
I
This monograph is a collection of essays on the School of Names (Mingjia 名家) written by Bernard S. Solomon. It includes two parts: the ten theses of Hui Shi 惠施 and the five chapters in the Gongsun Longzi 公孫龍子. In addition to Hui Shi’s ten theses, twenty-one theses or statements held by some anonymous sophists (bianzhe 辯者) are also recorded in the last chapter (“Tianxia” 天下 [All under heaven]) of the Zhuangzi 莊子. As we know, these ten plus twenty-one theses or statements are mentioned as assertions or conclusions without any explanation. Almost all scholars in the field of the School of Names feel difficulties in offering explanation for these theses. To work on this topic means to face a great challenge. Here Solomon accepts this hard work and, I think, he deserves our appreciation.

II
As far as I know, none of the explanations provided by scholars in the field have any readily available evidential support from the ancient text. I think Solomon’s explanation is not an exception. They all, including Solomon, have to use their imagination or speculation to work out an intelligible picture. In general, Solomon’s speculation is based on his unique or peculiar assumption. He says:

My argument in Chapter One is that the “paradoxes” are concerned with language habits that condition one’s responses to words and the structures in which they appear which make these responses predictable. Among these habits is the tendency to think of a term as the permanent repository of a concept so that one will keep contrary concepts apart as if the terms for them have separated them permanently. The assumption drawn from this tendency is that the imagination once narrowed by it may suffer further constriction when it is exposed to the faculty of recognition whether it is of a literary allusion, a technical term, or anything that is familiar and taken for granted. In studying the language of these “paradoxes,” we find them empty of the content often assigned to them (e.g., knowledge of the space-time continuum, ideas about atomism, the illusory nature of measurement), which now seems irrelevant, and we are left with the sense that their linguistic structure and its effects are their true content.
Here I cannot say I fully understand what is said above. It seems to me that it is too loose and obscure in terms of a description of a working assumption. And most importantly, the idea of “permanent repository of a concept” (p. 11) cannot be found in the text explicitly or implicitly. His trilogy of three connected ideas, i.e., “real existents,” “mental existents,” and “verbal existents” (p. 17), used to explain the theses, if not completely without sense, is not grounded on the text. At most, using this trilogy can give us only a very tortuous and unnatural understanding of the text. In this regard, I think I cannot agree with Solomon’s explanation for Hui Shi’s ideas.

W. V. Quine divides paradoxes into three kinds: (1) veridical or truth-telling paradoxes, (2) falsidical paradoxes, and (3) antinomies. Since to assume that there is a barber who shaves all and only those men in the village who do not shave themselves would entail the absurdity that he shaves himself if and only if he does not, Bertrand Russell’s barber paradox can be understood as a reductio ad absurdum to disprove the existence of the barber. In this sense, according to Quine, we can identify this paradox as veridical, i.e., it indirectly tells the truth that there is no such a barber in the village.¹ Quine also thinks that the Frederic paradox and the barber paradox are alike. His reason is that: “The Frederic paradox is a veridical one if we take its proposition not as something about Frederic but as the abstract truth that a man can be 4n years old on his nth birthday. Similarly, the barber paradox is a veridical one if we take its proposition as being that no village contains such a barber.”² But, I think to make a sentence with mere surprise or apparent puzzlement is not sufficient to construct a

¹ The sentence “There is someone who shaves all those and only those who don’t shave themselves” can be formulated into the following:

(∃y)(∀x)((yRx)↔¬(xRx)]

This sentence can lead to a contradiction if we assume it is true. Suppose it were true, then there would have to be someone b* who was the mysterious barber:

(∀x)[(b*Rx)↔¬(xRx)]

But if the sentence holds for all things (∀x), it holds for b* himself/herself. That is:

[(b*Rb*)↔¬(b*Rb*)]

Obviously this is logically impossible. However, this contradiction cannot be followed, if the sentence does not presuppose such a barber (b*). If we use Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to deal with the sentence, no contradiction can be found. We can see that

(∃y)(∀x){[(yRx)↔¬(xRx)]&(y=x)}

the sentence, no contradiction can be found. We can see that

(∃y)(∀x){[(yRx)↔¬(xRx)]&(y=x)}

is (contingently) false but not logically false (i.e., self-contradictory). Hence, the barber paradox cannot be understood as an antinomy; it can only be used as an indirect proof for the non-existence of such a barber.

paradox; a tricky joke can produce the same effect. So, there should be a difference between the sentence about Frederic’s birthday and that about the barber paradox. The barber paradox, as veridical, shares with a falsidical paradox a characteristic that there is a real contradiction or seeming contradiction embedded in them, which is used as a *reductio ad absurdum* to disprove something. In this sense, the Frederic sentence seems unqualified to be a veridical paradox because the mere surprise or apparent puzzlement given by the sentence does not have the same kind of function as those of veridical or falsidical paradoxes. It just tells a plain truth in a tricky way.

I think Hui Shi’s ten statements cannot be recognized as belonging to any kind of paradox in Quine’s classification. It is because, according to Solomon’s interpretation and some other popular ones, none of these statements can be identified as “dilemma” (including modern semantic paradox and set-theoretical paradox), “falsidical paradox” (such as Zeno’s paradoxes), or the proper kind of “veridical paradox” (such as Russell’s barber paradox). At most, some of them may be understood as a special kind “veridical paradox,” that is, a truth-telling statement expressed in a tricky form such as the Frederic paradox. For example, Hui Shi’s sixth statement (“The south has no limit and has a limit” 南方無窮而有窮) can be understood as a plain truth if we follow Solomon to treat the first notion of “south” as direction and the second one as region. Nevertheless, this is not a paradox in any sense but a sentence with an ambiguous or equivocal word. Solomon’s using “teaser” instead of “paradox” to label these statements seems better, though his interpretation gives us a plain truth which does not create any really difficult questions or problems with philosophical significance (see p. 24). So, without sufficient supporting textual evidence, based on his imagination, Solomon has tried his best to interpret the ten statements in an intelligible way. I appreciate very much the effort made by Solomon but cannot agree with him because we cannot find any evidence from any ancient Chinese text to appropriate any proposed explanation, including his.

It seems that Hui Shi adopts a cognitive relativism as a strategy to lead people to change their minds from the state of exclusiveness to that of inclusiveness. In contrast, Zhuangzi uses a strategic scepticism to promote an aesthetic or spiritual mysticism. Based on relativism, Hui Shi regards all viewpoints as coming from different particular perspectives and claims that the only way out of this particular mentality is to adopt an attitude of universal love. In this regard, Hui Shi does not have any non-rational stand, though he chooses a relativist approach. On the other hand, Zhuangzi thinks that all viewpoints are man-made, rationally oriented, and subjective—and thus none of them can be ascertained as absolute truth or falsity in corresponding to reality. For Zhuangzi, only when people give up this calculated mentality and transform their minds into a state of indifferent concern (i.e., nothing for contrast [wudai 無待]) or enter into a state of harmony (he 和), freedom (xiayao 逍遙), or heavenly happiness (tianle 天樂), can they transcend the predicament of relativity.
According to Zhuangzi’s view in “Qiwu lun” (On the uniformity of all things, 11), there is no absolute standard for us to justify one subjective view or another with respect to a universal assertion on reality and we cannot know the rightness of their argumentations or discriminations. It is because what they argue is about their view on reality; but there is no such reality corresponding to their view. Hence, when people argue with each other, they cannot find any objective criteria to decide which side is absolutely right or wrong. People think they know what the proper place (zhengchu 正處) is for living, but it is not really and universally a proper place. People think they know what the proper taste (zhengwei 正味) is for eating, but it is not really and universally a proper taste. People think they know what the proper colour of beauty (zhengse 正色) is, but it is not really and universally the proper colour. It is because there is nothing which can be described as “proper place,” “proper taste,” and “proper colour” in the natural state of reality; and because things pertaining to each case are not without linguistic making or conceptual carving. In other words, there is a natural world; but there is nothing in the natural state of the world, or no linguistically produced things can be found in the world in its original state. Zhuangzi’s idea of weiyi 為一 (being one) (“Qiwu lun” 6, 9) is not about the sameness or unity of all things; it is about undifferentiated nature which is not a matter of sameness and difference, or unity and separation, of things or events. I think, through Wang Ni’s 王倪 saying in “Qiwu lun” (11), Zhuangzi chooses a strategic scepticism to go beyond this cognitive approach. That is, all argumentations and discriminations such as those made by Confucians 儒 and Mohists 墨 are based on their own subjective views. They think what they assert or argue corresponds to or represents reality; but there is no reality in the sense of a base for correspondence or representation. So what they are doing is just like Hui Shi’s chasing the shadow. He tries to search for the things in reality; but actually it is like searching for the echo from sound or chasing the shadow with physical form 逐萬物而不反，是窮響以聲，形與影競走也 (“Tianxia” 7). What they speculate upon as reality is nothing but the shadow or echo of what they say. In this regard, Zhuangzi suggests that we not make argument or debate. All beliefs and theories claimed to be true or right are grounded on the framework of reference and criteria of judgment embedded in their languages. From a perspective of dao, we cannot judge whether a proposition is true or false, whether a theory is right or wrong in an absolute or ultimate sense. To say they are true or false, right or wrong, presupposes that there is a reality to correspond to them or to be represented by them. Although Zhuangzi may accept conceptual relativity, the relativity is not based on the correspondence of conceptual scheme to reality, instead,

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3 Throughout this book review the division of sections in the Zhuangzi follows the practice by James Legge.
it is based on the framework of reference and criteria of judgment embedded in their languages. The truth and falsity of Confucians and Mohists are their claims of truth and falsity; they are not really the truth and falsity in terms of their correspondence to reality. Conceptual or cognitive relativism in a Davidsonian sense implies that different views can all be true of reality; but Zhuangzi’s conceptual relativity entails that no views reflect reality because there is no reality in this sense.

A. C. Graham interprets Zhuangzi’s idea of *weiyi* in “Qiwu lun” as presenting Hui Shi’s idea of *yiti* (“one body”) in the sentence that “heaven and earth were born together with me and the ten thousand things and I are one” 天地與我並生，萬物與我為一 and thinks that Zhuangzi rejects it on the grounds that “as soon as I say it there are two things, the world and my statement about it.” Here, he assimilates Zhuangzi’s argument to Plato’s against the Greek sophist in demonstrating the difficulty about the One and its name.4

I think there are several mistakes in Graham’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s idea of oneness. One of them is that Graham does not notice that Hui Shi’s idea of *yiti* is essentially different from Zhuangzi’s idea of *weiyi*. Strictly speaking, Hui Shi’s idea is “all in one,” not Zhuangzi’s idea of “all is one.” “All in one” means all the parts in one whole, while “all is one” means many is identical with one. The former is a collective whole, i.e., the one as aggregate of differentiated entities, whereas the latter is a mystic oneness, i.e., the one as undifferentiated chaos. To consider things as *yiti* implies that there is one body or organic whole which consists of different parts or components, while to consider things as *weiyi* means that many is one or one is many, a mental state of undifferentiation or non-individuality. The former is a view on the part-whole relationship whereas the latter is a view to form a spiritual vision of mysticism. Zhuangzi’s *weiyi* can be described as an “undifferentiated oneness” as mentioned in the chapter “Nine Abidances” 九守 of the *Wenzi* 文子. That is, “Laozi said: ‘When the heaven and earth have not yet been formed and the state is obscure and dusky, the reality is undifferentiated being one’” 老子曰：天地未形，窈窈冥冥，渾而為一. Furthermore, the discussion on the Huo 濤 River indicates that Hui Shi, unlike Zhuangzi, commits a duality of the subject and the object, the self and the other. Based on this distinction, Hui Shi’s idea of “one body of heaven and earth” (*tiandi yiti* 天地一體) (“Tianxia” 7) means that all things can be united or formed into a whole though they can be distinguished as different parts which can also be distinguished from their whole, while Zhuangzi’s idea of “the ten thousand

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things and I are one” (wanwu yu wo weiyi 萬物與我為一) means that there is no difference between them in terms of individuality. The whole as one collection can be expressed in language, while the undifferentiated one or mystic one is ineffable. Here, Graham misreads Zhuangzi’s statement that “heaven and earth were born together with me and the ten thousand things and I are one.” I think the first part of the statement means that there is no temporal priority between heaven, earth, and me. In other words, there is no distinction in terms of time. The second part means that the myriad things and I are not divided into different entities. In other words, there is no distinction in terms of space. These two parts together form an idea of chaos without individuality, one of the most salient characteristics of mysticism. To understand this idea of undifferentiated and mystic oneness, one has to transcend the principle of individuality and the principle of expressibility. Zhuangzi’s idea of oneness is definitely not the same as Hui Shi’s, because Hui Shi’s idea of yiti as a collective whole is consistent with these two principles. So, he can define what is the greatest one (dayi 大一) and the smallest one (xiaoyi 小一) without claiming any contradiction in making his definitions. Zhuangzi is not challenging Hui Shi’s idea of yiti; what he wants to assert is the undifferentiation and ineffability of the mystic oneness. Yiti refers to the one as a whole that is formed by different things, while weiyi refers to the one as an undifferentiated realm that is not formed by different things. Hui Shi’s idea of yiti is consistent with his emphasis on making distinctions while Zhuangzi’s idea of weiyi is grounded on giving up distinction-making. It does make good sense for Zhuangzi to appeal to mental practices such as “fasting or cleaning of the mind” (xinzhai 心齋) and “sitting for forgetting all things” (zuowang 坐忘) for entering into the natural harmony of the undifferentiated reality, a spiritual vision of all is one, rather than entertaining a holistic idea of all in one.

5 Li Cunshan 李存山 has given a convincing argument to explain the difference between Hui Shi’s and Zhuangzi’s thought. He thinks that, to treat the great one/unit or infinity as a base for comparison, Hui Shi is able to claim that “the heaven is as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes” 天與地卑，山與澤平. But he is not able to claim that “the heaven is lower than the earth; mountains are under the level of marshes.” On the other hand, when Zhuangzi claims that “under heaven there is nothing greater than the tip of an autumn down, and Tai Mountain is small” 天下莫大於秋毫之末，而太山為小 (“Qiwu lun” 9), he does not make his comparison on any base such as the great one/unit and the small one/unit. See Li Cunshan, Qilun yu renzue 氣論與仁學 (The theory of qi and the study of ren) (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 2009), pp. 75–76. In this regard, Zhuangzi rejects any objective standard, such as “proper/right place,” “proper/right taste,” and “proper/right colour,” for comparison (“Qiwu lun” 11). He wants to deconstruct the objectivity of making distinctions, and thus believes that, after this deconstruction, one is able to entertain the mental power of harmony (“Dechong fu” 德充符 1).
Solomon thinks that “this pregnant sense of ‘one’ as it renders the idea of a whole that is composed of parts, and that asserts their underlying unity of substance or, of kind, is directly opposed to the concept of ‘one’ as an undifferentiated whole” (p. 43). But there is no evidence in the text indicating that, in addition to the sense of one as a whole of parts, Hui Shi’s idea of *yiti* is also related to Zhuangzi’s idea of *weiyi* which means one as an undifferentiated chaos. So, I think Solomon recognizing Hui Shi’s final thesis about *yiti* as in large part a reworking of a familiar idea of *weiyi* is wrong (see p. 42). Solomon seems to commit to the same fallacy as Graham.

Solomon also treats Hui Shi’s first thesis about the definitions of *dayi* as related to the idea of *yiti*. He speculates:

A term *dayi* (*great[est] unit*) that by definition renders one concept, i.e., “undifferentiated unity,” will be resisted as it is logically defined by a different concept (“the greatest whole composed of parts”); this resistance will be overcome by stating the contrary (“most small and has nothing inside itself”) of the new definition (“most great and has nothing outside itself”) and the logical rendering of this contrary by a term (*small[est] unit*), not previously defined away, which itself is the contrary of the disputed term as a parallel logical rendering of its new definition; what first appears to be a problem regarding the meaning of the term *great unit* will be seen, finally, to be a problem regarding the nature of the concept of unity as its different meanings, including those opposed to one another, are rendered by the single term *one*. (pp. 45–46)

The explanation provided in the above passage is very unclear. First, there is no reason to identify one of the definitions of *dayi* as “undifferentiated unity” though “the greatest has nothing outside itself” can be used to define *dayi*. It is because, as indicated by the definition, there are no two definitions, one meaning “undifferentiated unity” and the other meaning “the greatest whole composed of parts.” Second, we cannot find evidence from the text that shows that there is an interplay or interaction between *dayi* and *xiaoyi*, except that a pair of polar concepts is defined with metaphysical implication.

In the chapter “Qiushui” 秋 水 (The floods of autumn, 4), Zhuangzi uses the voice of the Earl of the River (He Bo 河伯) to mention these two notions and the voice of Ruo of the Northern Sea (Hai Ruo 海若) to criticize these ideas. It seems to me that “that which is most great cannot be encompassed” 至大不可圍 and “that

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6 I think Zhuangzi’s idea of *weiyi* should be understood as “undifferentiated chaos” rather than “undifferentiated unity.”

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which is most minute has no bodily form” 至精無形 mentioned by the former are paraphrases of dayi and xiaoyi respectively. The criticism given by the latter is:

When from the standpoint of what is small we look at what is great, we do not take it all in; when from the standpoint of what is great we look at what is small, we do not see it clearly. Now the subtle essence is smallness in its extreme degree; and the vast mass is greatness in its largest form. Different as they are, each has its suitability—according to their several conditions. But the subtle and the gross both presuppose that they have a bodily form. Where there is no bodily form, there is no longer a possibility of numerical division; where it is not possible to encompass a mass, there is no longer a possibility of numerical estimate. What can be discoursed about in words is the grossness of things; what can be reached in idea is the subtlety of things. What cannot be discoursed about in words, and what cannot be reached by nice discrimination of thought, has nothing to do either with subtlety or grossness. ("Qiushui" 4)

夫自細視大者不盡, 自大視細者不明。夫精, 小之微也; 廸, 大之殷也; 故異便。此勢之有也。夫精粗者, 期於有形者也; 無形者, 數之所不能分也; 不可圍者, 數之所不能窮也, 可以言論者, 物之粗也; 可以意致者, 物之精也; 言之所不能論, 意之所不能察致者, 不期精粗焉。

So, according to Zhuangzi’s view, dayi is without bound and thus cannot be calculated effectively and xiaoyi is without form and thus cannot be distinguished physically. The so-called concept of dayi as “everything” defined by Hui Shi is what Georg Cantor, one of the major founders of set theory, describes as “absolute infinite.” He says,

A multiplicity can be such that the assumption that all its elements “are together” leads to a contradiction, so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity as a unity, as “one finished thing.” Such multiplicities I call absolutely infinite or inconsistent multiplicities. As we can readily see, the “totality of everything thinkable,” for example, is such a multiplicity.8

It is obvious that the concept of dayi as “everything” is similar to the concept of “un-bound (or unlimited) totality” pursued by some philosophers in traditional theology. Neither are constructible through any effective or recursive procedure. If what is

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conceived cannot be constructed, it is highly probable that it is not an identifiable entity in any possible world: mathematical, physical, or metaphysical.

Let’s go to the part of Gongsun Longzi. I think the most successful interpretation offered by Solomon is that of “Mingshi lun” 名實論 (On names and reality); I will discuss this chapter later. In regard to other chapters, I do not think his interpretations and explanations are not controversial.

Solomon’s explanation for “Tongbian lun” 通變論 (On understanding change) is very tortuous and his interpretation for some sentences is not in accordance with the text. For example, he thinks that, in the case of two, right, and left, the problem is that of a gap between term and transferred meaning; in the case of sheep and ox, the problem is that of a spurious gap between term and referent; in the case of ox foot/feet, sheep foot/feet, or fowl foot/feet, the problem occurs between term and number; and, in the graph of bi 碧, the problem is that of the absence of a gap where there should be one (p. 83). I think it assumes too much in explaining the text. Some places of Solomon’s translation are obviously not right. For example, his translation “Can one call ‘right’ when it participates in something ‘change’?” (3) cannot match the original sentence 右有與可謂變乎? It is because the word “right” is used to refer to an entity, not mentioned with quotation. The Chinese words “you yu” you yu means “has a partner or conjoint part,” not “participates in something.” His explanation is that: “If the drawing compass is a ‘two’ by virtue of its separate parts, but a ‘one’ by virtue of these parts as they function together to produce a new entity, its limbs, now right, now left, partake of that ‘right’ and ‘left’ that never change as they make themselves known in the right and left hands or, right and left bands” (p. 63). But Gongsun Long’s “two” is not used to refer to the separate parts of something or compass, but used to refer to a compound entity which is formed with the right (one) and left (one). So he recognizes that “left and right can be called two.” His notions of “one,” “right,” and “left” are used to refer to a single unit or parts, and he never uses the word “one” to refer to an entity which is formed with two parts. So, Gongsun Long asserts that two as a whole is not identical with its parts, either right (one) or left (one). It is the reason Gongsun Long says that “one/right/left cannot be called two.” If we follow Solomon, however, the sentence “two does not have/contain one/right/left” cannot be explained without difficulty.

Solomon’s interpretation and explanation are not on the right track. I think this is not Solomon’s own problem; most scholars including Graham have the same problem. According to my personal view, the words in this chapter, including “two,” “one,” “right,” and “left”; “sheep,” “ox,” “horse,” and “fowl”; qing 青, “white,” “yellow,” and bi, are all used as symbols, either individual constants or variables. I think not
only this chapter can be explained without difficulty, but also other chapters can be explained cogently and coherently, if we understand Gong Sun Long’s ontology as a two-level world: one level is a realm of phenomenal or physical particulars and the other is a realm of non-phenomenal or non-physical entities such as concrete universals—a level which not only has the status of ontological ground for the phenomenal particulars, but also the status of their cosmological origin. For example, in “Baima lun” 白馬論 (The white-horse dialogue), we can say that a particular baima 白馬 (white-horse) is not identical with a universal ma 馬 (horse). It is because the former is two while the latter is one (left = white and right = horse). “Zhiwu lun” 指物論 (On concepts and their instances) asks why “no wu 物 (things) are formed without zhi 指 = 旨 (connotative entity); but zhi [inside wu] is not zhi [before forming into wu]” 物莫非指；而指非指? The second part of the original sentence looks like a self-contradictory expression; but actually it is not. Because Gong Sun Long says in later sentences that “it is not the case that zhi is not zhi; it is the case that when zhi joining together in wu is not zhi [before joining together in wu]” 指非非指也；指與物非指也. In the sentences “something may be white, but white [as zhi which has not yet joined together in wu] is not thereby fixed upon it” 物白焉不定其所白 ("Jianbai lun” 堅白論 [On the hard and the white]) and “the white as white fixing into something is not the [non-fixing] white” 定所白者非白也 (“Baima lun”) both assert that the fixing white, such as the white of a white-horse or the white of a white stone, is not identical with the non-fixing white. So, the white-horse (left + right) is not only not identical with the white (left one), but also does not have the white (left one) though the white-horse has a fixing white which is not the same as a non-fixing white. It is also the reason Gong Sun Long in “Tongbian lun” 議事論 asserts that “two does not have/contain one.”

In his interpretation and explanation of “Baima lun,” Solomon uses his three levels of discourse, one about terms, one about their [referring] material objects, and one about the concepts reposing in the terms. But the explanation based on this framework is quite artificial. Sometimes his explanation faces difficulty and has to assign Gong Sun Long’s argument as committing fallacy. For example, according to his explanation, there is a syllogism in the chapter which commits the fallacy of the undistributed middle term (p. 118). He thinks that the major premise is “having a white horse [i.e., a horse of colour] is tantamount to having a horse” (8), that the omitted minor premise is “having a yellow horse is tantamount to having a horse,” and that the conclusion is “having a white horse [is tantamount to] having a yellow horse.” I think, nevertheless, this elaboration of Gong Sun Long’s argument is inaccurate. My own elaboration is:

(1) [For the argument’s sake] having white-horse is to deem one’s having horse.

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(2) It is inadmissible to say (or it is not the case) that having white-horse is to be deemed having yellow-horse.

(3) ∴ Having horse is different from having yellow-horse.

The argument form can be elaborated as follows:

(1') (\(\forall x\))(\((x=a)\rightarrow \neg(x=b)\))
(2') (\(\exists x\))(\((x=a)\rightarrow \neg(x=c)\))
(3'). ∴ (\(\forall x\))\{((x=b)\rightarrow \neg(x=c))\}·((x=c)\rightarrow \neg(x=b))

The validity of this argument form is very easy to prove. Based on this valid argument (form), Gongsun Long continues to address the second argument:

(4) To deem having horse different from having yellow-horse is to differentiate yellow-horse from horse.
(5) To differentiate yellow-horse from horse is to deem yellow-horse not horse.
(6) ∴ Yellow-horse is not horse.

Its form can be formulated in the following:

(4') (\(\forall x\))\{((x-b)\rightarrow (x=c))·((x-c)\rightarrow (x=b))\}→(\(\exists x\))((x=c)\leftrightarrow (x=b))
(5') (\(\exists x\))((x=c)\leftrightarrow (x=b))→(c=b)
(6') ∴ \neg(c=b)

The conclusion of the argument is that “Yellow-horse is not horse” \([\neg(c=b)]\). In this regard, Gongsun Long seems to appeal to our linguistic intuition that “white-horse” and “yellow-horse” can be put into the same argument place; he thinks that to assert “yellow-horse is not horse” but to reject “white-horse is not horse” is absolutely absurd or ridiculous. According to the spirit of the argument, if we assign black-horse, instead of white-horse, as the value of “a” and assign white-horse, instead of yellow-horse, as the value of “c,” the substituted instance of the conclusion would be “white-horse is not horse.”

Solomon’s translation of (6d) (“Horse” [i.e., the concept expressed in the term, which excludes reference to colour] takes part in “white horse” [i.e., the concept expressed in the term, which includes reference to colour]) is not in accordance with its grammatical structure. Because, the original sentence 馬與白馬也 should be punctuated into 馬與白，馬也 [= 耶]? (“Is horse combined with white horse?”)

Otherwise it cannot make sense in linking the previous sentence 白馬者，馬與白也 (“White-horse is horse combined with white”) and the following sentence 故曰：白馬非馬也 (“Therefore white-horse is not horse”). On the one hand, Solomon interprets the keywords “white-horse,” “horse,” and “white” in (6c) as terms mentioned by Gongsun Long; on the other hand, he interprets these words in (6d) and (6e) as ones
used by Gongsun Long to express concepts. In (6c) 与 is interpreted by Solomon as meaning conjunction while in (6d) 与 is used by him to mean “takes part.” But, I think, there is no reason to provide two different meanings for these two tokens of the same word.

In “Jianbai lun,” 無堅得白, 其舉也二 and 無白得堅, 其舉也二 are translated by Solomon into “when one grasps the white without the hard, what is disclosed of it [i.e., the stone] is two [i.e., the white and the stone]” and “when one grasps the hard without the white, what is disclosed of it [i.e., the stone] is two [i.e., the hard and the stone]” respectively. His translation has to treat 坚 and 白 as referring to qualities or properties of an object or substance while treating 石 as referring to an object or substance. But this is not right. It is because “white-stone,” just like “white-horse,” is a combination of two qualities or properties; or, more correctly speaking, of two zhis (concrete universals). In other words, 石, just like 馬, is used to refer to form or shape, a quality or property of an object. If the referent of 馬 is recognized as a shape as expressed in the sentence “‘horse’ is what was used to name a shape” (2) in “Baima lun,” then the word 石 should also be recognized as a word used to name a shape. Besides, when the questioner asks the question, “The hard, white, and stone are three. Is it permissible?” it does not make sense to treat “three” as referring to two qualities (hard and white) plus one object (stone). So, the two sentence tokens 其舉也二 should be understood as two in terms of qualities (white [colour] plus stone [shape] demonstrated by seeing and hard [texture] plus stone [shape] demonstrated by touching), rather than two in terms of one quality and one object (white [colour] plus stone [object] and hard [texture] plus stone [object]).

There are also some other mistreatments of the grammatical structure in this piece of dialogue. For example, the term 得以 in the sentence 其白也，其堅也。而石必得以相盛盈 (7) should not be separated into two terms 得 and 以 and translated, as done by Solomon, into “grasped” and “since” respectively (p. 124). I think the sentence means that “one obtains by seeing its white and by touching its hard; and thus the stone [shape] can be with them to have mutual permeation or overlapping.”

As we know, the chapter which is most difficult for interpretation is “Zhiwu lun.” The first two sentences 物莫非指, 而指非指 appear to include a self-contradiction in the second sentence. In order to explain away the contradiction, most scholars have to interpret the last two tokens of the word 指 into two different but related senses. In this regard, Solomon treats the first one as meaning “a concept” while the second one as meaning “its objects” or “the object of a concept.” But this treatment does not have support from the text. Moreover, some sentence arrangements are not so reasonable. For example, the conditional sentence 天下無指物無可以謂物 is cut by Solomon into two parts: (2) 天下無指 and (2a) 物無可以謂物. But (2) seems to contradict (4) 指也者天下之所無也. Solomon’s solution is to treat 指 in (2) as “concepts” and 指 in (4) as “the zhi that are not the zhi that all things are,” but this cannot explain
the contradiction away; so he uses (5–5a) as an echo of (2–2a) and a response to (4) (p. 143). In other words, in addition to having the objects of a concept in the world, if there are also concepts in the world, (4) cannot be sustained. So, (4) can be rejected. Nevertheless, Solomon’s interpretation of (5–5c) is not grammatically adequate. His treatment is as follows:

(5) 天下無指，
    [If] there are/were no zhi [i.e., concepts] in the world,
(5a) 而物不可謂指也。
    and things cannot/could not [therefore] be called zhi [i.e., their objects or instances]
(5b) 不可謂指者，
    [then] what cannot/could not be called zhi (i.e., their objects)
(5c) 非指也?
    are not/were not zhi (i.e., their objects) (p. 135)

I think there is no reason to treat (5–5a) as an antecedent and (5b–5c) as a consequent of a conditional or counterfactual sentence. The grammatical structure is of two compound sentences: one is [(5) and (5a)]; the other one is [the reason for (5b) is (5c)] (without question mark). To insert the conditional markers “if” and “then” between these two compound sentences is not appropriate.

The translation of (6–6a) is also unusual and odd. It is:

(6) 天下無指而物不可謂指者，
    [What is meant by] “things cannot/could not be called zhi (i.e., the objects of a concept) if there are/were no zhi (i.e., concepts) in the world”
(6a) 非有非指也。
    is that if there are/were no zhi (i.e., concepts) [in the world], [things] are not/would not be zhi (i.e., their objects). (p. 144)

What we can find in the above translation is that it adds too much into the text and does not take care of the grammatical structure. Solomon splits the simple sentence 非有非指 (6a) into a conditional sentence (非有)→(非指) and interprets the keywords in the sense that: fei you 非有 = [tianxia] fei you [zhi]〔天下〕非有〔指〕 and 非指 = [wu] fei zhi (物)非指. This arrangement is very artificial and without textual evidence. I think it is obvious that (6a) has a double negation in a simple sentence; but Solomon reconstructs this simple sentence into a conditional or counterfactual sentence. I don’t think this arrangement is acceptable.

Another queer translation of (9–9a) is:

(9) 指非非指也，
[if the one] zhi (i.e., that which is absent from the world, namely, the abstract concept) were not different from [the other] zhi (i.e., that which is present in the world, namely the concrete concept),

(9a) 指與物非指也。

[then when the one] zhi (i.e., the abstract concept) is present in things (i.e., shares itself with them [8]), it would not be [recognized as the other] zhi (i.e., the concrete concept).

In addition to interpreting zhi as “the object of a concept” and “a concept,” the latter further explicated by Solomon as “an abstract concept” in (7) and split “a concept” into “an abstract concept” and “a concrete concept” in (9). I think it reads too much into the text. Besides, to add the conditional markers “if” and “then” into (9–9a) to make a complicated conditional sentence \[A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)\] is also without evidence from the text and not in accordance with the grammatical structure.

IV

The most successful interpretation and explanation provided by Solomon are for “Mingshi lun.” Solomon is right to treat \(wu\) as referring to things broader than the referents of “creature” and “object” and, following the \(Zhou li\) 周禮 (Rites of Zhou), to regard its referent including virtues, courses of action, and the arts (p. 89). Solomon is also right to use some examples to illustrate the deep meaning of the idea of “to make the name correct” in “Mingshi lun” or the idea of “rectification of names” (zhengming 正名) in the \(Analects\) (\(Lunyu\) 論語). In regard to the examples from the \(Analects\) (III.1, 2, and 6), he explains:

What testifies, then, to the impropriety of the behavior of the head of the Ji 季 family is his title (\(dafu\) 大夫), for it announces that he is the object of a concept that excludes such behavior as the special province of the bearers of the title \(wang\) 王 or \(gong\) 公. In brief, his conduct is not in balance with the concept that reposes in his title. But if all that were required is that concept and conduct be in balance, one would be able not only to adjust the conduct to the concept, but to adjust the concept to the conduct, which means, in the one case, confirming the title but making the conduct conform to its requirements, and, in the other, linking the object to a new concept that legitimizes its behavior, the former implying the object’s settling into its proper place in the order of things, the latter the ouster of the original object of the concept, in this instance the reigning collateral kinsman of the head of the Ji family. (p. 92)

The question of “rectification of names” illustrated in the examples from the \(Analects\) is about the imbalance between an assumed title or name and a required conduct
or duty. In comparison, the question of Gongsun Long’s idea of “to make the name correct” is about a name linking clearly to the concept of which the “real thing” is the object. It seems that, for the Confucian examples, an assumed title or name is operated properly if its assigned conduct or duty is not violated; while, for Gongsun Long’s examples, a name is used correctly if it links properly to the concept of which the “real thing” is the object.

I think Solomon’s explanation is basically right, especially his explanation for the examples from the Analects. His idea of “title requirement” can be understood as John Searle’s idea of “status function.” Based on this understanding, I think naming within a ritual system of sociopolitical institutions in ancient China is used to produce an institutional fact in the sense that the authority in terms of ancient sage-kings or tradition imposes a status function on each name (ming 名) or object (qi 器) within the system with collective recognition or acceptance. Through naming, the authority assigns each person or object some kind of role (fen 分/份) in terms of particular obligations and rights. Here, what is the corresponding target of a name is not a physical entity of a brute fact; it is a social entity of an institutional fact. So, a particular naming is constituted of a physical fact in which an imposed status function for executing deontic power is realized, as described by Searle. For example, a person being a king or named as a “king” is not a brute fact in terms of the person’s physical features, but an institutional social fact whereby the person is assigned with some kind of deontic power to do things in a political system. This fact is created by the naming (or status function declaration) in virtue of the constitutive rule of zongfa 宗法 (a mechanism of selecting the oldest son as successor of kingship).

In general, I appreciate very much Solomon’s effort to try to make a coherent and intelligible picture for the texts of the School of Names though I am not satisfied with his interpretation and explanation in several places. I think my disagreement with Solomon indicates a normal phenomenon in the field and it also happens in other book reviews in the same field. In regard to such a kind of text whose difficulty in interpretation and explanation is very high, I think Solomon’s contribution in providing one of the possible solutions for the text which may not be without controversy but is definitely helpful for deepening the questions in the text.

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