they preferred the public schools; some even missed the public schools in their hometowns. A father said: “The school is not well-administrated. Students are allowed not to do their homework. We have no idea how to communicate with teachers. On the parents’ meeting, the teacher talks a lot about prohibition of puppy love but seldom on study. Teaching here falls much behind that of our hometown. When my son returned back, he found that he couldn’t catch up with his classmates.” A mother told us: “Not long ago I knew a person who can turn my daughter’s household registration to Beijing registration, and we have accumulated some money these years. Therefore, we plan to send her to the public school next year. After all, public schools are much better than private ones. They have better and more responsible teachers, and the private schools cannot compare with the public ones on the environment, teaching facilities and schoolmates.”

Now that they preferred the public schools, why didn’t they send their children there? The mother had given the answer. About half of the children answered that they hadn’t permanent urban household certificates so they had no rights to study in public schools in Beijing; about 30% answered their families were too poor to pay the tuition and various activity fees of public schools;

23% answered that the public schools were far away from their homes. And attention should be paid to that about 20% of the floating children complained unequally treatment or bully in public schools; having in mind the percentage of those who had studied in urban public schools (about 21%), the “20%” means nearly all. (Table 5)

They have no rights to enroll in public schools and any high schools in cities as well. Actually more than 80% of them have to drop out or go back to their hometowns to continue study after graduating from junior high schools because firstly high school education is not included in the compulsory education in China so most of the floating families cannot afford the tuition and secondly most high schools in urban areas are not allowed to admit floating children for their lack of urban household registration. Even for those who go back to hometowns, their future is not as good as we have expected. The educational condition in their hometown is quite different from that in large cities and many of the back-to-hometown children have lived in cities for such a long time that they are not accustomed to the rural life. So there are great chances that they cannot catch up with their classmates in the hometown and fail in the college entrance examination at last.

What’s the result? Maybe being one of the enormous migrant workers again. Class reproduction is thus formed and cannot be easily removed. A seven-grade boy said: “I want an exciting life. I want to be admitted to a university. I want to have my own company. I want to live happily with my parents.” This sounds ambitious; however, then he said: “But I have no idea what I can do. My father wanted to send me back to my hometown in Shandong when I was in fifth grade. I said no because I like to be with my friends here. My father agreed. But several days before, he told me I have to go back hometown when I finish my eighth grade. I quarreled with him. But I have no idea what else I can do if I do not do so. Find a job? I don’t want to be my parents again. Go back to hometown? I

have never been to my hometown. Drop off? Maybe.”

The high rates of dropping-out and transferring, low-quality school education and the lower education level lead to a huge number of teenagers out of school and employment, which reduce their opportunities to receive high-quality education and positive guidance, increase their sense of insecurity and instability and lower their sense of affiliation to the society they live in. Without chances to further their study and enough knowledge and techniques to find a job, they find it even harder to get economic opportunities, which leads to, augments and consolidates the economic inequalities; and with plenty of idle time and ignorance of necessary legal knowledge, they are even likely to commit crimes.

Behind all the substandard schools, unqualified teachers of high mobility and the potential class reproduction, we can always find the HRS. The migrant schools are not approved and illegal because they enroll the floating children, who are out of charge of local government. The local educational finance is just for local children with local household registration by law so that the local government has no obligation to be responsible for education of migrant children. Although the floating population have tremendous and indispensable contributions to the cities, they are not accepted as “local people” by laws and regulations, which means they are not entitled with local welfare including pension, medical insurance and education. The HRS results in educational inequalities between urban children and migrant children, which institutionally deprive migrant children of their due rights to receive education of equal quality. The illegal status also means that the government can punish and even close them down, which may prevent the schools from public funds. In August 2011, the other private school in the DB was commanded to close for the reason of unsafety and unqualified teachers. More than one hundred students of that school had no where to go. Most of

them transferred to the school P, some just went back to their hometown and some older had to find jobs. But if they were legal and thus could be funded and supported by the government and the public, would the school equipment be unsafe and the teachers be unqualified?

Poor family education also matters. The parents are not well-educated (Table 6). And not only in the schools but also at home, the floating children are not well- treated (Table 7). The rates of experiencing or witnessing domestic violence, lack of care and being neglected are quite high (Table 8).

One result of the poor family education is children's negative evaluations on their families (Table 9). 82% of the floating children agreed that "family members are the most important people in their life", but only 57% of them thought they were happy in their families. The huge difference between these two numbers implies children's dissatisfaction with their family life. Another result is their low identity to their parents, families and groups (Table 10). With their negative evaluation on their family life, it is no doubt that they do not want to be people like their parents. But the question is, with such a strict social limitation, what else kind of people can they be?

The poor family education results in the lack of positive guidance from their family members, which increase their sense of being neglected and abandoned and the chances to do something bad, and negative evaluation of their families; the low-quality school education prevent the migrant children from satisfying jobs and higher status. Surely people are born unequally; however, they want to change their destiny but the society doesn't allow. The solidification of social status forms and class reproduces, which means the descendants of peasants are still peasants and they cannot change their identity easily. The inequalities caused by the HRS have limited their parents, which lead to the poor family education, and now the inequalities and the HRS are still limiting migrant

children. They have to live in such a changing world with an impossibly changed social status.

Institutionalized Inequalities: Two-way Stigmatization and Self-seclusion

Why aren't the migrant schools legalized? Some scholars pointed out the political economy behind the floating population (Hu, Wang and Zou 2002). They argued that the governments actively created the floating population and maintained them as cheap labor so that the governments and the region in charge could perform well in economical development. The political economic perspective provides one explanation but it just accounts for the HRS from demand of the government. Actually most of the urban residents don't agree to share their resources with their rural counterparts either.

Just after the NPC and CPPCC sessions this year, Yu Zhengsheng, the Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai, said that Shanghai would be among the first regions to allow migrants childrens to take the college entrance examination locally (*yi di gao kao*). However, the reaction of Shanghainese seemed unhappy (Table 11). After the announcement, I conducted an Internet survey through a large questionnaire website and the result illustrated that more than 90% of the Shanghainese respondents said no to the reform and nearly half of them worried about the loss of their own interests and one third worried about heavy population burden if *yi di gao kao* was allowed. Some of them even labeled the migrants as low-educated, low-paid, vulgar and even potential criminals. Some others mentioned that too many migrants had "diluted" Shanghai culture, especially the Shanghai dialect. Surprisingly, about 68% of the respondents supported the HRS and regarded it as a shield to protect themselves.

From their answers it can be concluded that most of the urban residents don't want to share their

resources with migrants. The reluctance and stereotype root in both the sense of superiority in regional prosperity and higher living standard because of the unequal economic development resulted from the HRS and the fear of losing their advantages and resources. The worry is, with more political openness, the civil reluctance has been widely accepted and has influenced the decision of the governments. The individual and informal discrimination has become institutionalized.

The institutionalized inequality have great influence on both migrant parents and children. We can find it through migrant's views of urban residents. Not surprisingly, most of the parents in the interview had a negative attitude to Beijing residents. A mother said: "Beijingers only know money. Not like in my hometown, people here are impersonal (*bu ren ren*).” A father complained to us: “Both Beijing parents and children look down upon our children. They despise us in every word and behavior. They are always dissatisfied with us. Beijingers are extraordinarily arrogant. So do Guangzhou people.” Children learn from their parents; with such parents' views, migrants children also had quite low evaluations about the urban children. More than half children agreed that urban children had a much higher living standard – “They have allowance every day” – but also 70% of migrant children considered that urban children may disdain them and they did not agree with their life style: “Their life is luxurious”; “they don't respect others.” This contrast is noteworthy.

This kind of two-way stigmatization actually intensifies the institutionalized inequality. Facing the stigma posed by urban residents, the migrants are left and also trap themselves to a lower and discriminated status. Their marginalized and isolated life can be one proof. Most of the floating population have three living patterns: renting makeshift houses, building a simple house or living in the house provided by their employers (Wang 2006). Their living condition is marginalized and isolated for three reasons: first, migrant labors are the largest customers of the low-rent and informal

houses; secondly, they live in the dirtiest and messiest areas of cities; and thirdly, they always live together away from the urban residents.

The village DB was such a place. There were no bituminous roads there; most of houses were single-storey and illegally-built; and the space between houses was quite narrow. Little green, severely polluted air because of sand and rock in the open and no parks or street gardens – ironically, the village was only twenty minutes' drive away from *Liang ma qiao*, one of the embassy zones and most modern areas in Beijing.

However, people there seemly had little complaints about their life. One seven-grade boy told us: "I can get anything I want in the village. So I needn't go out of the village." Besides the convenient life, most respondents answered that they had "a sense of comfort" in the village. A five-grade girl had been to the downtown with her mother once, and she said when she got off the bus, she felt uncomfortable and thought people around her was watching her. But when she was back the village, she felt "happy and unfettered."

The two kids depicted a closed, autarkic scene of the village. Most of the people living in the village came from one or several provinces and usually people from same hometown lived closely. The social relationship there was based on kinship and hometown and the service facilities were easily accessible. People found life in the village was much easier than living with the local residents. They could communicate with each other on the same topic with their same dialect and live with the similar life style. They gather together and struggle with their own values and life styles without considering whether they were consistent with the urban life which did not welcome them.

Chinese society is famous for its "relationship" (*guan xi*). But for the migrants, floating means loss of traditional, mature social relationship, lower social participation in the new society,

transformation of social identity and thus lack of social capital. They have to establish new social relationship, abide by the new social norms and found their new trust in the new community; however, it's not as easy as expected. For many of them, this process is like an individual anomie: for every one of them, the old social norms have been broken down or inoperative but the new norms haven't been founded. The village is just like an emotional and relationship protector which is an imitation of their familiar hometown. They get emotional comfort and communications here to ease the anxiety about life, work and future.

Living in such a relatively closed area, migrants actually know little about the city they are living in. Most of the parents went out of the village only for work. In spare time they just stayed at home and seldom went out for sightseeing with their children because they couldn't afford it. They had few local friends and the only few friendship wasn't close. Their self-block also has influence on their children. Half of the children said they had never made friend with urban children or tried to do so. The others had no more than three local friends and most of them contacted through the Internet (there are three internet bar in the village and parents often allowed them to surf the Internet for study reasons.) Half of them never left the village and 30% had only visited the Tiananmen Square. The self-seclusion in fact limits their horizons.

Actually the migrant children know little about their hometown either (Table 12). 37% of the children respondents had never been to their hometown and it had been two or three years since more than half of them had been home. Most of them returned their hometowns in the Spring Festival and stayed there for at most one month. Many of them couldn't speak their dialects fluently. Almost everyone considered their hometowns as "messy", "under-developed" and "unpromising" and most of them decided not to return their hometown in the future.

The result is confusion and intorsion of identification. Migrant children are stuck between rural and urban areas, cultures and identifications. 90% of the children said “I am not a Beijinger”, and a slightly smaller portion of them answered “I am not a peasant”. A seven-grade girl told us that she would be sent back to her hometown for further study, but she didn’t want. “I don’t belong there. And I am not a Beijinger either. I don’t know where I belong. I don’t want to bother myself with such question. My present life is happy. I don’t want it changed.” Children are confused with whom they are and then they have to put their emotional sustenance back in the village and on the people with similar destiny. We may call it “intorsion of identification”, which means they search for identification among “we group”. Not like their parents who still have connections with their hometown, many of migrant children were born and grew up in the city. The only connections with their hometown are their parents and their rural household registration. On the one hand, they are nearly disconnected with their hometown and they want to get the easy money in cities; on the other hand, they are limited in the “urban village” by themselves, their parents and the urban residents. They are isolated by the HRS (through education, the outside institutional inequality) and they also trap themselves (through two-way stigmatization and self-seclusion, the inside institutionalized inequality). They live in the city but they are treated and isolated as the secondary citizens and have no access to equal social resources because of their household registration; they are still peasants legally but they have little link with rural areas and farm work. They are both urban and rural residents but they are neither of them at the same time. They are – and they think they are – and unique sandwich class.

Such intorsion may lead to further isolation – spatial, social and psychological – from urban life and block the communication between migrants and local residents. Besides their little voice, the

mixture of arrogance, fear and ignorance of the local residents who are able to influence the policy-making makes the socioeconomic inequalities much more severe and therefore forms a vicious circle. As we can see, the third generation of migrant workers is emerging.

Conclusion

From a historical perspective, such phenomenon appeared in the course of industrialization and urbanization of almost all the nations, mainly because the floating population cannot adapt to the urban society in labor skills, income, life style and habits. What makes China's problems so different and severe is the HRS, an institution that hinders both spatial and social mobility. Most developed countries have introduced lots of social welfare policies and provided equal treatment and opportunities for both locals and migrants to help those floating population integrate in the urban society as soon as possible. However, in China, directly because of the HRS, migrant children cannot enjoy qualified school and family education which provides necessary knowledge, skills and social networks for urban life and upward mobility; and the long-term implementation of the HRS also intensifies, justifies and institutionalizes the inequalities between urban and rural areas, leads to an inward identification. Migrant children may not identify with their hometowns, their parents and the local residents, but they do identify with a better life and a brighter future. However, most of them cannot change their destiny and such a better life is only an illusion. They cannot move on or step back.

The solutions can be considered from both urban and rural aspects. For cities, introduction of necessary social welfare and equal treatment and opportunities for both locals and migrants is essential for an equal competition and healthy social mobility. For rural areas, the central government

should strengthen the development of rural areas to “attract” more people to settle down to ease the urban pressure. According to Polanyi (1957), China has experienced marketization, and now China should re-embed market into other social systems. Therefore, only with complete adjustment of relationship between rural and urban areas and urban-rural integration can we solve the inequalities faced by migrants in China.

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Appendices

Period	Inequalities
1949-1952	Labor division, residence
1953-1965	Income, grain provision, social welfare, mobility
1966-1976	Social welfare, identity, income
1977-1984	Social status, reputation, income, social welfare, grain provision, employment, identity, education
1985-1991	Identity, social status, reputation, income, social welfare, grain provision, employment, education, living condition
1992-	Identity (esp. children), social status, income, social welfare, living condition, employment, education

Table 1 The Inequalities Led by the HRS in Different Periods of Time after 1949

Source: Dong, J.. (2005). The Household Registration System under the perspective of Functionalism. *Cangsang*, 2005(2/3), 23.

Whether the teacher has ever changed in a semester?

Whether the teacher has ever changed in a semester	Percentage
Not changed	44.8
Changed once	51.7
Changed twice	2.2
Changed for three times and above	1.3

Table 2 Teacher-changing Condition in school P in a Semester (%)

What was the most unsatisfying with the school?

What was the most unsatisfying with the school	Percentage
Lack of reading materials	25.8
Lack of playgrounds	9.4
The dilapidated and unsafe school buildings	51.6
Under-qualified teachers	5.6
Classmates	2.1
Others	5.5

Table 3 The Most Unsatisfying with the School P (%)

Do you have experiences of school transferring?

School transferring	percentage
No	43.2
Once	27.4
Twice	19.7
Three time and more	9.7

Table 4 Experiences of School Transferring of Students in School P (%)

Why don't you study in a public school?

The reason that migrant children do not study in a public school	percentage
No permanent urban household certificates	55.3
The public schools are unaffordable	43.6
The public schools are too far away from home	23.4
I once had bad experiences in public schools like unequal treatment	20.2
Other reasons.	15.4

Table 5 The Reason that Migrant Children in School P Do Not Study in a Public School (%)

The educational level of migrant parents

Educational Level	Father	Mother
Illiteracy	7.6	15.9
Elementary school	32.1	32.6
Junior high school	35.5	30.6
High school and vocational school	18.1	11.8
College and above	2.7	2.2

Table 6 The Education Level of Migrant Parents of Students of School P(%)

Bad experiences at home

Bad Experiences at Home	"Always" & "Sometimes"
Witnessing family quarrel	51.0
Witnessing family fight	19.8
Witnessing family playing mahjong	45.0
Witnessing family gambling	10.3
Abuse	52.2
Physical punishment	34.7
Injuries from violence	17.4
Lack of care	22.1
Left at home alone	45.1

Table 7 Bad Experience at Home of Migrant Children in School P (%)

Domestic violence faced by migrant Children in School P

Domestic Violence	Percentage
Abuse	41.3
Physical punishment	30.5
Injury from violence	18.0

Table 8 Domestic Violence faced by Migrant Children in School P (%)

Are family members the most important people in your life?

VS. Are you happy in your family?

	Family members are the most important people in my life	I feel very happy in my family
Agree	82.3	57.4
Agree to some extent	11.6	26.8
Do not agree	6.1	15.8

Table 9 Migrant Children's Evaluations on Their Family Life (%)

Do you want to be a person like your parents?

I want to be a person like my parents	
Agree	36.1
Agree to some extent	23.4
Do not agree	40.5

Table 10 Migrant Children's Identification with their parents (%)

Why don't you agree with *yi di gao kao*?

Reasons that people don't agree with <i>yi di gao kao</i>	Percentage
They may compete with us and my interests will lose.	47.4
There will be so many people in Shanghai, which make me uncomfortable.	31.2
Migrants are of low quality and impolite which may destroy the image of Shanghai.	44.6
Free migration may dilute Shanghai culture which has been endangered.	67.3
Other reasons	24.3

Table 11 Reasons that People Don't Agree With *yi di gao kao* (%)

Have you ever been back to hometown?

Frequency	Percentage
Never	37.4
Once	42.1
Twice	15.5
Three times and more	5.0

Table 12 How Many Times the Migrant Children in School P Have Ever Been Back to Hometown (%)

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