

Taiwan as an Imperial Colony of Japan: 1895-1945*

RAMON H. MYERS

On April 17, 1895 Li Hung-chang and Itō Hirobumi affixed their signatures to a document sanctioning the transfer of Taiwan and the Pescadore islands from Ch'ing control to Japanese management. Sorely humiliated and chagrined, the Ch'ing government relinquished control over a group of islands it long regarded as of special strategic importance for the defense of the mainland. With their newly won prize, the Japanese enthusiastically set about to occupy the island. Occupation was neither automatic nor without cost. On May 29, 1895 Japanese troops landed in north Taiwan; on October 21, 1895, nearly six months later, Governor-General Kabayama declared that Taiwan had been pacified. His proclamation was premature, for areas in the extreme south, the central highlands, and along the eastern coastline had not yet been occupied by Japanese troops, and it would not be until 1902 that the activities of guerrilla units opposing Japanese rule would completely cease.¹ Instead of obtaining a rich spoil, within two years time the island had cost the Japanese dearly in terms of lives lost and expenditures from the home treasury. Disgruntled officials in Tokyo even began discussing the possibility of selling the island to France or Germany.

In spite of a shaky beginning, the Japanese government eventually established their hegemony over the island, and their colonial management during the next half century undoubtedly became one of the most remarkable on record in modern times of any foreign power to improve living standards and create new opportunities for its colonial subjects. Like other imperial powers with colonies Japanese political rule of Taiwan was extremely repressive and designed to serve Japanese interests first. The principle of granting self-rule to the Chinese was never seriously entertained by the Japanese nor did they prepare them for such an eventuality. This essay examines the system of imperial control in Taiwan and traces the key changes in Japanese colonial policy over the period. For the moment, therefore, it becomes necessary to ignore those who were subjugated under Japanese rule and concentrate on the organizations, strategies and behavior of the rulers themselves.

The System of Imperial Control

Although Taiwan later became strategically important for Japan given its southern location close to the China coast and its proximity to Southeast Asia, it was roughly 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo and from the outset, extremely difficult to control. Moreover, Japan had no

* The author thanks Professor C.N. Tay for preparing the Chinese abstract of this essay.

¹ Harry J. Lamley, "The 1895 Taiwan War of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power" in *Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History*, p.55.

experience in colonial matters, having never in its history occupied and ruled a foreign territory. The sub-tropical conditions in Taiwan and the intense hostility expressed by the Chinese toward their conquerors made matters doubly worse for Japan to establish smoothly the machinery by which she could manage Taiwan without great expenditure for herself. The first three years of colonial rule were full of set-backs and brought about a painful realization by the Japanese authorities that perhaps they had taken on an impossible task. But historical events are greatly influenced by the actions of individuals, and in the case of Taiwan two Japanese officials initiated policies and saw to their implementation between 1898 and 1906 which resulted in the island becoming a peaceful and prosperous colony within the Japanese empire. Their policy will be discussed in the next section as the present task is to examine the political order which the Japanese ultimately established to keep the island in the firm grip of their control.

In 1895 the Japanese established the Office of the Governor-General (*Sōtokufu*), governed by a high ranking military official of admiral or general status, to formulate colonial policy and manage the colony of Taiwan and the Pescadore islands. The Governor-General held supreme power, authorized all decisions, commanded military forces under his jurisdiction, and was responsible for all affairs in the colony.² His authority could only be questioned by the Minister of Home Affairs and the Cabinet. His decisions became the law, and any official found guilty of disobeying his authority could be imprisoned for one year and fined up to 200 yen.³ His supreme powers permitted him to use military power when he deemed it necessary, to rule by edict, to abrogate the decisions made by government officials in local administration, and to discipline and promote officials as he saw fit. In Table 1 of the appendix, I have listed the nineteen governor-generals who ruled Taiwan between 1895 and 1945. Their average tenure of service was two years and one month. Between 1919 and 1936 civilians served as governor-generals, and because these colonial chiefs were greatly influenced by the changing political tide in Tokyo, their term was much shorter than that of governor-generals serving in Korea.⁴

Within the Office of the Governor-General were a secretariat, an office for military affairs, and a civil affairs bureau (*minseibu*). Between 1895 and 1898 colonial policy was formulated principally in the secretariat, enforced by military, and regulated by various offices in the civil affairs bureau. After 1898 the civil affairs bureau began to initiate policy subject only to scrutiny and final agreement by the Governor-General. At first the civil affairs bureau was responsible for the police, tax office, communications bureau, office for developing industry, the engineering section, and a general affairs office (*shomubu*).⁵ By 1908 it greatly increased in size to include additional agencies to supervise the railway system, port authorities, agricultural stations, the postal and educational offices, the sugar and monopoly bureaus, and the penal system.

The Office of the Governor-General created a local administrative system to transmit its decisions into practice. The structure of this system changed many times over the period for reasons which are not always clear but presumably relate to steps taken by the authorities to centralize control more effectively under the Governor-General and facilitate communication between that office and various echelons of local administration. In 1897 3 provinces (*shū*) and

2 Taiwan sōtokufu kambō bunshoka (comp.), *Taiwan tōji sōran* (A Survey of Taiwan under Japanese Rule), Tokyo, 1908, p.49. See also Mochiji Rokusaburō, *Taiwan shokumin seisaku* (Colonial Policy in Taiwan), Tokyo, 1912, p.56.

3 *Ibid.*, p.49.

4 Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 30, 1970, p.131.

5 *Taiwan tōji sōran*, pp.51-53.

a single department were established; in 1898 this system was revamped to become 6 provinces and 3 prefectures (*chō*) with bureaus for police, general affairs, and promotion of industry. In 1899 this system was again altered to become 4 provinces and 4 prefectures. Then in 1902 a dramatic reform abolished the old system and established 20 prefectures. This new local administration system persisted until July 27, 1920 when Governor-General Den Kenjirō abolished it and created the 5 large provinces of Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung. Within these provinces the *sōtokufu* established, according to population size, 26 prefectures (*ken*) for Tainan province, 38 for Taipei, 39 for Taichung, 48 for Hsinchu, and 49 for Kaohsiung.⁶ This structure remained fairly intact until the end of the Pacific War.

The precise nature of the local administration system can be seen more clearly in Chart 5 on the following page which shows the echelons of administrative control and when the structure changed over the period.

What is interesting about chart 5 is the penetration of Japanese control and influence into every village. At each level of local administration a Japanese official ruled: province and prefecture; the municipality and county; town and village. Such thorough bureaucratization was not evident in other Japanese colonies, such as Korea, where local people were permitted to hold local offices and were only subject to Japanese police and official surveillance.⁷ In 1935 a new development, involving the creation of deliberative councils (*gikai*), took place. At each echelon of local administration councils varying in size from 25 to 50 persons were established for the purpose of advising the chief Japanese official. One half of these council members were to be appointed by officials and could only serve for more than four years. Each councilor had to be a male, over 25 years of age, and wealthy enough to pay more than 5 yen in annual taxes.⁸ These advisory councils contained both Japanese residents of the colony and members of the Taiwanese community whom the Japanese trusted and regarded as safe and reliable. But these councils neither held power nor could they block any decisions once made by the Japanese official of that administrative echelon.

The core of officials selected, promoted, and given responsibilities in the colony were fairly well trained, took their duties seriously, and appear to have performed honestly and with the same characteristic zeal demonstrated by officials at home. Prior to 1898, however, the quality of official performance was poor and considerable corruption prevailed. This state of affairs changed after 1898 when officials were required to take annual exams to qualify them for specific duties.⁹ Due to the sub-tropical climate and the high incidence of death caused by disease Taiwan was considered a hardship post and a special salary structure was established to compensate for these handicaps. The salary for upper level officials (*sonin* rank) was 50 percent higher than at home and for lower level officials (*hannin* rank) 80 percent higher.¹⁰ Aside from being paid a higher salary, after serving 2 consecutive years an official received an annual 1 yen increment thereafter until 20 years of service. For officials above *hannin* rank, who had served for three years, each acquired an extra one half month service time for every additional month served in Taiwan. These same

6 Lin Chin-fa, *Taiwan tōjishi* (A History of Taiwan under Japanese Rule), Taipei, 1935, p.252.


7 Edward I-te Chen, *op. cit.*, p.144.

8 *Taiwan tōjishi*, pp.313-315. This major reform occurred during the reign of Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō.

9 *Taiwan tōji sōran*, pp.75-76. All officials, however, were subject to the same Japanese laws as those officials serving at home.

10 *Ibid.*, pp.76-77. The three ranks in the Japanese bureaucracy at this time ascending to importance and precedence were *chokunin*, *sōnin*, and *hannin*. Officials of *chokunin* rank were made directly by imperial appointment. Officials of *sōnin* rank only required imperial approval.

CHART 5
Systems of Local Administration in Taiwan under Japanese Rule: 1895-1945



Source: Edward I-ti Chen, *Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa*, p.142 and p.151.
Lin Chin-fa, *Taiwan tōjishi* (A History of Taiwan under Japanese Rule), p.140 and p.315.

officials also received special supplementary retirement allowances if forced to retire early because of sickness contracted while in Taiwan.

In 1905 there were nearly 60,000 Japanese living in Taiwan of which nearly forty percent were employed in the civil service and military. By 1920 the Japanese population had risen nearly three fold but the percentage of gainfully employed working in the civil service had declined. By 1940 there were roughly 350,000 Japanese settled in the island, many working in services, industry, and commerce while only a small fraction, probably not exceeding ten percent were employed in the civil service. The overwhelming majority of these Japanese considered making their careers and raising families in the colony. By the 1930s the new economic prosperity had already enticed businessmen, professionals, engineers, skilled workers, and even farmers to migrate and settle in Taiwan. The following table provides a bird's-eye view of Japanese population and employment change over much of this period. I have combined full-time and part-time gainfully employed as well as those working in government and services. Employment in the colonial civil service scarcely kept pace with the increase in Japanese residents of Taiwan.

TABLE 21
Japanese Population and Gainfully employed in Government and Services
in Taiwan for Selected Years

| Year | (1) Total Number of Japanese | (2) Total Gainfully and Part-Time Employed | (3) Number Employed in Gov. & Services (2) | (4) (3) as a Percent of (2) |
|------|------------------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1905 | 59,618 | 57,335 | 23,130 | 40 |
| 1915 | 137,229 | 135,402 | 41,153 | 30 |
| 1920 | 166,621 | 164,266 | 57,676 | 35 |
| 1940 | 346,663 | 228,281 | 36,569 | 16 |

Source: T'ai-wan sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-che t'ung-chi shih (Statistical section of the Head Office of the Taiwan Provincial Government) comp., *T'ai-wan sheng wu-shih i-nien-lai t'ung-chi t'i-yao* (Statistical Summary of Taiwan Province during the Last Fifty-one Years), Taipei, 1946, p.97 and pp.134-139. Henceforth referred to as *TCTY*.

(1) This figure omits part-time employed persons.

(2) Services include such professions as education, medicine, law, religious work, etc. After 1905 employment in professional services steadily assumed a larger share of this total figure.

Japanese residents at first lived in compounds within each walled city, and then as the major provincial city capitals were expanded and modernized certain suburban sections were allotted to Japanese colonists and government workers to live. In these sections, typically quiet residential sections away from the Chinese commercial core of the city, the administration built schools, museums, parks, and hospitals which serviced principally the Japanese urban community but were open on a selective basis, especially the school system, for the elite of the Chinese populace as well. Government workers and their families sent their children to the principal Japanese primary and middle schools to be educated and then to Japan to enter the university system. This community separatism made it possible for the administration to bestow direct benefits to its civil servants and immigrants and provide the customary amenities which normally would have been available in Japan for these same classes of people. While Japanese officials and police dressed

in standard uniforms, thus setting themselves apart from their subjects, the Japanese community of each city kept to itself and mixed very little with the Chinese populace.

The administration immediately began to construct imposing office buildings as symbols of Japanese power and intent to rule the island indefinitely. The building to house the staff and offices of the Governor-General was a huge, ornate structure facing a wide plaza and looking out across that section of Taipei which housed the Japanese community. It dwarfed all other structures of the city in size and appearance. In each major administrative province and prefecture new government buildings were constructed, city streets widened and increased in number, and the central core of the old Chinese walled cities either renovated and enlarged or a new city center built.¹¹

In order for an administrative structure to be established and conditions made appropriate for small Japanese communities to co-exist with the Chinese community, peace and security had to be guaranteed and made permanent. The organization which enabled the colonial administration to rule without being under-mined by major civil disturbances, revolution, and agitation was the police. In July 27, 1895 a police bureau of 70 officers and 700 patrolmen were established in Taipei and placed under military command.¹² For the next two years the police cooperated with the military and military police to quell the rising insurgency on the island.

In late 1895 a number of Chinese guerrilla units ranging in size from 100 to 200 men under the leaders of Li Ta-pei and Lin Li-ch'eng encircled I-lan city and four major market towns in northeastern Taiwan.¹³ They attacked small Japanese military units and created great fear and consternation among the populace of this mountainous region. Other guerrilla bands under Ch'en Ch'iu-chü attacked Taipei city. Throughout 1896 and 1897 security conditions steadily deteriorated. These Chinese rebel units lived in the mountainous areas to emerge at night and attack with speed and rapacity small towns and military garrisons, steal weapons, food, and clothing, and burn buildings. After these sudden strikes they quickly departed to attack in another area. The civilian populace soon recognized that Japanese armed units could not prevent these incursions, and shortly the countryside around major cities was entirely in rebel hands with no Japanese able to venture forth without an armed guard of considerable size. In March of 1896 Governor-General Nogi initiated a policy by which military troops were despatched to hunt guerrilla bands in the mountains; police units were to protect villages and large cities; and between the distant mountain ranges and more populated areas military police were to roam and ferret out rebel bands.¹⁴ This three tier system, as it became known, proved extremely difficult to coordinate and make work effectively. In June of 1898 it was abolished, and under the leadership of Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and his civil affairs bureau chief Gotō Shimpei a new policy was launched to smash the insurgency.

The broad strategy adopted by Kodama and Gotō involved granting amnesty and monetary rewards to guerrilla leaders who surrendered their weapons and those of their men or surrounding guerrilla units and wiping them out to the last man if they refused to surrender. This combination of carrot and stick tactics of granting total reprieve or inflicting terror and death gradually proved

11 *Ibid.*, pp.238-241, for the amounts of money spent to enlarge and improve Taichung, Tainan, and Taipei cities.

12 *Ibid.*, p.98.

13 Lin Chin-fa, *Taiwan hattatsushi* (A History of the Development of Taiwan), Taipei, 1936, p.146. See also Taiwan shiryō honzonkai (Society for the Preservation of Taiwan Materials) comp., *Nihon tojika no minzoku undō* (Nationalist Uprisings under Japanese Rule), Tokyo, 1968, I, pp.292-308 for a discussion on guerilla attacks on Taipei proper.

14 *Taiwan tōji sōran*, p.99.

to be effective in 1899. On several occasions Goto personally visited such leaders as Ch'en Chiu-chü, Lin Huo-wang, Lin Hsiao-hua, and Lin Ch'ao-chün and secured their surrender.¹⁵ The police played an important role in attacking those rebel bands which stubbornly persisted in fighting. By 1900 the insurgency threat had greatly declined, and in 1902 it completely disappeared. Police sub-stations were then established in every prefecture and township. In May of 1899 the force of 259 police officers and 4,061 patrolmen had the power to arrest and detain without warrant.¹⁶ These patrolmen worked closely with village *pao-chia* or *ho-kō* units which had been restored by Gotō and Kodama in 1898 as a security measure to protect villages from guerrilla attacks. After 1900 this organization enabled Japanese officials to control villages very effectively. Any crimes committed by a member of a village *kō* made all other members and their families liable for the same offense and severe punishment was meted out to the *kō* in which that criminal was affiliated. At the same time Chinese were gradually recruited as patrolmen because of their knowledge of local customs. In November 1901 a police office responsible to a central police bureau in the civil affairs bureau was created in each prefecture. Below this main prefectural police office were numerous sub-departments with their sub-stations depending upon area size and population density. The police now began to assume a variety of functions such as enforcing all laws, checking on reforms of weights and measures, vigorously demanding villagers use new sugar cane seeds, guarding against smuggling from mainland China, enforcing public sanitation measures, and inspecting markets.

The qualifications for becoming a policeman were also made very rigorous. A prospective member had to be knowledgeable of Taiwanese (and if Chinese he had to speak and read Japanese), enroll for 1 year in a police school, and pass appropriate exams. The graduate was then given on the job training for 20 months, after which he could assume responsible police duty. The police were well paid: officers receiving 7 yen per month and patrolmen 4 yen per month.¹⁷ There were material emoluments and attractive retirement allowances. Very soon the police force became outstanding for its speed and efficiency in enforcing Governor-General laws, and from all accounts it appears to have been an organization free of corruption and nepotism. The police served with dedication and zeal; its presence was felt everywhere. For the next forty-five years the Taiwan police bureau, with its efficient filing system for all criminals and potential disturbers of the peace, easily maintained calm and security.

The Governor-General's office and police force could rule effectively by using force, but in order to make the Chinese productive and compliant subjects the Japanese had to establish guidelines and norms to regulate their conduct. In effect a legal and adjudicative system was required so that behavior could be moulded to comply readily to the demands of the colonial administrative system. The Japanese decided to apply to Taiwan the same legal codes used at home and obtain Chinese conformity to these laws. For this purpose, a judicial system was established in the colony, quite separate from its counterpart in Japan, to investigate, adjudicate, and administer punishment.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Taiwan hattatsushi*, p.153. The rebel leader Ch'en Chiu-chu later became a rich man, managed a camphor business, and finally died in December 1922 of illness nearly a quarter century later.

¹⁶ *Taiwan tōji sōran*, p.99. For further discussion of police organization and activity in Taiwan see Ching-chih Chen, "The Police and Hokō Systems in Taiwan under Japanese Administration (1895-1945)" in *Papers on Japan* (Vol.4), Cambridge, 1967, pp.147-176.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.105.

¹⁸ For a good description of the establishment of this separate adjudicative system which applied the Japanese law, see the study by Suzuki Sōgen, *Taiwan ritsureiron* (An Essay on Taiwan Laws), Taipei, 1905. Suzuki Sōgen was the first, highest ranking judge of the high appeals court in Taipei and was a member of Okamatsu Santarō's commission for the study of old Taiwan customs.

Two types of courts were created:¹⁹ first, local courts (*chihō hōin*) were established at the local administrative office to handle all civil and criminal cases; second, a court of appeals (*fukushin hōin*) or a higher court was located in Taipei to examine all lower court decisions and render final decisions of cases referred to it. Each local or regional court had a judge who heard and decided all cases submitted to him; the court of appeals was served by three judges who decided all cases. The appointment of court judges had to be confirmed by the emperor and be of *sōin* rank. Within each lower level court was an investigation and prosecution bureau (*kensat-sukyoku*) which processed all cases and forwarded them for adjudication and a records office which kept an extensive file of all cases received and handled. By 1908 the legal system had assumed the following structure: an appeals court was located in Taipei; 2 local courts were established in Taipei and Tainan respectively and 4 courts in Hsinchu, I-lan, Taichung, and Chia-i respectively. These courts were presided over by 24 judges and 9 prosecutors, and contained 191 clerks, and 35 translators.²⁰ This court system was restructured on August 8, 1919 by Governor-General Akashi Motojirō to become a three tier system. The appeals court was abolished and replaced by a supreme court (*kōtō hōin*), which in turn included an appeals section (*jōkokubu*) and a retrial section (*fukushinbu*).²¹ The former was presided over by 5 judges and the latter by 3 judges. They upheld or ruled on the decisions made at the local or regional court level.

In table 2 of the appendix the reader can observe the types of laws passed by the Governor-General office to provide the same legal system, terms of reference, and standardized legal documents for handling criminal cases and civil suits as used in Japan. Deeds, special forms, legal codes, and necessary machinery to adjudicate were introduced into Taiwan by legal statutes passed in ever greater number after 1898. The success of the administration in the legal sphere must be attributed entirely to the vigorous efforts of the administration and police to eliminate brigands and popular opposition to Japanese rule. The following table shows the number of cases prosecuted, which related directly to opposition of colonial rule, but which the Japanese simply referred to as judicial punishment for banditry.

TABLE 22
Punishment for Banditry by Regional Courts: 1900-1906

| Regional Court | Number of Cases Punished | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Death Punishment | Other Forms of Punishment |
| Taipei Region | 870 | 810 |
| Taichung Region | 2,248 | 768 |
| Tainan Region | 1,455 | 614 |
| First Provisional Court | 2 | 12 |
| Second Provisional Court | 35 | 16 |
| Grand Total | 4,610 | 2,220 |

Source: Lin Chin-fa, *Taiwan hattatsushi*, pp.151-152.

Roughly 4,600 people were formally put to death for resisting Japanese authority in a violent fashion while another 2,200 were summarily punished by fines and imprisonment. These cases

¹⁹ *Taiwan tōji sōran*, p.71. See also Mochiji Rokusuburō, *op. cit.*, pp.102-106.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.73-74.

²¹ Sugiyama Seiken, *Taiwan rekidai sōtoku no jiseki* (The Achievements of Successive Governor Generals in Taiwan), Taipei, 1922, p.223. Furthermore, the salary and fringe benefits of judges in this new legal system were greatly increased and made more attractive than the prevailing salary structure for similar judgeships in Japan. See also p.227.

certainly gave notice to the Chinese that a powerful, formal system of adjudicative machinery existed to try and punish speedily any law breaker. Popular protests were greatly reduced but not entirely stamped out as disturbances occasionally erupted in central and southern Taiwan after 1902.²² But this new legal machinery functioned in a very efficient manner until 1945 to handle any offenders violating the civil and criminal codes of Japan.

Within a decade the Japanese established a formal system of administrative control that reached into the smallest and most remote communities on the island. The tight, pervasive bureaucratic control which the Japanese exercised even at the village level operated efficiently and speedily to punish any groups or individuals opposing Japanese authority. The Chinese population had no recourse but to obey and adjust as best it could to these new circumstances. Taiwan's small size also made it possible for a small dedicated cadre of officials and police to administer all facets of social and economic life.²³ Finally, colonial officers took their job seriously, and because they received preferential treatment and reward they performed outstanding work. The success story of this colonial administration was neither automatic nor for-ordained. As will be seen in the next section, certain individuals and their policies greatly determined the successful outcome of early colonial rule in Taiwan.

Early Japanese Colonial Policy

The first three governor-generals, Admiral Kabayama, General Katsura, and General Nogi, failed completely to establish a plan which could be realistically undertaken to make the colony pay and cease being a drain on the Japanese treasury. Only with the arrival of Kodama Gentarō, the fourth governor-general (1898-1906) and his civil affairs bureau chief, Gotō Shimpei, in late spring of 1898 did a strategy begin to unfold which eventually made Taiwan a very prosperous colony characterized by order and peace.

Kodama and Gotō were men of the early, turbulent Meiji period. Both had displayed outstanding qualities of leadership and the ability to adopt foreign methods and procedures to conditions characterized by backwardness and conservatism. Gotō was born in 1857 in Iwashiro Mizusawa.²⁴ He studied medicine, and at the age of twenty graduated as a physician to work at a hospital in Aichi prefecture. By 1882 he became head of the Nagoya hospital and medical school. He was later responsible for the government establishing a Sanitation Bureau within the Department of Home Affairs. He served with the military during the first Sino-Japanese war and was appointed head of a commission to prevent plague. After the war he managed the Sanitation Bureau, and in February 1898 Kodama urged him to become his Civil Administration Bureau chief in Taiwan, a position he was to hold until his transfer to president of the South Manchurian Railway Company in 1907. Kodama was born in 1853 in Tokuyama fief. After the Meiji Restoration he joined the new government army and diligently proved himself to advance to the grade of major. He served with distinction on the general staff during the Satsuma Rebellion. In 1891 he

22 In 1907, 1911, 1912, 1914, and 1915 police action had to be taken again to put down popular uprisings. The outbreak in 1915 resulted in 95 people receiving the death punishment. See Lin Chin-fa, *op. cit.*, pp.223-235.

23 Taiwan is roughly 36,000 square kilometers in size. The island of Kyūshū is slightly larger with 42,078 square kilometers. Korea, on the other hand, was roughly six times larger than Taiwan in size, and for this reason Japan had to rely more upon a system of indirect rule in her Korean colony by using Koreans as lower echelon, local administrative officials.

24 Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shimpei den* (Biography of Gotō Shimpei, I), Tokyo, 1937, pp.123-151, 247-293, 351-366, 657-902.

visited Europe with Terauchi and other staff officers to learn what Western military tactics and organization might be adopted by the Japanese ground forces. Kodama was very impressed by the Krupp armament industries and the development of artillery by the German army.²⁵ During the Sino-Japanese war he was promoted to major-general and served with brilliance as a staff officer. During the war he met Gotō, and a warm friendship bloomed, a factor which explains much of the close working relations between these two men while they served in Taiwan.²⁶ Kodama died of a brain hemorrhage at the age of 54 before he and Gotō were to assume management of Japan's spoils from the Russo-Japanese war, the Liaotung peninsula and part of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

It was not until November 5, 1901, at a conference with district officials in Taipei, that Kodama publicly declared the purpose and objectives of Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan and how these were to be achieved.²⁷ Kodama, like most Japanese leaders of his time, was vitally concerned about Western aggression in the Far East and Japan's ability to maintain its sovereignty. He contended that more was required of a country like Japan than just cultivating its arts and knowledge; the countries of the Far East required wealth and power to preserve their independence. The following excerpt from Kodama's speech expresses this attitude.²⁸

The Western powers have developed by science and learning so that their military system is an arrangement of beauty, their weaponry advanced and effective, and their tactics brilliant. These advancements have yet to reach the countries of the Far East. The day that we engage in war with one of these powers, victory or defeat will be decided in a single battle. We ought to realize that we must match them in both strength and skill. Our power is weaker than theirs, yet in wisdom and skill we exceed them. However, wisdom and skill alone are insufficient. In spite of our being able to improve upon our skills, if these cannot be utilized effectively, they are to no avail. We must be able to make use of our abilities and exhaust their potential completely, and this can only be accomplished if we have wealth. If there is only a surfeit of skill and an inadequate amount of wealth capability, how can we lead and achieve victory? How can we match our rivals?

The path to acquire wealth was for Japan to develop its resources, and for this end, "the most urgent task of the present was first to develop the resources of Taiwan."²⁹ Once these resources were fully developed and utilized, Taiwan's position would be made more secure and she could better compete "in the economic struggle of the day."³⁰ The plan Kodama set forth to develop Taiwan's resources was for the administration to take the lead and begin to develop on different fronts projects that would improve Taiwan's transportation and maritime links with the world and increase the capabilities of agriculture to supply more products. Kodama concluded that "these activities could be easily and diligently carried out by the government and should increase tremendously Taiwan's economic capabilities."³¹ The specific industries to be promoted in the context of a broad development program of balanced growth were sugar, tea, forestry, livestock, and grain.

The organizational and managerial requisites to ensure success of this colonial policy were not mentioned by Kodama, and it is to Gotō Shimpei, perhaps the chief architect of colonial policy in Taiwan, that we must turn to understand how the Japanese intended to carry out this program

25 Shukuri Shigeichi, *Kodama Gentarō* (Kodama Gentarō), Tokyo, 1943, pp.256-258.

26 Moriyama Moritsugu, *Kodama Taishō den* (Biography of General Kodama), Tokyo, 1908, pp.259-260, 281.

27 Mochiji Rokusaburō, *op. cit.*, pp.168-182.

28 *Ibid.*, pp.170-171.

29 *Ibid.*, p.173.

30 *Ibid.*, p.173.

31 *Ibid.*, p.174.

successfully. Gotō operated from a concept he constantly referred to as “biological politics.”³²

Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on principles of Biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and the police force. If these are satisfactorily accomplished, we will be able to persevere in the struggle for survival and win the contest of “the survival of the fittest.” Animals survive by overcoming heat and cold, and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for them because they adapt to their environment. Thus, depending upon time and place, we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties that confront us. In our administration of Taiwan we will then be assured of a future of brilliance and glory.

What Gotō seems to be saying is that by controlling man's social environment, it becomes possible to influence and determine the course of social change and evolution. By improving upon the infrastructure of society such as agencies for law and order, public health, education, and transport, it is possible to shape positively the economic development taking place. Human beings in such a setting will then adapt and respond in a predictable way to permit control. Colonial policy, therefore, must restructure the social and physical environment to favor certain kinds of change. But such policies can only be intelligently formulated if a leadership has properly informed itself about the peoples and customs they are attempting to change. For this purpose Gotō invited scholars from Japan, trained in legal history and concepts to examine and study the institutions, laws, and common customs of the Chinese people. Professor Okamatsu Santarō organized a team of scholars to research Chinese legal records, conduct interviews, and carry out brief field trips to compile information which Gotō and his team of administrators could use to introduce the necessary reforms.³³

Organizational underpinnings were always necessary for fashioning and implementing policy. Gotō advocated that a small policy making group of experts be given broad powers to make decisions. Under previous governor-generals, the civil and military authorities constantly were at cross purposes and only confusion resulted. General Kodama gave Gotō free reign to manage the civil affairs bureau as he saw fit, and this bureau soon became the decision making unit in Taiwan. Gotō staffed it with brilliant young men whom he personally interviewed and recruited: Nitobe Inazō for agricultural and industrial development; engineer Hampei Nagao, construction; Tatsumi Iwai, finance; and Nakamura Zekō, land use.³⁴ These, and other members of the team, met frequently to discuss policy, thrash out problems, and keep one another informed of activities under his personal purview. Through a network of district officials, various offices, and agencies, the policies formulated in the civil affairs bureau then became implemented.³⁵

In 1899 the government took the lead to encourage greater utilization and development of Taiwan's land and labor: a land survey was launched; railroad and harbor construction commenced; and government buildings in Taipei and other cities began to be built. In 1900-01 the sugar industry received attention: a research station to improve sugar cane yields was established and a modern sugar cane processing mill was constructed outside of Kaohsiung. By the end of Kodama and Gotō's period of management a new railroad linked Keelung in the northeast with Kaohsiung

32 Tsurumi, *op. cit.*, II, pp.26-27.

33 Ramon H. Myers, “The Research of the Commission for the Investigation of Traditional Customs in Taiwan.”

34 Chang Han-yu and Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 22:4 (August 1963), p.438.

35 E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Taiwan under Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shimpei,” *Papers on Japan* (Vol. 4), Cambridge, 1967, pp.115-116 for the establishment of the civil affairs bureau and its role.

in the south, Keelung's modern harbor had been built, a central bank had been created and the money supply unified, market measurement units were standardized, the sugar industry was rapidly developing, public health units were in existence in major cities, and the government was entirely located in the capital. Taipei, with its buildings and chain of command extending to district offices throughout the island.³⁶

Deficit financing to transfer capital from Japan to Taiwan was the strategy adopted to finance and complete these numerous projects. The colonial administration resorted to deficit financing and spending on projects which would be completed quickly, and then pay their way as well as obtaining additional tax revenue. Therefore, while new activities were being promoted, financed in part by borrowed funds, new taxes were being collected, new sources of revenue were discovered, and resources were rapidly being employed in higher productivity pursuits. The remarkable achievements cited above were won on a pay as you go basis. By 1906 large budget surpluses were being obtained and new tax revenue generated to finance Taiwan's economic growth and administration without aid from Japan. Table 23 shows budget revenues and reliance upon external financing for the period 1896-1908.

Observe that between 1896-1897 the Taiwan administration greatly depended upon funds from Japan; under the Kodama and Gotō administration subsidies from Japan rapidly declined to zero. By 1905 colonial administration operated on an independent financial basis. Between 1899 and 1904 debt financing funded much of the capital expenditures for the major projects. The administration floated debt issue of around 25 million yen, the bulk being held within Japan. Between 1899 and 1904 Kodama's administration spent 26.6 million yen for social overhead investment, whereas between 1905 and 1913, another 25 million yen was spent to complete some projects started during Kodama's period as well as to develop the sugar industry, railroad feeder lines, new harbors, and irrigation canals.³⁷ The funds received from bond floatation were used to purchase and import and necessary capital for Keelung's harbor construction and the building of the trans-island railroad. But revenues acquired from other sources played a strategic role in enabling the government to shoulder such a great financial burden and successfully complete the many projects it launched, making all of them extremely profitable and able to operate on a self-sustaining financial basis.

The administration introduced a land tax reform which by 1904 increased land tax revenue more than three fold above the 1896 quota. It also established numerous government monopolies for products with a highly inelastic demand in which price control would bring very high revenues. The new land tax garnered 1.9 million yen the first year compared to an average annual tax receipt of 900,000 under the old system.³⁸ In August 1899 a camphor monopoly bureau was created; revenue from camphor production and sales only amounted to 20,600 yen in 1898 but jumped to 3.7 million yen in 1900.³⁹ In 1899 a salt monopoly was established and by 1909 salt revenue was over 800,000 yen annually. Monopoly bureaus for tobacco, opium, and wine were also established with equally profitable results. Contrary to the case of early Meiji economic development where the land tax revenue played such an important role, in Taiwan the largest increase in new revenue came from indirect taxes and monopoly bureaus (see table 23, col. 2 and 4 for years 1904-1908).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.116-117; Chang Han-yu and Ramon H. Myers, *op. cit.*, pp.439-446.

³⁷ Chang and Myers, *op. cit.*, p.446. Note that for the years after 1905 these expenditures were covered by budget revenue.

³⁸ Taiwan sōtokufu zeimukyoku, *Taiwan zeisei no enkoku* (A History of the Taiwan Taxation System), Taipei, 1935. See Table 5.

³⁹ Mochiji Rokusaburō, *op. cit.*, pp.113-114.

TABLE 23
Sources of Revenue for Colonial Administration: 1896-1908

(unit: 1,000 yen)

| (1) Year | (2) Excise and Customs Tax Revenue | (3) (2) as Percent of (1) | (4) Revenue from Government Property and Enterprises and Other Sources | (5) (4) as Percent of (1) | (6) Subsidy from Japanese Treasury | (7) (6) as Percent of (1) | (8) Revenue from Deficit Financing | (9) (8) as Percent of (1) | (10) Carryover from Previous Year | (11) (10) as Percent of (1) |
|-------------|---|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1896 | 1,363 | 14.1 | 1,349 | 15.0 | 6,940 | 70.9 | - | - | - | - |
| 1897 | 1,891 | 17.8 | 3,433 | 31.4 | 5,959 | 50.8 | - | - | - | - |
| 1898 | 1,979 | 17.1 | 5,523 | 46.0 | 3,984 | 32.4 | - | - | 795 | 4.5 |
| 1899 | 1,979 | 12.4 | 8,183 | 47.0 | 3,000 | 18.2 | 3,200 | 19.4 | 1,064 | 3.0 |
| 1900 | 1,629 | 7.3 | 11,439 | 52.4 | 2,598 | 11.7 | 5,500 | 24.7 | 1,103 | 4.9 |
| 1901 | 1,906 | 10.6 | 9,817 | 49.7 | 2,386 | 13.1 | 4,864 | 24.6 | 795 | 2.0 |
| 1902 | 2,239 | 11.5 | 9,657 | 50.5 | 2,459 | 13.6 | 4,740 | 24.3 | 402 | 0.1 |
| 1903 | 2,308 | 12.5 | 10,112 | 51.4 | 2,459 | 13.3 | 4,068 | 21.3 | 1,090 | 1.5 |
| 1904 | 4,129 | 18.5 | 12,093 | 55.1 | 700 | 3.1 | 4,487 | 21.1 | 927 | 2.2 |
| 1905 | 5,651 | 23.2 | 16,105 | 63.4 | - | - | 215 | 1.8 | 3,443 | 11.6 |
| 1906 | 6,022 | 20.6 | 19,699 | 64.2 | - | - | - | - | 4,971 | 15.2 |
| 1907 | 5,889 | 21.1 | 21,213 | 71.3 | - | - | 2,000 | 6.8 | 155 | 0.8 |
| 1908 | 6,983 | 21.6 | 22,148 | 65.4 | - | - | 2,000 | 6.9 | 2,740 | 6.1 |

Source: Taiwan sōtoku kambō bunshoka (comp.), *Taiwan tōji sōran* (A Survey of Taiwan under Japanese Rule), Tokyo, 1908, pp.173-177.

In 1906 Taiwan became self-supporting and began repaying the debt created to finance the social capital which had made land and labor more productive and increased capital accumulation. By establishing an infrastructure the state reduced transport costs, increased marketing efficiency, and provided peace, security, and improved health for the labor force. This pattern of administrative economic policy continued under Governor-General Sakuma and subsequent governor-generals until the mid 1930s when the administration initiated a new colonial policy. During this period the administration built technical and commercial schools; launched new irrigation projects and constructed more roads; improved and expanded harbors; increased the number of banks; founded a central research institute; and even established a huge hydroelectric generating project. In essence, the Kodama and Gotō strategy of having the administration finance and create new infrastructure to facilitate efforts by the Japanese and Chinese to seek private gain, served as the future guideline for officials to follow. Even in planning the construction of the enormous Jitsugetsutan hydroelectric plant, a project conceived in 1919, built in Taichung province, and completed in 1925, the administration still did not consider a long run industrialization plan.⁴⁰ It merely hoped that by expanding the supply of electrical energy, private enterprise would take the initiative to develop new industry on its own. A development plan by which the state would take a leading role to create an industrial base had to await until Japan began preparing for armed conflict in China.

The Second Phase of Japanese Colonial Policy

In November 1930 Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō convened a conference to assess current conditions in Taiwan's industries. The purpose of the conference was to elicit ideas of how agriculture might be further developed and diversified and general conditions improved for industrial development.⁴¹ The major decision which brought a sharp break in industrial development came in March 4, 1935 when Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō convened a conference in Taipei to outline the island's future industrial development.⁴² From this conference dates the decision for the administration to promote heavy industry with all possible speed. Plans were considered for establishing new industries which would supply their products, the bulk of which were to be intermediate industrial goods such as metals and ores, to industries in Japan.

The Taiwan Electrical Company, a subsidiary of the Nissan manufacturing enterprise in Japan, began building a factory in Keelung for processing minerals.⁴³ In December 1935 the factory began production. In July of the same year the Japanese Aluminum Company was created as a subsidiary of the Taiwan Electrical Company. In November 1936 the first factory commenced operations in Kaohsiung. In July 1936 the Taiwan Technological Society was formed to organize all professionals in mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering. In November 1936 the Taiwan Development Corporation was formed and capitalized at 30 million yen to launch a large number of different factories producing cotton yarn, chemicals, and electrical power. The colonial administration provided 15 million yen, and Mitsui and Mitsubishi corporations supplied

40 Sugiyama Seiken, *op. cit.*, pp.237-240. The Jitsugetsutan hydroelectric power works was completed by 1926 to dam the waters from the upper reaches of the *cho-shui-ch'i* river in Taichung province. The envisaged supply of electrical energy was estimated at 130,000 k.w. power. The first plans and steps to construct this project were made under Governor-General Akashi (June 6, 1918 to Sept. 12, 1919).

41 Kusui Ryūzo, *Senji Taiwan keizairon* (An Essay on the Taiwan Economy during Wartime), Taipei, 1944, p.49.

42 *T'ai-wan ching-chi shih ssu-chi* (No.4), p.135.

43 *Ibid.*, p.135.

the remainder. The administration began to contribute large capital shares to help private enterprise form new corporations to build new factories producing construction materials, chemicals, iron and steel, light metals, textiles, and food processing.

As further indication of administration commitment to promote industry we can observe a sharp increase in budget outlays in 1937. If annual budget revenue and expenditure are expressed as an index (base year equal to 1934-36) and deflated by a consumer price index, we observe little change in administration expenditures between 1931 and 1933, an 8 percent rise occurs in 1934, followed by moderate increases in 1935 and 1936.⁴⁴ But in 1937 outlays rise by nearly 10 percent and nearly 10 percent again in 1938. Another large increase occurs in 1941 with a 20 percent increase in expenditures taking place.⁴⁵ By 1944 total outlays doubled those of the 1941 budget.⁴⁶

In order for the colonial administration to develop industries that would complement Japan's home industrial base and make Taiwan self-sufficient in industrial products such as consumer goods, new organizations had to be created to control economic activity. In late 1940 and 1941 numerous statutes were introduced by the governor-general's office of Hasegawa Kiyoshi to initiate wartime controls. The very nature of these control measures strongly suggests an erratic response by the administration to participate in the general wartime mobilization ordered by leaders in Tokyo. Economic planning in Taiwan never became as sophisticated as in Manchuria where the military launched a five year industrial development plan in 1937. In Taiwan the control measures merely ensured commodity stockpiling and shipment to Japan and her bloc countries. By 1940 a severe labor shortage already threatened these stockpiling efforts because of large scale construction, factory development, and military conscription after 1937. The administration began to register skilled worker and their occupational skills, extended the number of hours worked in factories to 12 per day instead of the customary 10 as in the past, and allocated graduates of technical schools to certain areas and jobs. In that same year a Labor Association (*rōdō kyōkai*) was established with branch offices in each major city and prefecture to plan how to mobilize labor for local needs.⁴⁷ These offices were responsible to a Central Labor Association and the administrative officer of the prefecture.

In addition to labor scarcity, shortages of materials and even capital were becoming more conspicuous by early 1941, and prices were beginning to rise rapidly. In the fall of 1941 a Central Price Commission staffed with 1,393 persons had been established to fix prices and control inflation.⁴⁸ Between 1941 and 1942 the Commission's work proved to be very successful because the Taipei wholesale price index declined 2 percent. Between 1942 and 1943 and again in 1944 prices increased about 67 percent, the highest annual price increase ever to have taken place under Japanese rule.⁴⁹ Then in 1945 and 1946 serious inflation took place with price rises of 500 and 400 percent respectively.

44 These calculations are based on budget data in current value (yen) obtained in Taiwan keizai kenkyūkai chōsabu, "Hiyaku suru Taiwan zaisei" (The Great Leap in Taiwan's Fiscal Affairs), *Taiwan keizai sōsho* (Taiwan Economic Series, 10), Taipei, 1942, pp.115-118. I have deflated these index series with the 1903-1938 price index calculated by Toshiyuki Mizoguchi.

45 Calculated from "Hiyaku suru Taiwan zaisei," p.118.

46 Obtained from budget data expressed in Taiwan yuan for 1946 contained in *TCTY* p.981. Budget expenditure in 1941 (yen converted to 1946 Taiwan yuan) was 315 million yuan, and in 1944 it had risen to 712 million yuan.

47 Taiwan keizai nempō kankōkai (comp.), *Taiwan keizai nempō: shōwa jūnana nempan* (Taiwan Economic Yearbook for 1942), Tokyo, 1942, p.145.

48 *Ibid.*, pp.214-215.

49 *TCTY*, p.897.

In October 1941 the Provisional Taiwan Economic Inquiry Commission met in Taipei to plan Taiwan's participation in the war effort.⁵⁰ This conference advanced recommendations to slow the pace of industrial development and mobilize more resources for the war effort. Members pointed out that the island did not have the highly developed industrial base to repair and service ships. Perhaps the most important suggestion to emerge from this conference was that Taiwan should concentrate upon supplying food and textile materials for the military and where possible, Chinese labor should be recruited for service with the Japanese army and perform tasks to free troops for combat duty. It was also suggested that the sugar industry divert its investments from the north to the south so that more land could be used to produce rice, sweet potatoes, and fiber crops. Japan's acquisition of sugar production facilities in Java and the Philippines later resulted in several plans, never fully implemented, to shift some of Taiwan's sugar producing capacity to these countries to increase sugar so that even more land in Taiwan could be used for food and fiber production.

One of the principal ways in which the administration promoted the establishment of new industries between 1939 and mid 1941 was to import idle machines and equipment from Japan proper and distribute throughout Taiwan.⁵¹ In this fashion new cement, textile, wood pulp, and certain chemical producing factories were rapidly established. Then in 1942 the administration formed the Taiwan Iron Industry Control Association for the purpose of planning the supply and transport of critical resources for the iron industry, to control and plan production of various iron products, and determine their proper allocation.⁵² In late 1942 the colonial administration began planning a more active role by Taiwan to develop the new possessions Japan had obtained from her military victories in Southeast Asia. These efforts, however, proved to be only paper planning and resulted in little resource transfer from Taiwan to the south.

The vigorous mobilization steps which the colonial administration initiated after 1935 demanded a greater participation by the Chinese in a war which they were still not given equal rights with Japanese citizens. The Japanese began to organize their colonial subjects into local militia for the purpose of inculcating loyalty and commitment to Imperial Japan's effort to build a greater East Asian order. For example, newspapers record efforts as early as October 1938 to form local militia from village *ho-kō* units in Taiwan province.⁵³ These efforts apparently were fairly successful, because by 1943 over 600,000 young men had been recruited on a standing local military basis.⁵⁴ The police force, which in 1944 totalled 8,588 of which 7,735 were patrolmen, was still only staffed by about 1,400 Chinese, the remainder being Japanese.⁵⁵ During this wartime period it operated efficiently to enforce laws preventing hoarding, espionage, and other infractions of the many wartime statutes.⁵⁶ Until the very end of the war the administration kept a tight fist control over its subjects. The next task is to examine the effect of Japanese policy and organizational reform upon the economic and social fabric of this Chinese society.

50 *Taiwan keizai nempō: shōwa jūnana nempan*, p.45.

51 Taiwan Economic Annual Report Publication Association (edit.), *Taiwan Economic Annual Report: 1943*, Tokyo, 1943, p.75. (This report was translated by Military Government Translation Center Naval School of Military Government and Administration, New York 27, N.Y. I have not seen the original.)

52 *Ibid.*, p.85.

53 Such an account can be found in the *Taiwan nichichi shimpō*, October 22, 1935, p.5.

54 Kondō Kenichi, *Taiheiyō senka no Chōsen oyobi Taiwan* (Korea and Taiwan during the Pacific War), Tokyo, 1961, p.34.

55 *Ibid.*, p.16.

56 For cases indicating the severity of Japanese law and punishment for violations during this early wartime period (1939-40) see Uematsu Sei, "Taiwan ni okeru hanzai no chihōteki tōkuchō" (Local Characteristics of

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

| <i>Name</i> | <i>Status When Appointed</i> | <i>Duration of Service</i> | <i>Career</i> |
|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Kabayama Sukenori | Admiral | May 1895-June 1896 | Minister, Home Affairs (1896-98) |
| Katsura Tarō | Lt. General | June 1896-Oct. 1896 | Premier (1901-06, 1908-11, 1912-13) |
| Nogi Maresuke | Lt. General | Oct. 1896-Feb. 1898 | |
| Kodama Gentarō | Lt. General | Feb. 1898-April 1906 | Minister, Army (1900-02) Minister, Home Affairs (1903) |
| Sakuma Samata | General | April 1906-May 1915 | |
| Andō Sadami | General | May 1915-June 1918 | |
| Akashi Motojirō | Lt. General | June 1918-Oct. 1919 | Former Commander of Japanese Garrison in Korea |
| Den Kenjirō | Civilian | Oct. 1919-Sept. 1923 | Minister, Justice (1923) Minister, Agriculture and Commerce (1923) |
| Uchida Kakichi | Civilian | Sept. 1923-Sept. 1924 | Formerly Civil Supt. of Gov.-Gen. of Taiwan (1910-15) |
| Izawa Takio | Civilian | Sept. 1924-July 1926 | Resigned to become Mayor of Tokyo |
| Kamiyama Mannoshin | Civilian | July 1926-June 1928 | Former Member of House of Peers |
| Kawamura Takeji | Civilian | June 1928-July 1929 | Former Head of Bureau of Home Affairs under Gov.-Gen. Sakuma of Taiwan |
| Ishizuka Eizō | Civilian | July 1929-Jan. 1931 | Former Member of House of Peers; also Chief Counselor under Gov.-Gen. Kodama of Taiwan |
| Ōta Masahiro | Civilian | Jan. 1931-Mar. 1932 | Formerly Chief Executive of Kwantung Peninsula |
| Minami Hiroshi | Civilian | Mar. 1932-May 1932 | Minister, Correspondence (1932-34) |
| Nakagawa Kenzō | Civilian | May 1932-Sept. 1936 | Formerly Vice-Min., Education |
| Kobayashi Seizō | Admiral (Ret.) | Sept. 1936-Nov. 1940 | |
| Hasegawa Kiyoshi | Admiral (Ret.) | Nov. 1940-Dec. 1944 | |
| Andō Rikichi | General | Dec. 1944-Aug. 1945 | Commander-in-Chief, Taiwan Garrison |

Source: Edward I-Te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 30, 1970, pp.130-131.

Crime in Taiwan) in *Taiwan bunka ronsō* (II), pp.109-181. For example, see the first trial case discussed by the author in which a Chinese merchant was brought before police authorities for having a false name card and given a six months prison sentence. The severity of the punishment, as the author — a trial judge himself — admits, was excessive, but he justifies it on grounds of wartime circumstances.

TABLE 2
Legal Statutes Introduced in Taiwan by the Japanese Colonial Administration,
1896-1910

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1896 | 1. | Establish Taiwan Gov.-Gen. judicial court system. | 3 | 7 | 11 |
| | 2. | Establish Taiwan Gov.-Gen. provisional court system. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for Taiwan Gov.-Gen. communication system. | | | |
| | 4. | Imperial penal code for crimes in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules for Taiwan land tax. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules for Taiwan mining. | | | |
| | 7. | Law pertaining to prompt decision for crimes involving arrest, detention, and minor fines. | | | |
| | 8. | Rules preventing contagious diseases in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 9. | Rules pertaining to taxation of manufactured tea. | | | |
| | 10. | Litigation and adjudication of foreigners. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules pertaining to customs matters and customs duties of Chinese vessels entering and leaving ports. | | | |
| 1897 | 1. | Law pertaining to special exports and imports. | 2 | 6 | 9 |
| | 2. | Taiwan opium law. | | | |
| | 3. | Land tax on land bought and sold in legal statute pertaining to Taiwan government forest and arable land. | | | |
| | 4. | Rules pertaining to deed's tax. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules pertaining to handling firearms. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules pertaining to handling gunpowder. | | | |
| | 7. | Rules pertaining to tax exempt land used by railroads. | | | |
| | 8. | Rules pertaining to exemption of import duties for materials used in constructing railroad of the Taiwan Railway Company Ltd. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1897 | 9. | Rules pertaining to tax on camphor oil. | | | |
| 1898 | 1. | Reform of tax rules for sugar industry. | 1 | 6 | 26 |
| | 2. | Concerning the demand for originals, transcripts, and excerpts of judgements of criminal cases. | | | |
| | 3. | Reform of rules pertaining to deed's tax. | | | |
| | 4. | Rules for registering Taiwan shipping. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules pertaining to handling delinquent taxes in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules for printed forms in civil litigation. | | | |
| | 7. | Rules for relaying court decisions of the Taiwan Gov.-Gen. Office. | | | |
| | 8. | Relating to civil commerce and criminal cases. | | | |
| | 9. | Rules for implementing the law pertaining to civil commerce and criminal cases. | | | |
| | 10. | Rules pertaining to expense for civil litigation. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules pertaining to expense for criminal litigation. | | | |
| | 12. | Law pertaining to private railway companies. | | | |
| | 13. | Rules for registering land. | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for land survey in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 15. | Rules for the Land Survey Commission. | | | |
| | 16. | Law for Taiwan Gov.-Gen. Courts. | | | |
| | 17. | Rules for local administration taxation. | | | |
| | 18. | Law for reprimanding and punishing officials in Taiwan Gov.-Gen. court system | | | |
| | 19. | Law for stabilizing currency and monetary value according to the yen. | | | |
| | 20. | Reform of Taiwan opium law. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| Year | Statute Number | Type of Statute | Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office | Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree | Total Number |
|------|----------------|---|---|--|--------------|
| 1898 | 21. | Law for <i>Pao-chia</i> system. | | | |
| | 22. | Reform of rules governing the Taiwan mining tax. | | | |
| | 23. | Reform of laws pertaining to provisional court system of Taiwan Gov.-Gen. | | | |
| | 24. | Law for punishing crimes committed by bandits. | | | |
| | 25. | Rules for collecting fines from litigation concerning misdemeanors and serious crimes. | | | |
| | 26. | Law concerning storage tax. | | | |
| 1899 | 1. | Law for civil suits. | 7 | 12 | 32 |
| | 2. | Law concerning local charity funds. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for Taiwan prison system. | | | |
| | 4. | Rules for preventing animal diseases. | | | |
| | 5. | Reform of Statute 1 issued in 1899. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules pertaining to underground water in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 7. | Rules for salt monopoly. | | | |
| | 8. | Law pertaining to civil criminal litigation for citizens of Ch'ing China living in Taiwan and its application for other laws. | | | |
| | 9. | Pre-trial for crimes committed by Chinese of Taiwan and Ch'ing China. | | | |
| | 10. | Rules for investigating Taiwan shipping. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules for deposits in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 12. | Rules for registering immovable property in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 13. | Notarized certificates showing no wealth or assets for foreigners. | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for salt lands in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 15. | Rules for the monopoly of camphor and camphor oil in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 16. | Rules for production of camphor and camphor oil in Taiwan. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1899 | 17. | Reform of rules of the Taiwan salt monopoly. | | | |
| | 18. | Abolishing Statute 10 issued in 1896. | | | |
| | 19. | Rules for taxes on commodities and ships leaving Taiwan harbors. | | | |
| | 20. | Rules for Taiwan customs duties. | | | |
| | 21. | Procedures for reforming law statutes. | | | |
| | 22. | Rules for the Taiwan ship tonnage tax. | | | |
| | 23. | Rules for disease inspection in Taiwan harbors. | | | |
| | 24. | Civil law for Chinese living in Taiwan and Ch'ing China. | | | |
| | 25. | Reclamation of sea shore land. | | | |
| | 26. | Higher appeals for litigation of criminal cases. | | | |
| | 27. | Higher appeals and re-examination of provisional court judgement decisions. | | | |
| | 28. | Reform of rules for Taiwan salt monopoly. | | | |
| | 29. | Reform of Statute 19 issued in 1898. | | | |
| | 30. | Rules for building construction in designated zone for official or government use in case of urban development. | | | |
| | 31. | Rules for relief funds allocated at time of natural disasters. | | | |
| | 32. | Reform of procedures governing Taiwan penal system. | | | |
| 1900 | 1. | Statute governing land taken by foreigners. | 5 | 8 | 21 |
| | 2. | Period for leasing and renting land. | | | |
| | 3. | Statute for Taiwan newspapers. | | | |
| | 4. | Statutes for duplicate forms for registered foreigners. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules for lawyers in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of the rules governing laws concerning civil and commercial crimes. | | | |
| | 7. | Statute for aboriginal land. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1900 | 8. | Rules for relief concerning flood damage. | | | |
| | 9. | Reform of rules pertaining to land tax. | | | |
| | 10. | Reform of Statute 9 of 1898. | | | |
| | 11. | Statute concerning land tax which landowners have evaded paying. | | | |
| | 12. | Statute governing sale of Taiwan rice. | | | |
| | 13. | Statute governing Bank of Taiwan issued bank notes and counterfeit notes and their circulation. | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for household construction. | | | |
| | 15. | Rules for garbage and waste disposal. | | | |
| | 16. | Statute governing management of Taiwan railroads. | | | |
| | 17. | Rules for distribution and use of medicines. | | | |
| | 18. | Reform of Taiwan penal system. | | | |
| | 19. | Reform of rules for registering all shipping. | | | |
| | 20. | Statute pertaining to weights and measures. | | | |
| | 21. | Procedures governing security in Taiwan. | | | |
| 1901 | 1. | Crimes concerning the telegraph and telephone system. | 3 | 5 | 23 |
| | 2. | Registration of lawyer's name in litigation matters. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for land use. | | | |
| | 4. | Law for handling criminal litigation. | | | |
| | 5. | Reform of rules for inspecting Taiwan shipping. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules for public irrigation projects. | | | |
| | 7. | Abolishment of tax on sugar industry. | | | |
| | 8. | Statute governing sugar, molasses, and syrup exported to Japan. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|--|--|---|---------------------|
| 1901 | 9. | Reform of taxes on ships and goods leaving Taiwan. | | | |
| | 10. | Rules for preserving Taiwan's forests. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules governing seaman and officers on vessels in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 12. | Tax on sugar, molasses, and syrup. | | | |
| | 13. | Statute for appeals stemming from matters concerning customs duties and tax on goods and ships leaving Taiwan. | | | |
| | 14. | Fiscal affairs in local administration boundaries. | | | |
| | 15. | Reform of rules for registering Taiwan shipping. | | | |
| | 16. | Reform of rules for local administrative taxes. | | | |
| | 17. | Reform of Statute 16 of the local administration tax rules. | | | |
| | 18. | Reform of rules for preventing contagious disease in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 19. | Reform of Statute governing notarized proof of no wealth or assets held by foreigners. | | | |
| | 20. | Reform of rules pertaining to litigation concerning misdemeanors and major crimes. | | | |
| | 21. | Reform of rules for charity dispensed for reason of plant damage. | | | |
| | 22. | Reform of rules for land use. | | | |
| | 23. | Reform of rules for lawyers in Taiwan. | | | |
| 1902 | 1. | Statute governing inconvertible notes issued by Bank of Taiwan. | 3 | 2 | 9 |
| | 2. | Reform of Statute pertaining to opium. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules governing use of facilities for defense of Taiwan. | | | |
| | 4. | Reform of rules for local administrative taxation. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules for promoting sugar industry. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of rules governing the Land Survey Commission. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| Year | Statute Number | Type of Statute | Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office | Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree | Total Number |
|------|----------------|---|---|--|--------------|
| 1902 | 7. | Statute governing return of land tax and government revenues collected is taxes before rules for land registration. | | | |
| | 8. | Rules for fines and penalties for ships' officers and crew. | | | |
| | 9. | Reform of rules concerning a relief funds for natural disasters. | | | |
| 1903 | 1. | Rules concerning bank management. | 3 | 3 | 14 |
| | 2. | Statute for land used as collateral by the Japan Bank for encouragement of industry. | | | |
| | 3. | Reform of rules for public irrigation projects. | | | |
| | 4. | Prohibiting the import of copper. | | | |
| | 5. | Statute for taxing imported silver ingots. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of rules of land survey. | | | |
| | 7. | Reform of the land survey commission. | | | |
| | 8. | Reform of rules for expenses concerning civil litigation. | | | |
| | 9. | Statutes governing settlements of <i>Ta-tsu</i> . | | | |
| | 10. | Reform of rules governing in court system under Taiwan Governor-General official. | | | |
| | 11. | Statutes for conferring land ownership rights. | | | |
| | 12. | Rules for public registration. | | | |
| | 13. | Statutes governing regulation of pawnshops. | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for regulating coinage and notes and their production. | | | |
| 1904 | 1. | Statute pertaining to handling of fines and flogging. | 1 | 4 | 13 |
| | 2. | Rules for limiting interest rates. | | | |
| | 3. | Statutes for officials to effect compromises involving civil suits. | | | |
| | 4. | Law for speedy judgements of crimes. | | | |
| | 5. | Law to prohibit import of foreign auxiliary currency. | | | |
| | 6. | Statute for regulating rights of <i>Ta-tsu</i> . | | | |
| | 7. | Rules for managing weapons and ammunition. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1904 | 8. | Law pertaining to issued of bank notes by Bank of Taiwan. | | | |
| | 9. | Law for government redemption of silver backed bank notes. | | | |
| | 10. | Law governing rights of owners mortgaging their land. | | | |
| | 11. | Reform of Statute 6 issued in 1904. | | | |
| | 12. | Procedures for Taiwan land tax. | | | |
| | 13. | Reform of rules for local administration taxes. | | | |
| 1905 | 1. | Rules for Taiwan tobacco monopoly. | 1 | 4 | 14 |
| | 2. | Law pertaining of jurisdiction of foreigners employed in Taiwan. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for registering land. | | | |
| | 4. | Law for registration of local courts and their branch offices. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules for registration tax. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of rules for deed's tax. | | | |
| | 7. | Reform of Statute 12 issued in 1899. | | | |
| | 8. | Rules for commercial suits refused courts. | | | |
| | 9. | Handling of special civil suits. | | | |
| | 10. | Management of special suits involving criminal cases. | | | |
| | 11. | Statute governing court procedures. | | | |
| | 12. | Reform of Statute 11 issued in 1901. | | | |
| | 13. | Reform of Statute 19 issued in 1899. | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for tax on spirits used by hospitals and industry. | | | |
| 1906 | 1. | Rules for innoculating against small pox. | 7 | 0 | 11 |
| | 2. | Rules for managing vagrants. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for weights and measures. | | | |
| | 4. | Reform of rules for registering land. | | | |
| | 5. | Abolishing Statute 8 issued in 1904. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of Statute 8 issued in 1902. | | | |
| | 7. | Law pertaining to lottery tickets. | | | |
| | 8. | Reform of rules on taxation of cargo and ships leaving Taiwan ports. | | | |
| | 9. | Statute governing names of land owners who, as residents of Ch'ing China, are listed in land registration as covered in items 3 of Ordinances 63, issued in 1896. | | | |




TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Statute Number</i> | <i>Type of Statute</i> | <i>Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office</i> | <i>Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree</i> | <i>Total Number</i> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|---------------------|
| 1906 | 10. | Reform of Taiwan Mining rules. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules for tax levied on spirits used by industry. | | | |
| 1907 | 1. | Statute for Taiwan public schools. | 5 | | 11 |
| | 2. | Rules for encouraging development of camphor. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for managing long term leased land. | | | |
| | 4. | Rules for surveying long term leased land. | | | |
| | 5. | Rules for the commission surveying long term leased land. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules for tax on production of spirits. | | | |
| | 7. | Reform of rules for ship tonnage tax. | | | |
| | 8. | Statute governing civil law for Chinese living in Taiwan and in Ch'ing China. | | | |
| | 9. | Reform of rules for taxing cargo and ships leaving Taiwan ports. | | | |
| | 10. | Reform or rules on taxing spirits used by industry. | | | |
| | 11. | Rules governing crimes related to direct taxation in Taiwan. | | | |
| 1908 | 1. | Reform of rules governing tobacco monopoly. | 1 | 5 | 20 |
| | 2. | Rules governing prevention of plague and other communicable disease. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for organization formed to prevent plague. | | | |
| | 4. | Rules for government sponsored irrigation works. | | | |
| | 5. | Reform of regulations governing courts under the Taiwan Gov.-Gen. Office. | | | |
| | 6. | Reform of rules for taxing cargo and ships leaving Taiwan ports. | | | |
| | 7. | Rules for taxing printed paper. | | | |
| | 8. | Rules for managing Taiwan bank notes. | | | |
| | 9. | Statute governing criminal acts. | | | |
| | 10. | Statute governing the penal system. | | | |
| | 11. | Statute governing civil affairs. | | | |
| | 12. | Statute for registering ships. | | | |

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

| Year | Statute Number | Type of Statute | Statutes Introduced by Taiwan Governor-General Office | Statutes Sanctioned by Imperial Decree | Total Number |
|------|----------------|--|---|--|--------------|
| 1908 | 13. | Reform of rules for public registration | | | |
| | 14. | Rules for preventing and erradicating pests. | | | |
| | 15. | Prohibition of silver imports. | | | |
| | 16. | Abolishment of Statute 9 issued in 1904. | | | |
| | 17. | Statutes for redeeming inconvertible silver notes. | | | |
| | 18. | Rules governing Taiwan farmer associations. | | | |
| | 19. | Statute limiting circulation of silver notes which must be converted to new yen notes. | | | |
| 1909 | 20. | Rules governing private railway construction. | | | |
| | 1. | Statute to reform rules for Taiwan custom duties. | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| | 2. | Statute governing crimes and punishment concerning the printing industry. | | | |
| | 3. | Rules for exempting taxes and postponing tax payments on spirits being exported from Taiwan. | | | |
| | 4. | Reform of speedy judgement of criminal cases. | | | |
| | 5. | Reform of laws governing the <i>Pao-chia</i> system. | | | |
| 1910 | 6. | Rule for taxes on spirits used by industries. | | | |
| | 1. | Reform of Statute 12 issued in 1900. | 3 | 2 | 6 |
| | 2. | Abolishment of rules for deed's tax. | | | |
| | 3. | Reform of Statute 3 issued in 1904. | | | |
| | 4. | Reform of laws governing penal system. | | | |
| | 5. | Reform of rules for civil suits using printing forms. | | | |
| | 6. | Rules governing rights of sugar mills and textile factories in Taiwan. | | | |

Source: These items were translated from a chart showing all laws passed and enforced in Taiwan between 1896 and 1919 as contained in Nagao Keitoku, *Taiwan gyoseiho taii* (A Summary of Administrative Laws in Taiwan), Taipei, 1923.

日本帝國殖民地時期之台灣

一八九五——一九四五

(中文摘要)

一八九五年四月十七日，日本因甲午之役戰勝清廷，獲得台灣與琉球。其始五十年間對台灣人民實施嚴厲統制，並將該島發展成爲繁盛農業殖民地。惟自軍事佔領以後，行政上仍無把握，進展亦緩。初三年屢遭挫折，使日本當局對殖民事業漸失信心。日人以軍事管理處理本島行政，導致中國居民反抗與破壞。大量駐軍更使經費劇增，旋而日本國內官員對台灣之處置頗費週章，且有售與法國之議。

一八九八年第四任台灣總督兒玉源太郎偕民政長官後藤新平抵台，共同擬就行政及改革方針，四年之內遂達成如下效果。(一)二氏將中國居民之反抗加以粉碎，並利用清治時期保甲制度與日人自創現代化警察武力，建立一種地方管理制度。(二)新當局徹底革新財政，大量增加稅收，以供殖民地施政經費。此改革包括土地測量與土地稅改革，徵收消費稅，設立新專賣局以供應分配鴉片、樟腦、酒等。(三)政府用赤字財政措施向日本國內貸款，建設貫通全島鐵路、兩現代化港口、醫藥設備、公路、農業研究所一所、及若干爲中國居民而設之語言學校。該項開銷爲當地中國農民開闢新市場，且加添對日輸出，從而促進地方發展，增進傳統農業方面之專業化與交易。農村收益與生產因而激增。

兒玉、後藤二氏認爲，中國居民的勞力與資本，如有良好環境來運用，殖民地經濟必迅速繁榮。十年之內，果如其言。殖民地政府同時防止中國居民參加政治或法律工作，官職權要概由日人充任。由日籍人員組成之司法系統，對觸犯新法及反抗日本統治者嚴厲處罰。日籍公務員人數急速增加。日本商人與官員多以殖民地爲進身之階。總督府經常着手行政改革（見表五），以加深兼擴展日本帝國對鄉鎮階層各戶控制爲一貫目

標。其政治成就，於中國居民反抗情形，可以概見。反抗次數少，規模小而不集中，僅屬地方性暴動，絕不能引起中國居民之羣衆獨立運動。

一九三五年三月，當局開始逐步設立新機構，鼓勵日人投資台灣，發展新工業，支援日本作戰準備。因對新工業津貼增加支出，殖民地預算驟增。迄一九四〇年，爲防止物價工資膨脹，經濟計劃與管制遂呈普遍。一九四二年實施總動員，乃招募中國居民充當警察，並參加勞工隊以援助日軍。迨至一九四五年八月戰敗爲止，日本對本島居民始終維持其嚴厲控制。

版權為香港中文大學中國文化研究所
所有 未經批准 不得翻印

版權為香港中文大學中國文化研究所
所有 未經批准 不得翻印

版權為香港中文大學中國文化研究所
所有 未經批准 不得翻印

版權為香港中文大學中國文化研究所
所有 未經批准 不得翻印