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Righteousness, Ambition, and Courage: The "Unmoved Heart" of *Mengzi* 孟子 2A2 Revisited

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Introduction

We may attribute to the fourth century B.C.E. moral philosopher Mengzi 孟子, or Master Meng, the first-person teachings recorded by his disciples and found in the book named after him.[1] Part of one passage in the text—labelled simply 2A2 for the sake of convenience—is the focus of this study. Some of my analyses

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I am grateful to the audiences who raised questions at presentations of this paper over the last few years at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Fudan University, Harvard University, the University of Michigan, Peking University, Oxford University, and the University of Washington. Reading the paper as a keynote address at the 2024 meeting in Prague of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy was also a valuable opportunity to improve its contents. My thanks also go to this journal's anonymous reviewers. I am especially thankful to my good friends Joyce Clark and Mack Zhang Xiaoguang 張曉光 for their encouragement and helpful comments.

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[1] I do so in part because I find credible the traditional accounts of the origins of the *Mengzi*. Some have argued that the received text, as we now have it, can be dated to no earlier than the second century C.E. See, for example, Hans van Ess, "Reflections on the Sequence of the First Three Books of the *Mengzi*," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 41.3–4 (2014): 288, and the more detailed arguments found in Michael Hunter, "Did Mencius Know the *Analects*?" *T'oung Pao* 100.1–3 (2014): 33–79, especially 58–76. But such claims relate for the most part to the work of compiling, formatting and arranging the contents of the *Mengzi* we now possess and provide scant reason, beyond scepticism about the traditional dates and authorship of early works, *not* to trace most of the contents of the *Mengzi* back to the pre-Han period and perhaps even to an historical figure called Meng Ke 孟軻. Cf. notes 2 and 9 herein.

and explanations will be familiar to readers of early Chinese thought because they echo in part the commentaries of Zhao Qi 趙岐 (d. 201 C.E.),[2] Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200),[3] and Jiao Xun 焦循 (1763–1820),[4] and are also indebted to the

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[2] Early in the transmission of the *Mengz*i, Zhao Qi composed its earliest surviving commentary 注, having also copied seven of its original bundles of bamboo strips 篇 onto fourteen silk scrolls 卷 and divided their contents into sections 章. For Zhao Qi's biography, see *Hou Hanshu* 後漢書 64.2121–24. The Zhao Qi commentary to *Mengzi* 2A2 is found in the *Mengzi zhushu* 孟子注疏, ed. Ruan Yuan 阮元, *Chongkan Song ben Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* 重刊宋本十三經注疏附校勘記 (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1965), pp. 3.53B–58B. My citations of Zhao's full commentary come from the *Mengzi zhengyi* 孟子正義 of Jiao Xun 焦循 (for which see note 4 below). According to Zhao Qi's "preface" 題辭, the *Mengzi* originally consisted of seven "inner books" and four "outer books." Because Zhao concluded that the latter were not the work of Mengzi, he did not transmit them. Zhao transcribed the seven "inner" bamboo bundles onto fourteen silk scrolls, i.e., seven pairs of scrolls consisting of an "upper" 上 and a "lower" 下 scroll (usually referred to as "A" and "B"). See Jiao's *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 16 and 28. We cannot be certain that the sequence of the scrolls in Zhao's edition is the same as that of the bamboo books he saw; nor do we know the full extent and nature of Zhao's editorial work when he divided the contents into sections. In any case, 2A2 is the second section in the upper scroll of what is now the second pair.

[3] As part of the Song-dynasty re-evaluation of Mengzi and the transformation of the book from a "Philosophical Masters" 諸子 text to one of the more highly esteemed "Four Books" 四書, Zhu Xi composed the *Mengzi jizhu* 孟子集注, first published in 1190, that succeeded for a time in displacing Zhao Qi's work as the most authoritative commentary on the *Mengzi*. See *Dianjiao Sishu zhangju jizhu* 點校四書章句集注, in the series *Xinbian zhuzi jicheng* 新編諸子集成 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), pp. 3.229–33. The editors of this publication, on pp. 11–12, relate that they used a redaction dating to 1811, having noted the problematic textual history of Zhu's original *Sishu zhangju jizhu* after 1190. Zhu's notes are supplemented by the *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類, a compilation of the lessons he provided his followers toward the end of his life. See Li Jingde 黎靖德 (fl. 1263), comp. and ed., *Zhuzi yulei* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986). Li's work is hereafter abbreviated *ZZYL*. All 203 exchanges between Zhu and his students on 2A2 appear in *juan* 卷 52 of the text. All citations include in parentheses the name of the auditor who recorded Zhu's lesson. Zhu began his lessons on the early canonical texts and a variety of other subjects as early as 1173, the year in which the first known note-taking auditor, Liao Deming 廖德明, arrived at Zhu's school. Several uncertainties and imponderables surround the issue, but it is likely that approximately 150 exchanges on *Mengzi* 2A2 between Zhu and his students date to after Zhu's *Mengzi jizhu* manuscript was completed, presumably sometime in 1188 or 1189.

numerous translations into English of *Mengzi* as well as to the considerable amount of scholarship on the passage.[5] But, because 2A2 is an exceptionally rich and complicated passage, the full meaning of which may have escaped earlier authorities, other observations offered herein may not be as familiar.

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[4] Jiao's *Mengzi zhengyi*, rightly regarded as a capstone of the Qing-dynasty philological approach to the *Mengzi*, was intended to restore the prominence of Zhao Qi's commentary while undermining Zhu Xi's work by using the unfortunate strategy of making only the most oblique references to it or ignoring it altogether. Jiao Xun's work was first published in typeset and with punctuation as part of the series *Guoxue jiben congshu* 國學基本叢書 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934). It was later republished by the Zhonghua shuju press in 1987 with added punctuation by Shen Wenzhuo 沈文倬 (1917–2009). Page citations provided in these footnotes are from the 2021 reprint. Much of Jiao's commentary is devoted to explaining Zhao Qi's notes and glosses. But he also quotes widely from the opinions of others when they supplement or help correct Zhao's interpretations. With regard to my approach to 2A2, I regard as most important Jiao Xun's quotes of Chen Zushou 陳組綬 (d. 1637), Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692), and Mao Qiling 毛奇齡 (1623–1716). Their indebtedness to or rejection of Zhu Xi's commentary and notes would be more apparent had Jiao Xun at least provided a summary of Zhu Xi's interpretations. Chen wrote twenty-one *juan* of commentary on the "Four Books," of which ten are devoted to the *Mengzi*. A copy of the late Ming edition of the work, entitled *Jinshengju sanke canbu Sishu ranxi jie* 近聖居三刻參補四書燃犀解 survives in five volumes in the rare books collection of the Harvard-Yenching Library. Wang Fuzhi's notes on *Mengzi* 2A2 are found in his *Du Sishu daquan shuo* 讀四書大全說 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), pp. 8.527–45. Cai Jiahe 蔡家和, "Wang Chuanshan dui Zhuzi *Mengzi*, 'Haoran zhang,' quanshi zhi piping—yi *Du Mengzi daquan shuo* wei ju" 王船山對朱子孟子浩然章詮釋之批評——以讀孟子大全說為據, *Dangdai Ruxue yanjiu* 當代儒學研究 12 (2012): 151–78, has a useful discussion of differences between Zhu Xi's and Wang Fuzhi's understanding of *Mengzi* 2A2. Mao Qiling's "lectures" on 2A2 and other topics were written down by his follower Zhang Shifa 章世法 (fl. 17th cent.) in a subsequently damaged manuscript, given the title *Yijiang jian* 逸講箋 and included along with 116 other items in Mao's collected works, the *Xihe heji* 西河合集. Mao's views on 2A2 fill the first *juan* of the *Yijiang jian* and are repeated at length at *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 210–11, and immediately subsequent pages. An important purpose of my study is to remind readers of the *Mengzi* of the rich and subtle insights found in Zhao Qi, Zhu Xi, and the pages of Jiao Xun's commentary.

[5] For a list of translations of the *Mengzi*, see Jeffrey Riegel, "A Root Split in Two: *Mengzi* 3A5 Reconsidered," *Asia Major* 28.1 (2015): 40n10. A more recent addition to the

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Mengzi 2A1 and 2A2 record an extended conversation between the elderly Mengzi and a disciple, a nobleman named Gongsun Chou 公孫丑, that took place in the large eastern kingdom of Qi 齊 late in the reign of Xuan 宣王 (r. 319–301 B.C.E.).[6] Mengzi had first gained the ear of King Xuan by appearing to read his

(*Note 5—Continued*)

corpus of *Mengzi* translations is Robert Eno's *Mencius: Translation, Commentary, Notes*, Version 1.0 (online translation, copyright Robert Eno, 2016). My first attempt to understand the "Unmoved Heart" of *Mengzi* 2A2 dates to the mid-1970s. That led to the publication of my "Reflections on an Unmoved Mind" in a 1980 issue of the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*. It reflects the degree to which I was at that time indebted to a 1973 paper on *Mengzi* 2A2 written by David Nivison. Nivison's study was subsequently published as chapter 8 in *The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Bryan W. van Norden (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1996). The Chinese translation of my earlier work on 2A2 for inclusion in Kevin Huang Guan-yun 黃冠雲, ed., *Wang Anguo Hanxue lunwen ji* 王安國漢學論文集 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 2024), pp. 175–210, was the occasion of my decision to attempt a new study of the text; hence the "revisited" of my title. A comparatively large number of specialized studies on 2A2 have appeared since the publication of my original article. These are cited and occasionally commented upon in the notes below. For an introduction to the various issues in Mengzi's moral philosophy that serve as a context for his 2A2 arguments, readers are referred to the eight essays included in Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2002).

[6] In the appendix on "Events in the Life of Mencius," in D. C. Lau, trans., *Mencius* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1970), Professor Lau demonstrates that: 1) the sequence of Mengzi's visits first to the kingdom of Wei 魏 (referred to as Liang 梁 in the text after the name of the kingdom's capital) and then to Qi is chronologically correct; 2) there was only one visit to Qi; and 3) the visit took place during the reign of King Xuan. There have been more recently published claims that ignore Lau's arguments but no new evidence that overturns them. That Mengzi was already old by the time of these visits to Wei and Qi is proved by Hui 惠, king of the former, twice addressing him as "old man" 叟, in *Mengzi* 1A1 and 1A5. Lau believes that Mengzi, at the time of his conversation with Gongsun Chou, must have been close to seventy years old or even older (Lau, *Mencius*, p. 10). It is possible that other *Mengzi* passages, especially 2B2, 2B6, 2B14, 7B1, and others involving Gongsun Chou, are fragmentary excerpts from the same conversation. In part because Zhao Qi appears to stress the importance of theme rather than chronology in the arrangement and sequence of the sections of the

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mind and reacting empathetically,[7] but then the king and the philosopher parted ways because of Mengzi's disapproval of Xuan's aggressive annexation of the neighbouring kingdom of Yan 燕.[8] Mengzi thus found himself unwanted in Qi and was on the verge of departing the kingdom. I assume that Gongsun Chou was not only the interlocutor but also the recorder of the conversation found in 2A1 and 2A2.[9] The second pair of scrolls bears his name as its title. Although 2A1 and 2A2 are parts of the same conversation, I concentrate on the first 650 words in 2A2 and treat them as a stand-alone unit in the larger text. Compared with the internal coherence of its concepts and terminology, this 650-word part of the text is only loosely connected to both the contents of 2A1 as well as the remaining 446 words that form the balance of 2A2.[10]

Gongsun Chou poses seven questions to Mengzi that partition the text into segments. Mengzi's replies are, however, significantly more than answers to those questions. In them, he instructs Gongsun Chou on different *dao* 道, sets of principles and practices that *he* claims or at least implies to have achieved for their respective advocates an "Unmoved Heart" 不動心. Among the *dao* quoted by Master Meng is a teaching he attributes to Gaozi 告子, a figure well-known from his exchange with Mengzi on human nature in 6A1–4 and yet of still uncertain identity and connection with Mengzi. Mengzi's quotations of the *dao* of Gaozi and others constitute a single stratum that cuts across the text's segments. Because the various *dao* he quotes are expressed in symmetrical, elliptical, or grammatically odd phrases reminiscent of early poetry as well as in obscure vocabulary, Mengzi explicates

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(*Note 6—Continued*)

text, van Ess identifies what he takes to be the major themes of the sections that make up the first three pairs of scrolls, i.e., the part of the text mostly devoted to Mengzi's interviews with rulers. 2A2 is an exception in that it consists of Mengzi's replies to the questions of a disciple. Yet van Ess rightly identifies the theme of 2A2 as "benevolent government" by lumping it with others in what he takes to be a group consisting of 2A1–7; see van Ess, "Reflections on the Sequence of the First Three Books of the *Mengzi*," p. 298.

7 See *Mengzi* 1A7.

8 See *Mengzi* 1B10 and 1B11.

9 In the "preface" to his *Mengzi* commentary, Zhao Qi says that at the end of his life, Mengzi compiled the text's passages together with his followers Gongsun Chou and Wan Zhang 萬章. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 12.

10 When below I refer to 2A2, I mean only the 650-word part of it on which my study focuses.

them with paraphrases or word-glosses, defining difficult terms or substituting rare words with their more common alternatives. Mengzi's explications thus constitute a separate stratum or metatext that also cuts across the text's segments. The format of "canon" 道 (or 經) and "explanation" 說 (or 解) represented by these two strata is not uncommon in early Chinese philosophical literature.[11] And as with other examples, Mengzi's metatext was not merely lexical but also served philosophical and pedagogical ends. Gongsun Chou's questions both prompt Mengzi's explanations and serve to identify them as Mengzi's metatext supplement to the quotations of the various *dao*.

Mengzi 2A2 presents two related challenges: to identify its fine points of structure and meaning, and to demonstrate how its interrelated terms and concepts, though obscure and difficult to map, bind the passage together into a coherent whole. A good understanding of the relationship between Mengzi's metatext and his recitation of the teachings of others—especially Gaozi—as well as of his own is a key to meeting these challenges. It also reveals that the major topics in Master Meng's lesson to Gongsun Chou are the roles and distinguishing characteristics of three concepts in early self-cultivation philosophy: *Yi* 義, "Righteousness," *Zhi* 志, "Ambition," and *Qi* 氣, "Courage."[12] Explaining the meaning of these

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[11] Among texts transmitted from pre-Han times, examples of the "canon and explanation" format are found in the several "Chushuo" 儲說 chapters of the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子 as well as in that text's "Yu Lao" 喻老 and "Jie Lao" 解老 chapters. See Sarah A. Queen, "*Han Feizi* and the Old Master: A Comparative Analysis and Translation of Han Feizi Chapter 20, 'Jie Lao,' and Chapter 21, 'Yu Lao," in Paul R. Goldin, ed., *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2013), pp. 197–256. Chapters 40–43 of the *Mozi* 墨子 are another example of texts written in the *jing-shuo* format. See Sun Yirang 孫詒讓, ed., *Mozi xiangu* 墨子閒詁 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 279–365, and A. C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978). An example is also seen in the so-called Wuxing 五行 manuscript excavated in 1973 from a Han-dynasty tomb at Mawangdui 馬王堆, Changsha. For the latter, see Jeffrey Riegel "Eros, Introversion, and the Beginnings of *Shijing* Commentary," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 57.1: 143–77, esp. 145–49. The format of text and metatext is another feature that distinguishes the 650-graph passage from 2A1 and the balance of 2A2.

[12] I capitalize the transcriptions and translations of these and some other terms to identify them as specialized and to emphasize their importance in 2A2.

terms and their particular distribution in the text and metatext is central to my argument. Mengzi's lengthy metatext explanation of the inextricable link between Gaozi's Courage and his Ambition—in contrast to Mengzi's intimate embrace of Righteousness—leads, in my conclusion, to a discussion of Gaozi's identity and a reconsideration of the nature of his relationship to Mengzi.

The Opening Dialogue of 2A2

The 2A2 passage opens with Gongsun Chou asking Mengzi hypothetically whether it would or would not *dong xin* 動心, "move his heart," i.e., frighten him, if he were appointed to a high position with the expectation that Qi would be, either as the Hegemonic Domain 霸 or as the seat of the one True Kingship 王, the pre-eminent leader of all the other states, no different from the position of power and prestige that the previous high officials had won for the state in the past.[13] Gongsun Chou asks the question in immediate response to what Mengzi had just stated in 2A1. There Gongsun Chou asked, also hypothetically, whether Mengzi could repeat the accomplishments of the earlier Qi luminaries Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 643) and Yan

[13] The Chinese text and a full translation of the 650-word part of 2A2 upon which the present study focuses are found in the Appendix. My translation and interpretation of Gongsun Chou's question closely follow Zhao Qi's commentary, for which see *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 202. The phrase *bu yi* 不異, translated as "no different from," is glossed as "not surprising"不足怪 by Zhu Xi, for which see *Mengzi jizhu* 3.229. But Zhu backs away from that gloss in subsequent lessons to his students. See *ZZYL* 52.1231 (Xi Gaiqing 襲蓋卿), where Zhu defines the phrase as 不是差異, in agreement with Zhao Qi's interpretation. In 2A1, Gongsun Chou had asked about being a Hegemon but Mengzi replied by talking about being a True King. A Hegemon was one who ruled because of the military might of his state; a True King ruled because of his moral qualities and suasion. For Mengzi, examples of the latter were the virtuous rulers who had founded the "Three Dynasties," i.e., the Xia, Shang, and Zhou. In 2A2, Gongsun Chou's initial hypothetical question involves both Hegemons *and* True Kings. Van Ess's "Reflections on the Sequence of the First Three Books of the Mengzi" (p. 292) mistakenly takes Gongsun Chou's initial question to be based on matters of fact rather than hypothetical because 2B6 says that Mengzi already held office in Qi, serving as a Gentleman 卿 at the court. But Gongsun Chou is asking about the highest ministerial position in Qi—as he also does in the opening question of 2A1—an office to which Mengzi may have aspired but never attained. Cf. note 14.

Ying 晏嬰 who had made their respective rulers Hegemon and Pre-eminent 顯.[14] Mengzi dismissed Gongsun Chou's question (and the accomplishments of Guan Zhong and Yan Ying) by claiming that it would be easy for him to achieve for Qi the superior status as the seat of the True Kingship.[15] Mengzi elaborates on this claim by pointing out to Gongsun Chou that Qi already possesses the qualities necessary for King Xuan to be a True King.[16] Mengzi's claims in 2A1 of the ease with which the benevolent government of a True King could be put into place in Qi echo his attempt, recorded in 1A7, to persuade King Xuan that it would not be difficult for the king to govern his people with kindness. Xuan's failure to do so and thus be a True King was not because he lacked the ability, but was rather due to his refusal to act.[17] By asking Mengzi in 2A2 if there would be anything in his serving Qi and practising his *dao* that would frighten him, Gongsun Chou is questioning whether implementing benevolent government in Qi would be as easy as Mengzi claims: Would not its difficulty in fact move Mengzi's heart?[18]

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[14] Guan Zhong served Sire Huan of Qi 齊桓公 (r. 684–643) and Yan Ying served Sire Ling of Qi 齊靈公 (r. 581–554). A hegemonic domain was ruled by an "overlord" 伯, literally "uncle," who was supposed to act on behalf of and in the interests of the Zhou king, protecting the covenants and leading campaigns of chastisement against those who broke them. The term "Pre-eminent" 顯, used by Gongsun Chou to identify the status Yan Ying won for his ruler, does not occur frequently as the designation of the ruler of a state that lords it over other states, but we should probably understand such a ruler as similar in power and prerogatives to the "overlord."

[15] *Mengzi* 2A1: 以齊王易然.

[16] Mengzi elaborates in 2A1 on the reasons for the ease with which he could accomplish this status for Qi: given Qi's extensive territory, the desperation of its people to be governed humanely, and the overdue rise of a True King.

[17] *Mengzi* 1A7: 故王之不王，不為也，非不能也。

[18] In his commentary on the passage, Zhao Qi says that Gongsun Chou is asking whether fear of the difficulties of the tasks he would face might not debilitate Mengzi and prevent him from acting. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 202. In a record the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 dates to 690 B.C.E., when the aged King Wu of Chu 楚武王 (r. 741–690 B.C.E.) confessed to his wife that he was "frightened" 余心蕩 by the prospect of leading his armies into an impending battle, she explained to him: "Your majesty's span of life is exhausted. Your heart once full is now beating in fright, in accord with the natural cycle of things" 王之祿盡矣。盈而蕩，天之道也. See Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., *Chunqiu Zuozhuan*

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Mengzi replies "No!" 否 and adds allusively that his heart was unmoved at the age of forty 四十不動心. Although a moved heart refers to the state of being frightened—*dong* 動 and its synonym *dang* 蕩 are onomatopoetic for the sound of the heart pounding in fear and apprehension—an *Un*moved Heart is not simply its negation. The transformation of *dong xin* into *Budongxin* is not simply fright being stilled or the cessation of fear. It is instead the replacement of fear with the courage to confront difficulties.[19] At *Mengzi* 6B15, the only other passage in the text where *dong xin* occurs, the phrase refers to fright that was instrumental, for the ancient worthies who experienced it, in achieving a hardened nature, i.e., the resoluteness necessary for their eventual rise to the lofty official positions in which they distinguished themselves.[20] This suggests that the experience of the fright of a moved heart precipitates the steps by which one accomplishes an Unmoved Heart, the state in which one does not suffer debilitating fright but instead possesses the bravery necessary to perform a task or reach a goal. In other words, the sensation of *dong xin* caused Mengzi to deploy the techniques by which, at the age of forty, he first achieved *Budongxin*.[21] Mengzi's pinpointing the age of this

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(*Note 18—Continued*)

zhu 春秋左傳注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), Zhuang 4, 163. See also Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, trans., *Zuo Tradition* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), p. 145. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that a second reason for Gongsun Chou enquiring whether his heart would be moved if offered a demanding position in Qi was worry over Mengzi's old age.

19 That *Budongxin* means courage is confirmed by subsequent 2A2 passages in which Mengzi substitutes for the phrase the terms *Yong* 勇 and *Qi* 氣. For *dang* see note 18. Besides their apparent synonymy, I suspect there is a deeper linguistic connection been *dong* and *dang*, but the evidence is insufficient to prove it. Wang Li 王力, *Tongyuan zidian* 同源字典 (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1982), p. 357, supposes there was a phonological link between the two but he provides no details. Axel Schuessler, *ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), p. 215, makes note of Wang Li's supposition without further comment.

20 The key phrase in 6B15 describes how Heaven "moved the hearts and hardened the natures" 動心忍性 of those upon him it would bestow great responsibilities.

21 Mao Qiling, quoted at *Mengzi zhengyi* (p. 210), argues that Mengzi did not practise a novel set of techniques to free himself from fright and never spoke of an art of stopping his heart from moving. He points out that the heart inevitably moves, and one

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accomplishment is noteworthy. It is surely an allusion to the famous *Lunyu* passage in which Kongzi recounted the stages of his life, decade by decade, and claimed that "at forty I suffered no doubts" 四十而不惑.[22] Whatever broader semantic resonances "Unmoved Heart" might communicate, for Mengzi, in this dialogue with Gongsun Chou, it meant possessing a Courage free of hesitation and misgivings. From the age of forty he could easily undo or reverse any of the fraught consequences that inevitably accompany the onset of fear when confronting a challenge.

Mengzi's reply leads Gongsun Chou to compare him favourably to the legendary strongman Meng Ben 孟奔, a conclusion that may suggest that Gongsun Chou understood the stalwart confidence of Mengzi's Unmoved Heart as something akin to bodily strength.[23] If so, Mengzi does not reject this linkage—he will later,

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(*Note 21—Continued*)

must therefore experience fright at various points in life. He adds that, strictly speaking, an utterly still heart is a Daoist or Buddhist notion that the Ru never embraced. According to Mao, Mengzi's confidence was based on his having practised the two self-cultivation arts techniques well known from elsewhere in the text: *cun xin* 存心, "preserving the heart," that is, retaining the moral qualities such as Righteousness with which human beings are born (*Mengzi* 4B28); and *qiu fang xin* 求放心, "seeking to recover a lost heart," that is, working to restore the moral qualities that are lost because of the difficulties of everyday life (*Mengzi* 6A11). Basing himself on the Appendix I.B (1) interpretation of Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), for which see *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 203, Mao argues that, along with indifference to the trappings and responsibilities of high office that might cause others to fear being burdened with them, achieving an Unmoved Heart is not an art but an outcome of such practices. Mao elaborates further on what he takes to be the inevitability of the heart moving in his comments on Appendix III. D(1). See *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 214–15. Matthias Richter, "Must We All Have a Vast, Flowing *qi*? Revisiting *Mengzi* 2A2," *Nanyang Journal of Chinese Literature and Culture* 1.1 (2021): 32, expresses a similar view on the relative unimportance of the concept of "Unmoved Heart" in the grander scheme of Mengzi's self-cultivation thought.

22 *Lunyu* 2.4.

23 Meng Ben is mentioned three times in the *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋. The most revealing of these is an anecdote found at Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷, *Lüshi chunqiu jiaozhu* 呂氏春秋校注 (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1984), 14.829. See also John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans, *The Annals of Lü Buwei* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 14/8.3, pp. 333–34. Although these references do not suggest that he was anything more than physically strong, Gongsun Chou may have had some reason to think that it

(*Continued on next page*)

however, make it abundantly clear that his Unmoved Heart has nothing to do with physical force and potency—but nevertheless dismisses the comparison by observing that it would "not be difficult" 不難 to surpass Meng Ben since, Mengzi elaborates, Gaozi, or Master Gao, succeeded in not moving his heart at an even younger age than Mengzi had. If he were younger than forty, Gaozi would not yet have reached the necessary level of maturity traditionally associated with full-body strength.[24] This prompts Gongsun Chou to ask, "Are there *dao* for achieving an Unmoved Heart?" Mengzi replies, "Yes, there are" 有.[25] In the balance of the passage, he names others, including Gaozi and himself, whose *dao* enabled them to avert a heart that moves. These exemplars all illustrate that an Unmoved Heart is not simply a heart free of fright, but a heart that has been by one means or another strengthened against adversity.

Mengzi mentions Master Gao by name twice more in 2A2. In the first of these, Mengzi attributes to him a sixteen-word passage he quotes as the main part of an explanation of how Gaozi came to have an Unmoved Heart.[26] Mengzi

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(*Note 23—Continued*)

was apt in the context to refer to him. This is the interpretation of Mao Qiling, *contra* Zhu Xi, for which see *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 204. See also the comments of Nakai Riken 中井履軒 (1732–1817) quoted by Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang jishi xinquan" 孟子知言養氣章集釋新詮, a chapter in his *Mengxue sixiang shilun* 孟學思想史論 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1991), p. 343: "Meng Ben was someone who did not change his expression when a bare blade touched his chest and his life hung in the balance. This is why he is used as a comparison. It is acceptable not to enquire whether his bravery was physical or moral." Huang's study is especially valuable because of its quotations from Japanese and Korean commentaries.

24 The "Qu li" 曲禮 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記 identifies the distinguishing qualities a man possesses in each decade of his life: "A man in his forties is said to be employed in an official position by virtue of his strength" 四十曰強而仕. Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574–648) notes that the strength referred to in the passage is that of "being free from doubt" 不惑. See *Liji zhushu* 禮記注疏 1.17A–B for the passage and Kong Yingda's commentary. Zhao Qi alludes to the *Liji* passage in his comments on the significance of Mengzi's 2A2 claim. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 203. For his part, Zhu Xi refers elliptically to the *Liji* passage and then quotes *Lunyu* 2.4. See *Mengzi jizhu* 3.229.

25 The use of the term *dao* here by Gongsun Chou and Mengzi is one of the clues that the passages of 2A2 should be divided between canon and explanation or text and metatext.

26 See Appendix III.A.

notes his approval of its second half—though he rejects its first half; and perhaps Mengzi's original mention of Gaozi's relatively youthful attainment of the goal was also intended as a compliment, though perhaps a back-handed one, since Mengzi later makes clear that Gaozi's precociousness was marked by impetuousness and recklessness. In his other reference to Gaozi in 2A2, Mengzi criticizes him: "Master Gao never understood Righteousness and therefore made it external to him" 告子未嘗知義以其外之也.[27] The quotation of Gaozi's words and Mengzi's comments on them occupy a pivotal position in 2A2. And thus, Gaozi's identity and Mengzi's assessment of him form another major topic in my study of the text.

Who was Gaozi? Here is part of an answer.[28] *Mengzi* 6A1–4 record a discussion between Mengzi and Gaozi that is for the most part related to *xing* 性, "human nature." It is their only interaction recorded in the *Mengzi* or anywhere else in the literature of early China. Amongst analogies meant to illustrate that human nature is inherently neither good nor bad and that being "Benevolent" 仁 and "Righteous" in one's treatment of others has nothing to do with it, Master Gao says that "Righteousness is external, not internal" 義外也，非內也.[29] Thus, the Gaozi of 2A2 and the Gaozi of scroll six appear to be the same person. However, there is, in addition, a Gaozi who is identified in the *Mozi* as a disciple of Mo Di 墨翟 (fl. 5th cent. B.C.E.), patriarch of a school of thought that opposed the Ru 儒, or "Confucian," teachings cherished by Mengzi.[30] Is it possible that this individual is also the Gaozi of the *Mengzi*? Several scholars, both premodern and modern, have made this identification,[31] attempting to explain away the chronological difficulties involved

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[27] See Appendix IV.B, concluding sentence.

[28] Another part is found in the conclusion to this study.

[29] See *Mengzi* 6A4. What Gaozi meant by "external" and "internal" is subject to a broad range of interpretations.

[30] The name Gaozi, or Master Gao, figures in the three paragraphs that conclude the "Gongmeng" 公孟 chapter of the Mozi. See Sun Yirang, *Mozi xiangu*, 12.426–27; and cf. John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans., *Mozi: A Study and Translation of the Ethical and Political Writings* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2013), p. 366, for a translation of these three paragraphs.

[31] Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (1223–1296) and Hong Yixuan 洪頤煊 (1765–1837) agree that the Gaozi of *Mengzi* 2A2 and Book 6 was the Master Gao who appears in the *Mozi* as a disciple of Master Mo. See the commentary of Sun Yirang (1848–1908) at *Mozi xiangu* 12.426. See note 98 below for the scholars who rejected the argument.

by arguing that a very young Gaozi was Mo Di's follower and, when much older, he engaged in the 6A1–4 discussion with Mengzi who was at the time significantly junior to him.[32]

On Nurturing Courage

The first *dao* for achieving an Unmoved Heart that Mengzi cites in response to Gongsun Chou's request for instruction is that of Beigong You 北宮黝, possibly a native of Qi.[33] Mengzi labels Beigong You's *dao* as "Nurturing Courage" 養勇 and recounts from memory its six practices.[34] These consist chiefly of not flinching when threatened, regarding even the slightest affront as a major attack, and avenging oneself equally against all, with no regard for whether they are baseborn or lordly.[35]

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[32] Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) noted the chronological difficulty in affiliating Gaozi with both Mozi and Mengzi and resolved it by arguing that, when young, Gaozi had been a disciple of the aged Mozi and, when old, he had been challenged by the middle-aged Mengzi. Qian Mu 錢穆 quoted Liang's arguments and agreed with him that Gaozi could have been Mozi's disciple and much later met with Mengzi. See Qian Mu, *Xian-Qin zhuzi xinian* 先秦諸子繫年 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002), pp. 217–18. See also Huang Junjie, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang jishi xinquan," p. 345, and Nivison, *The Ways of Confucianism*, p. 124.

[33] A Beigongzi 北宮子 is mentioned at *Huainanzi* 淮南子 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 9.304. The commentary of Gao You 高誘 (*c.* 168–212) identifies him as a native of Qi and the same person as Mengzi's Beigong You. Qian Daxin 錢大昕, *Qianyan tang wenji* 潛研堂文集 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1922[?]), 9.125–26, also proposed that Beigong You was a native of Qi. For Mengzi's quote of Beigong You's teachings, see Appendix II.A.

[34] Mengzi's metatext substitution of *yong* for *bu dong xin* here as well as with regard to the two sets of teachings he subsequently quotes provides not only a definition for "Unmoved Heart" but also a framework in which he can juxtapose and compare these various *dao*.

[35] According to Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu* 3.229, it is his stubborn and unwavering insistence on prevailing over all adversaries that constitutes Beigong You's method for overcoming fright and achieving an Unmoved Heart. Li Minghui [Ming-huei Lee] 李明輝, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang de yili jiegou" 孟子知言養氣章的義理結構, a chapter in his *Mengzi chongtan* 孟子重探 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 2001), p. 6, points out that Beigong You's insistence on prevailing over all adversaries is characterized in the "Xing'e" 性惡 chapter of the *Xunzi* 荀子 as the basest of the three types of fortitude. See John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, vol. III (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 161.

Mengzi contrasts Beigong You's *dao* with how Meng Shishe 孟施舍, an otherwise unknown figure, kept his heart unmoved.[36] Also labelled as "Nurturing Courage," Meng Shishe's three principles, as remembered by Mengzi, were essentially to persevere fearlessly no matter the odds against him.[37] In a commentarial remark on Meng Shishe's *dao*, Mengzi compares him with the famous first-generation Ru school disciple Zengzi 曾子, or Master Zeng, otherwise known, in the *Mengzi* and elsewhere, for the sincere and selfless filial piety he showed his parents. That Mengzi finds Beigong You similar to another first-generation disciple, Zi Xia 子夏, is meant to dismiss both of them for practising an inferior form of nurturing courage.[38] Although he professes ignorance of which of the two—Beigong You's or Meng Shishe's—is "worthier" 賢,[39] Mengzi nevertheless distinguishes Meng Shishe's *dao* for "Nurturing Courage" by equating it with "keeping intact *Qi*" 守氣.[40] Mengzi's metatext gloss both affirms that *yong* 勇, or "courage," is a form of the "Vital

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[36] The correct form of Meng Shishe's given name 名 is disputed. Zhao Qi and Zhu Xi argue that *shi* 施 is not the first syllable of a two-syllable name in this context but rather a phonetic indicator of the pronunciation of the initial consonant of *she* 舍. That is, the proper form of the given name is simply She. Yan Ruoqu 閻若璩 (1636–1704), contradicting Zhao, says that *shi* does not serve a phonetic purpose here and that the name should be read Shishe. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 207. For Zhu Xi's argument, see *Mengzi jizhu* 3.229. For other opinions on the form of Meng Shishe's name, see Huang Junjie, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang jishi xinquan," pp. 352–53, and Richter, "Must We All Have a Vast, Flowing *qi*?" p. 32 note 3.

[37] See Appendix II.B. In his 1B3 interview with King Xuan, Mengzi labels as "minor" 小 the courage of the sort displayed by Beigong You and dismisses it as "the courage of a commoner who can only confront as an enemy a lone individual" 此匹夫之勇敵一人者也. We should probably understand Meng Shishe's indifference to victory as a sign that he was able to take on whole armies. According to Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu* 3.229, his focus solely on remaining fearless while being indifferent to victory constitutes Meng Shishe's Unmoved Heart.

[38] See Appendix II.C. *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 208, provides various explanations of why Mengzi makes these particular comparisons. In the remaining part of 2A2, following its first 650 words, Gongsun Chou attempts (but fails) to get Mengzi to evaluate the respective wisdom of Zi Xia and several others of Kongzi's disciples.

[39] See Appendix II.C. Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230, defines *xian* 賢 as *sheng* 勝, "win, prevail."

[40] The received text reads *shou yue* 守約, a scribal error caused by mistaken dittography of the later, second occurrence of *shou yue* in Mengzi's characterization of Zengzi's

(*Continued on next page*)

Breath" that nurtures life and provides the energy necessary to meet a challenge, as well as makes clear that *Qi* in the present context means "Courage."[41] We can surmise that, in Mengzi's view, Beigong You's *dao* may have involved nurturing Courage, but that he failed to keep it intact, perhaps frittering away whatever Courage he possessed by indiscriminately bullying all who made him fearful.

Mengzi's comparison of Meng Shishe to Master Zeng leads to a quote of a story about Master Zeng's courage, embedded in which is a *dao* Master Zeng entitles "Enlarged Courage" 大勇 and attributes to *the* Master 夫子, Master Kong 孔子 (Confucius),[42] a clear signal that it is superior to the two already quoted and thus worthy of Gongsun Chou's special attention. The essence of Zengzi's *dao* consists of hesitating rather than acting impulsively when fearful, turning inward before going into battle in order to discover whether or not his heart is *suo* 縮, "tightened, contracted, or shrunken." A lack of *suo* would render Zengzi incapable of frightening even an untrained commoner, but with this quality, he could march

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(*Note 40—Continued*)

nurturing courage, for which see Appendix II.C. That the correct reading at this particular point in *Mengzi* 2A2 is 守氣 is based in part on Mengzi's repeating this exact characterization of Meng Shishe's methods below. For the argument in favour of the correction, see Song Shuping 宋淑萍, "*Mengzi jizhu buzheng*" 孟子集注補正, *Shumu jikan* 書目季刊 11.1 (June 1977): 67, and Huang Junjie, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang jishi xinquan," p. 358. In addition to their arguments it should be noted that Mengzi's use of *shou yue* is a metatext gloss on the more obscure term *suo* 縮 which appears in the Zengzi anecdote. It would thus be nonsensical to read *shou yue* here as a characterization of Meng Shishe's attitude towards victory and defeat. Zhao Qi failed to recognize the nature of the second occurrence of *shou yue* in the text he examined and so defined the first, mistaken, occurrence of *yue* as *yueyao* 約要, "essential." See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 208. Zhu Xi adopted Zhao Qi's definition, for which see *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230. In the *ZZYL* lessons to his followers Zhu Xi repeats this mistaken interpretation. See *ZZYL* 52.1234 (Jin Quwei 金去偽), 1234 (Shen Xian 沈僩), and 1234 (Chen Chun 陳淳). Zhu's mistaken reading is defended by Li, "Mengzi zhiyan yangqi zhang de yili jiegou," p. 8.

41 For Courage being a form of the Vital Breath, cf. the occurrence of the term *yongqi* 勇氣 at *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu*, Zhuang 10.1, 183. Durrant et al., *Zuo Tradition*, p. 161, misconstrue the term to mean "the energy one gets from courage." Courage is itself the energy that is aroused by the beating of war drums.

42 Appendix II.C (2).

against a multitude.[43] If he had found his heart to be *bu suo* 不縮, i.e., "loose and unrestrained," Zengzi would have taken steps to tighten and restrain it. In his metatext, Mengzi compares Zengzi's *dao* with that of Meng Shishe by saying that Zengzi "kept intact the binding" 守約.[44] That *suo* is replaced by its synonym *yue* 約, "bound tight, constricted," confirms that, with regard to Zengzi's reflections on the modalities of his heart on the eve of a conflict, we should take *suo* to describe shrinkage or pulling back in his heart as if it were fettered or tightly reined in.[45] In other words, shrinkage in his heart is both tantamount to Zengzi having made it "unmoved" as well as the precondition of his possessing "Enlarged Courage."

Mengzi's "Flood-like" Courage

At this point in the text, Gongsun Chou deferentially asks Mengzi if he might learn about Mengzi's own Unmoved Heart and that of Master Gao. Mengzi replies by quoting a sixteen-word utterance he attributes to Gaozi.[46] But before turning to an analysis of it, I first summarize what Mengzi says subsequently of his own

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[43] Zhao Qi substitutes "Righteousness" 義 and "Uprightness" 直 for *suo* in his commentary. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 208–9. Zhu Xi defines the term by citing its two occurrences in the "Tan gong" 檀弓 chapter of the canonical *Liji* in which it refers to the vertical stitching on a cap and cords tied lengthwise around a coffin. But he concludes that the term refers to "Uprightness." See *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230. For the passages that Zhu Xi cites, see *Liji zhushu* 7.127B and 8.152B. Zhao and Zhu have both chosen to understand *suo* in terms of what they take to be its connotations rather than its literal meaning. Their doing so was no doubt inspired by the prominence of the terms "Righteousness" and "Uprightness" in Mengzi's metatext analysis of his own *dao* and what they saw as the parallels in Zengzi's and Mengzi's teachings on cultivating Courage.

[44] Appendix II.C (3).

[45] Cf. also the *Liji* passages quoted by Zhu Xi cited in note 43 above. My reading rejects the attempts by Zhao Qi and Zhu Xi to understand *yue* 約 as "essential." Cf. note 40 above. Wang Fuzhi, *Du Sishu daquan shuo*, 8.528, defines *suo* as *guzi* 骨子, the skeleton, framework, or "ribs" that hold together an opened umbrella or unfolded fan. Though he thus favours a metaphor different from what informed Zhu Xi's interpretation, Wang nevertheless concluded that the ribs that serve this purpose vis-à-vis Zengzi's heart are Righteousness: "Inside there is a form of Righteousness that acts as a skeleton . . . Righteousness is the skeleton. It is therefore said, 'He used Righteousness to keep his interior [=heart] upright'" 內裏有箇義作骨子……義即縮也。故曰義以直內.

[46] Appendix III.A.

Unmoved Heart. Reversing the original sequence in the text helps demonstrate that Mengzi's *dao* is not only built upon the foundation of what he says about Zengzi's Enlarged Courage but also contrasts sharply with the way Gaozi attained his Unmoved Heart, and thus makes more explicit what distinguishes Gaozi's methods from his own.

When Gongsun Chou asks Mengzi about the ways in which his self-cultivation arts are superior to those of Master Gao, Mengzi replies by naming two skills he claims for himself: "I understand words, and I am good at nurturing my Flood-like Courage" 我知言我善養吾浩然之氣.[47] At Gongsun Chou's prompting, Mengzi speaks first of the latter.[48] Because he avers that what he means by Flood-like Courage is "hard to explain" 難言, the length and detail of his subsequent commentary on the subject should be understood as Mengzi's struggle to put into words his superiority to Gaozi.[49]

Mengzi defines "Flood-like" 浩然, i.e., the "extensive, far-reaching" bravery that he possesses by adducing as synonyms the terms *zhida* 至大, "the largest," and *zhigang* 至剛, "the hardest," purposeful echoes of Master Zeng's phrase, "Enlarged Courage."[50] Mengzi adds that if this Courage is "nurtured" 養 with Uprightness, it will "fill the space between Heaven and Earth" 塞于天地之間. Such extravagant

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[47] Appendix IV.A.

[48] Appendix IV.A and IV.B.

[49] For Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), the very fact that Mengzi found it difficult to explain his "Flood-like *Qi*" was proof that he possessed it. Zhu Xi quotes Cheng's observation at *Mengzi jizhu* 3.231. Mengzi's claim that an explanation of Flood-like Courage is "difficult to explain" is a signal that what follows is his commentary on the concept.

[50] In elaborating on Zhao Qi's paraphrase of the line, Jiao Xun, *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 215, quotes medieval literary commentaries that suggest that *haoran* 浩然 refers to the whiteness of the *Qi* that permeates the cosmos and thus, by extension, to the "Celestial *Qi*" 天氣. Lee Rainey, "Mencius and His Vast, Overflowing *qi* (*haoran zhi qi*)," *Monumenta Serica* 46 (1998): 92, does not take into account how Mengzi's concept of Flood-like *Qi* was meant to echo Zengzi's "Enlarged Courage" and thus chooses to equate Mengzi's *Qi* with the cosmic "Primal *Qi*" 元氣. Riegel 1980 argues that Mengzi's concepts of *Qi* and *Haoran zhi qi* are indebted to the "Neiye" 內業 and related chapters in the *Guanzi* 管子. Bai Xi 白奚, *Jixia xue yanjiu: Zhongguo gudai de sixiang ziyou yu baijia zhengming* 稷下學研究：中國古代的思想自由與百家爭鳴 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998), pp. 176–80, makes a similar argument though in more detail.

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language meant not only to portray his bravery resonating beyond the confines of his body but also to impress Gongsun Chou with the claim that a master of cultivating it will serve as the human counterpart in the triarchy of Heaven, Earth, and Man 天地人.[51] Modesty was not among Mengzi's constant companions, but the purpose behind his boastfulness may have been to claim that he possessed unparalleled human qualities that could have made King Xuan a True King, had he in fact been offered and taken up an office in Qi.

Zengzi had used terminology related to some sort of system of fetters to portray the restraint of his heart when confronted by a martial challenge.[52] The language Mengzi used to elaborate further on the nature of the sort of Courage he cultivates borders on the erotic: his Courage "mates with Righteousness" 配義 and "joins with the *Dao*" 與道, terminology reminiscent of a fated pairing of two lovers.[53] Mengzi's use of the term *pei*, related to and interchangeable with its near synonym *fei* 妃, "serve as consort for," means that Mengzi regarded the pairing of Courage and Righteousness as comparable to a woman serving a man as a wife or consort rather than as the amity between close friends.[54]

(*Note 50—Continued*)

Riegel's "Reflections on an Unmoved Mind" (p. 449) cautions that "in his discussion of [*Qi*], Mencius nowhere adopts the purely physiological conceptualization found in the 'Neiye.'" Bai's *Jixia xue yanjiu* (pp. 179–80), offers other reservations but is in general committed to the idea that Mengzi's concepts were derived from Daoist experts at the Jixia Academy in the kingdom of Qi.

51 For the full text of these lines, see Appendix IV.B (1) and IV.B (2).

52 But cf. Wang Fuzhi's explanation of *suo* quoted in note 45 above.

53 Appendix IV.B (3). The juxtaposition and parallelism of the terms "Righteousness" and "*Dao*" suggest that, at least in this context, Mengzi thought of *Dao* as a moral virtue that he possesses internally and not simply as a corpus of teachings he has adopted.

54 Although it is not apparent in Zhu Xi's commentary, his *Zhuzi yulei* lessons to his followers reveal that he was aware of the sexual resonances of the passage. For example, he glossed *pei* as *sui* 隨. He could have meant that Courage "complies with" or "adapts to" Righteousness; but Zhu clearly meant that *Qi* "marries" Righteousness since he follows the gloss by identifying them as "wife and husband" (*fufu* 婦夫), an identification Zhu elaborates upon by saying that they are *kun* 坤 and *qian* 乾, the "Earth" and "Heaven" hexagrams in the *Zhouyi* 周易 and two of the most prominent emblems of female and male in Chinese cosmology and divination. See *ZZYL* 52.1255 (Cheng Duanmeng 程端蒙). At *ZZYL* 52.1259–60 (Zhou Mo 周模) Zhu says they are *qi* 妻 and *fu* 夫. Zhu added that just as the husband is the master of his wife, and *qian* is the master of *kun*, *Daoyi* 道義 is the master of the Courage.

The closely related virtues of Righteousness and the *Dao* are, however, not only the intimate partners embraced by Courage but also what sustains Courage.[55] "Lacking Righteousness and the Dao," Courage "withers and dies of starvation" 餒, i.e., becomes the opposite of Mengzi's large and strong "Flood-like Courage," and thus is of insufficient strength to support action.[56] Mengzi's claim that bravery gains sustenance from moral virtues has striking parallels in other early literature. The *Zuozhuan* account of a 632 B.C.E. military conflict between the domains of Jin and Chu contains the argument that its "just cause" 直 has "fully fed" the martial spirit of the Chu army, which will thus prevail over Jin forces weakened by the "treachery" 曲 of their leadership.[57] A passage included in the *Lüshi chunqiu* chapters devoted to "righteous warfare" 義兵 suggests that a just cause is one of the elements that enables a leader to "expand the fighting spirit of the people" 益民氣 and "form them into an army" 鬬眾.[58] That these parallels have to do with warfare and martial spirit might be happenstance. But they also indicate that Mengzi's

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[55] That moral virtues are both lovers of and sustenance for *Qi* reflects the commonplace linking between hunger for food and sexual desire. In *Mengzi* 6A1, Gaozi is quoted as saying that the enjoyment of "food and sex" 食色 is part of human nature. In 6B1, Mengzi argues that despite the strong desires for food and sex there are limits one will not exceed in attempting to get them.

[56] Appendix IV.B (4). In the words of Cheng Yi, Courage deprived of Righteousness and the *Dao* "grows smaller." Cheng's observation is quoted by an anonymous interlocutor at *ZZYL* 52.1254.

[57] Yang, *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu*, Xi 28.3, 458. The crucial causative link between "just cause" and sustaining the army's martial spirit is put in the mouth of Hu Yan 狐偃, uncle and adviser to Sire Wen of Jin 晉文公 (r. 636–628 B.C.E.). In this speech, Hu Yan (who is more commonly referred to in the *Zuozhuan* by the name Zifan 子犯) uses "a full stomach" 飽 as a metaphor for possessing a replete martial spirit. The *Zuo* commentary of Du Yu 杜預 (220–280)—for which see *Zuozhuan zhushu* 左傳注疏 16.272—explains "full stomach" as "upright Courage fills [them"] 直氣盈飽. Yang Bojun says the term means that "their knightly Courage is full and replete" 士氣飽滿. Durrant et al., *Zuo Tradition*, p. 415, ignores these commentaries and misconstrues the term to mean that the Chu army is "well-fed." I owe my reference to this important *Zuozhuan* passage to the scholarship of Nishijima Chōson 西島長孫, for which see Huang Junjie, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang jishi xinquan," p. 380.

[58] Chen Qiyou, *Lüshi chunqiu jiaozhu*, 8.457. Also see Knoblock and Riegel, *The Annals of Lü Buwei*, 8/4.2, p. 200.

"Flood-like Courage" is at base the stuff of martial bravery, and its cultivation is comparable to what underlies Zengzi's fighting spirit.[59]

Still struggling to clarify his meaning, Mengzi repeats himself using language that is slightly different but still strongly suggestive of romance: *Qi* grows by "coupling with Righteousness" 集義;[60] but "Righteousness never stealthily abducts

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[59] Du Duo 杜鐸 (1111–1170), a literati acquaintance of Zhu Xi and a prominent source for Zhu's understanding of "Flood-like Courage" equates Mengzi's concept with *qipo* 氣魄, a popular way in Song dynasty times to name the stamina and other psycho-physical resources—courage, spirit, daring, boldness, temerity—that sustain the will in difficult circumstances. See *ZZYL* 52.1243–44 (Shen Xian), 52.1243 (anonymous), 52.1255–56 (Lin Kuisun 林夔孫), and 52.1258–59 (Ye Hesun 葉賀孫). Du Duo also explained the method by which one nurtures Flood-like Courage in terms that Mengzi associates with Zengzi: looking inward to ensure that one is *suo*. Du concluded from his analysis that Mengzi's having cultivated "Flood-like Courage" reveals him and his ancestors in the lineage of early Ru masters to have been machismo knights and he argued that this characterization also applied to the disciple Yan Hui 顏回, who is conventionally portrayed as representative of the kinder and gentler side of the Ru tradition. See *ZZYL* 52.1243–44 (Shen Xian). Du Duo's point in the second of these quotations is that the courage and audaciousness essential to the early Confucian tradition, while subtly suggested in the words and acts of Kongzi and Yan Hui, were fiercely and bluntly displayed in the bravado of Mengzi. This was a portrait of Mengzi that resonated with Zhu Xi. Like Du Duo, Zhu Xi lamented that in his own era—when the Song dynasty had suffered great losses and was threatened by even greater ones—people were in retreat. No one took the portrait of Mengzi the resolute and unyielding as a model to be imitated. For Zhu, *Mengzi* 2A2 was not simply the subject of a lecture but guidance for how his followers could improve themselves by becoming masters of bravery and audaciousness. They needed to be like the ancients and not be affected or swayed by the prospect of ill-fortune or death. Instead they needed the daring to go forth, "curse the bandits" 罵賊—a reference to the tribes harassing the Song—and, fearful of no one, be willing to "sacrifice themselves for the sake of the dynasty" 殉國. This was for Zhu the essence of understanding the principles of the Ruist Way. See *ZZYL* 52.1243–44 (Shen Xian) and 1254 (anonymous).

[60] My rendering is based on Zhao Qi's gloss of *ji* 集 as *za* 雜. It signals us that *ji* should not be taken in its usual intransitive sense of "(birds) gathering and perching on a tree" but in the extended sense of "mix, blend, or mingle with." For Zhao's gloss, see *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 218. Though Zhao did not himself elaborate further on his understanding of *ji*, Jiao Xun made a point of emphasizing that *ji* 集, *za* 雜, *pei* 配, and *he* 合 all

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it" 非義襲而取之也.[61] The latter is an internal, miniaturized portrayal that echoes what Mengzi says in 6B1 of a breach of the rituals adopted for proper coupling in the world at large:

> If by climbing over the wall of your neighbour to the east and dragging away his virgin daughter you can get a wife, but by not climbing over the wall you would not get a wife, would you climb over it?[62]

Mengzi not only represents his Righteousness as possessed of agency vis-à-vis Courage, he also professes that it is a welcomed lover, an insider who observes the rituals of courtship that give permanence to its relationship with Courage. Mengzi's ability to confront fear and ensure steadfastness in the face of a challenge was due not to a "one-off" exploitation of his physical resources in the name of some conveniently claimed moral purpose but to his long-standing preservation and cultivation of an inborn moral quality wedded to the Vital Breath that sustained him.

(*Note 60—Continued*)

mean one and the same thing and refer variously to a marriage and its consummation. (Compare the uses in Modern Standard Chinese of *jiaoji* 交集 to denote the compatible coupling of romantic partners.) It is evident from his comments at *Mengzi jizhu* 3.231 that Zhu Xi failed to grasp the nature of the coupling of Courage and Righteousness that Mengzi described. On the contrary, Zhu takes *ji* 集 as a synonym for *ji* 積, "collect, accumulate" and *ji Yi* 集義 to be nothing more than "accumulating goodness" 積善. Though adopted by numerous translators and commentators, this is a careless definition not only because it ignores Zhao Qi's gloss but also because it is more closely connected to the self-cultivation thought found in the *Xunzi* than consistent with Mengzi's categorical claim that "human nature is good" 性善. The compound *jishan* 積善 occurs three times in the *Xunzi*, all related to self-cultivation methods. See *Xunzi* (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1979), pp. 7, 155, and 552. For a discussion of the significance of "accumulation" in Xunzi's thought, see John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 131. Bai (*Jixia xue yanjiu*, p. 178) argues for the same mistaken interpretation of *ji Yi* but he does so based on what he takes to be parallels with the *Guanzi*.

61 Appendix IV.B (5).

62 踰東家牆而摟其處子則得妻。不摟則不得妻則將摟之乎。The impropriety in taking the girl as a wife is not because she is the daughter of a neighbour or because she is young, but rather because it has not been sanctioned by ritual and has not observed the *measured* steps dictated by proper courtship.

Mengzi's test of the existence of Righteousness in himself—*his* moment of hesitation when frightened—consists of actively testing whether his actions cause him to feel dissatisfied in his heart and therefore lacking in his strength, which are unmistakable signs of the absence of Righteousness.[63] It is at this point in his instructions to Gongsun Chou that Mengzi criticizes Gaozi for making Righteousness "external" to him, by which Mengzi means, in this context, that Master Gao had expelled his Righteousness, refusing it the intimate, inborn, and thus "internal" 內 role it should normally have played in keeping Courage intact and strong.[64] Later in 2A2, as the conclusion of his metatext explanation of Flood-like Courage, Mengzi recites the allegory of the stupid farmer from Song who kills his sprouts by tugging on them to illustrate the point that Flood-like Courage must be gently nurtured and cannot be accomplished through blind and wilful force.[65]

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[63] Appendix IV.B (6). Feelings of satisfaction would indicate to Mengzi that his cultivation of Courage was proceeding properly. Xinyan Jiang, "Mencius on Human Nature and Courage," in Liu and Ivanhoe, *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi*, p. 143, mistakenly observes that Courage, while a "Confucian virtue," is an exception to the "unity of right action and right feeling." This is contradicted by this line in 2A2. Jiang's error is perhaps the result of his narrowly equating Courage only with 勇.

[64] Appendix IV.B (7). What Gaozi originally meant by this claim in 6A4 may have included but was certainly not limited to what appears to be its meaning in the context Mengzi provides for it in his 2A2 metatext.

[65] Appendix IV.C. The parable is introduced by the line, "Since there is certainly something there, be not neglectful; be not neglectful, but do not help it grow." The "something" refers to *Qi* or Flood-like *Qi*. Dobin Choi, "Mengzi's Maxim for Righteousness in *Mengzi* 2A2," *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 18.3 (2019): 371–91, argues that this line is pivotal in 2A2. But his claim is based on the mistaken understanding that the subject of the line is Righteousness. (Choi also overlooks Lau's important emendation, for which see note 102 in the Appendix.) In his insightful study, Richter, "Must We All Have a Vast, Flowing *qi*?", p. 37, identifies the parable of the Song farmer as what he calls a "guideline-explanation" 經說, i.e., what I call "metatext," appended to Mengzi's concept of the Flood-like *Qi*. Because he neglected to explore the possibility that other parts of 2A2 are also "guideline-explanations" that cause us to dwell upon and contemplate the text's terminology, Richter concludes that the one he identifies confirms that Mengzi's *haoran zhi qi* is the "main teaching" of his dialogue with Gongsun Chou. In my view, Mengzi's *dao* together with Gaozi's dictum and the metatext explanations of both form the crux of the passage.

As Mengzi makes clear in his discourse on Gaozi, his unchecked, vaulting Ambition has pushed Righteousness aside, eliminating moral considerations when Gaozi needs to pluck up and deploy his Courage.

Mengzi's Explanation of Gaozi's Sixteen Words

Let us now turn to the passage that Mengzi quotes and then explains as the means by which Gaozi attained an Unmoved Heart.

> Master Gao said: "What I do not get from Words, I do *not* demand of my Heart; what I do not get from the Heart, I do *not* demand of my Courage."
>
> 告子曰不得於言勿求於心不得於心勿求於氣 [66]

Anticipating his use of metatext to dissect his own Unmoved Heart, Mengzi immediately follows his quote of Gaozi's utterance with an explanation of how it constituted Gaozi's *dao*. Thus, Mengzi explains Gaozi's language in a series of comments, glosses, paraphrases, and supplementary descriptions, framing Gaozi's elliptical phrases so that they are understandable as the actions that resulted in Master Gao overcoming fright at a younger age than Mengzi. This involves a reformulation of Gaozi's utterance that erases the first pair of phrases by labelling them "unacceptable" (yet retains the second pair) as well as narrows the broad semantic scope of *Xin* 心, "Heart," by substituting for it the term *Zhi* 志, "Ambition." Subsequently, by describing the interactions between Ambition and Courage that are, according to Mengzi, the normative underpinnings of Gaozi's utterance, Mengzi concludes that because Gaozi had given excessive free rein to his Ambition, which resulted in a constriction of his Vital Breath, "He took a firm grip on his Ambition and did not disrupt his Courage." This climactic statement in his metatext is Mengzi's paraphrase of the second half of Gaozi's utterance.[67]

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[66] Appendix III.A. Gaozi's use of *Qi* need not originally have referred narrowly to Courage. But I render the term this way because this is how Mengzi uses it in the context of 2A2.

[67] Mengzi's understanding of Gaozi's utterance involves broadening significantly the usual meaning of the negated verb phrases *bu de* 不得 and *wu qiu* 勿求. Without involving the contents of Mengzi's paraphrases and glosses, Li, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang de

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We are of course at a loss to identify with any certainty what originally prompted Gaozi's utterance and what meaning and significance we should attach to it with respect to his life and philosophy. Mengzi identified the practices of Beigong You, Meng Shishe, and Zengzi as related to Nurturing Courage. But he does not label Gaozi's words beyond identifying them as something that "Master Gao said." We cannot assume that, in their origins, Gaozi's four phrases constituted, even indirectly, a *dao* for securing an Unmoved Heart. It is Mengzi who casts and then explains them this way, as he does all the others he quotes. As compelling as it may seem to search for Gaozi's philosophical roots, doing so is a detour from analysing *Mengzi* 2A2. The latter requires leaving Gaozi's utterance securely embedded in Mengzi's metatext.[68]

Moreover, although Master Meng's metatext appears to claim indisputable insight into the meaning of Gaozi's utterance and privileged authority vis-à-vis Gaozi's thought, we can question whether Mengzi reliably explains Gaozi's words or penetrates Gaozi's psyche. Disregarding Mengzi's boasting of his own

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(*Note 67—Continued*)

yili jiegou," pp. 21–22, suggests that, in Gaozi's utterance, *bu de* means something like "insufficient" and *wu qiu* as "make no demands of." On this basis, we might paraphrase Gaozi's utterance as: "When my Words prove insufficient, I make no demands of my Heart; when my Heart proves insufficient, I make no demands of my Courage." Such a paraphrase is purely hypothetical since we have no way of knowing with certainty what Gaozi's utterance meant originally, i.e., prior to the context Mengzi provides for it. But Li's definitions and my paraphrase are nevertheless useful as indicators of the extent to which Mengzi may have reconfigured Gaozi's phrases in his metatext commentary.

[68] Isolating them from Mengzi's metatext and rooting Gaozi's thought more firmly in the Mohist camp, Nivison, in *The Ways of Confucianism* (pp. 124–28 and 130–32), proposed that Gaozi's four phrases form the fragment of an epistemology in which primacy is given to the knowledge obtained from words and, secondarily, when words failed, from the mind's reflections. Nivison thought the knowledge that Gaozi sought from words was Righteousness. If so, it may be, as Nivison (*The Ways of Confucianism*, pp. 128–30) also long ago suggested, that the Daoist classic, *Zhuangzi* 莊子, specifically rejected this hierarchy by ironically putting words into the mouth of Kongzi that, with even more irony, encourage a disciple neither to listen to words nor to engage the mind at all, but rather to "listen with *Qi*" 聽之以氣, what Zhuangzi calls the "fasting of the mind" 心齋. See Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 and Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚, eds., *Zhuangzi jishi* 莊子集釋 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), p. 147. Lee Rainey ("Mencius and His Vast, Overflowing *qi*," p. 100) makes the same contrast between the *Mengzi* and *Zhuangzi* passages.

superiority, his glosses on the concept of Flood-like Courage unravel its difficult terminology and take us deep into Mengzi's own innermost heart. That is because they are after all the verbalizations of his introspection. What he tells us of Gaozi's *dao* may say more about Mengzi's own thinking than the meaning and purpose of Gaozi's words.

Mengzi begins his commentary on Gaozi's utterance by promptly judging its second pair of phrases "acceptable" 可 and, in the same breath, dismissing its first pair as "unacceptable" 不可.[69] It seems likely, though not certain, that Mengzi is referring narrowly to their relative efficacy as parts of a *dao* to achieve an Unmoved Heart rather than linking them more generally to other aspects of Gaozi's thought of which he approved or disapproved. By labelling them as he does, Mengzi may be explaining to Gongsun Chou that if, because of the first half, Gaozi would fail to prevent his heart from being moved, he could, because of the second half, repair the damage and successfully inhibit its movement. Allow me to elaborate. In Mengzi's later explanation of what he means by the claim, "I understand words" 我知言也, he identifies four examples of how malfunctions of the heart account for words that are "biased, excessive, perverse, and deceptive." I understand the passage to be Mengzi's metatext explanation of why he rejects the first half of Gaozi's dictum and also his warning to Gongsun Chou of the flaws that mar Gaozi's teachings.[70] Indeed, Mengzi's metatext climaxes with a warning about the

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[69] Appendix III.B (1). Mengzi's assessment is an introduction to the commentary that follows and elaborates upon it.

[70] Appendix V. Richter ("Must We All Have a Vast, Flowing *qi*?", p. 37) insightfully points out that Mengzi "understands both locution and illocution," though, it might be noted that, in 2A2, what interested Mengzi were the origins and causes of illocutions. Both Zhao Qi and Zhu Xi argue that the passage is closely related to Mengzi's criticism of the first half of Gaozi's utterance. From *Mengzi* 7B37 and Zhao Qi's commentary quoted at *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 1107, we know that, according to Master Meng, excessive Ambition leads to faulty claims and misstatements. In his *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 526, commentary, Jiao Xun equates the various illocutions listed by Mengzi in 2A2 with the unrestrained and nonsensical "spurtings" and "spoutings" 泄泄 referred to in a 4A1 quote from the second stanza of Song 254 ("Ban" 板) in the *Book of Songs* (for which see *Maoshi zhushu* 毛詩注疏 17D.633A). Mengzi characterizes such excessive verbiage as the chattering of those who "lack Righteousness in serving their lord, lack ritual propriety

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dangers that lurk in Gaozi's words because of his unexamined Ambition.[71] We may thus conclude that the reason Mengzi dismissed it as an invalid means to ensure an Unmoved Heart was Gaozi's self-professed refusal to examine or understand the faults of his Ambition when his words proved ineffective in confronting a challenge. The damage caused by such negligence on Gaozi's part may have precipitated the behaviours, ultimately self-correctable, that Mengzi found encapsulated in the utterance's second half.

The remainder of Mengzi's commentary on Gaozi's words consists of six statements, in five of which he prominently substitutes the term *Zhi* 志 for *Xin* 心 used by Gaozi in his utterance. In these metatext glosses, as often elsewhere in the *Mengzi*, *Zhi* refers to "Ambition"—that is, the mind resolutely and determinedly set upon and thus moving toward some goal.[72] In the first three of his expansions upon Gaozi's words, Mengzi depicts the normative bond between *Zhi* and *Qi*—namely Ambition and the Courage necessary to fulfil it—that is martial and hierarchical.[73] Thus, "Ambition is the leader of Courage" 夫志氣之帥也, and "Courage

(*Note 70—Continued*)

in accepting or relinquishing office, and oppose the Way of the Former Kings." (I take Mengzi's understanding of 泄泄 to be tantamount to what he referred to in 6B15 as "the sounds that burst from his mouth" 發於聲 [for which see below], a sign that the heart has been moved and requires restorative attention.)

[71] The text says heart but throughout this part of Mengzi's metatext we should, following Mengzi's gloss on Gaozi's utterance, substitute Ambition for heart. Moreover, if Mengzi was referring specifically to Gaozi's utterances when he told Gongsun Chou that he understood illocutions, then it follows that he also intended Gaozi to be the unnamed subject of what immediately follows: "What is born in his heart will do injury to his rules; and what issues forth from his rules will interfere with his conduct of affairs. Were another sage to arise he would surely heed my words." These lines appear in almost identical form in 3B9 where they cap Mengzi's impassioned explanation of why he must defend his teachings against those of Mo Di and Yang Zhu 楊朱. We should conclude that he had come to regard Gaozi in a similar light.

[72] Some early occurrences of *zhi* are written with 之 instead of 士, suggesting that the term is etymologically rooted in the movement of the heart/mind.

[73] Both Zhao Qi and Zhu Xi understand these three statements as normative, but they take them to be Mengzi's prescriptions of how one should act *contrary* to Gaozi. In other words, they assume that Gaozi's behaviour vis-à-vis his Ambition and Courage lay outside the normative standards set forth by Mengzi.

is the filling of the body" 氣體之充也, a function analogous, Zhu Xi suggests, to foot-soldiers obediently filling an army's ranks and formations.[74] A third gloss makes even more explicit the military-like subservience of Courage: "To whatever extreme Ambition reaches, Courage bivouacs there" 志至焉氣次焉. Mengzi's descriptions of the normative interactions between Ambition and Courage contrast with how, in the self-reflective part of his metatext, Mengzi evokes the congenial essence of Righteousness and the willing embrace of it by Courage.[75] Mengzi's description of Ambition as overbearing by its nature and Courage as "filling the body" is not only a normative account of the interactions of *Zhi* and *Qi* but also a lament for the confinement suffered by Courage when it is subject to Ambition.[76] Conjoined with Righteousness, Mengzi's Courage fills the cosmos.

In his fourth metatext statement, Mengzi shifts from his normative characterization of the interaction of Ambition and Courage to a description of Gaozi's internal acts: "He took a firm grip on his Ambition and did *not* disrupt his Courage." The shift in the rhetorical purpose of his metatext at this point is marked by Mengzi's use of the possessive pronoun *qi* 其, "his." It can refer to none other than Gaozi. That the statement is descriptive of Gaozi's acts identifies

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[74] *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230.

[75] Though the terms "Righteousness" and "Ambition" both belong to a broad semantic category of things connected to the workings of the heart, nowhere in 2A2 are they juxtaposed or treated as similar in meaning. Instead their distribution in 2A2 makes clear that they are mutually contradictory and exclusive: Mengzi's metatext untangling of Gaozi's utterance makes no mention of Righteousness but instead demonstrates that Gaozi was driven solely by Ambition until his self-reformation; and Ambition plays no role in Mengzi's explanation of his own self-cultivation. Mengzi clearly saw the two terms as representing conflicting forces that could influence Courage, *Qi* being the only term common to both segments of the text. David B. Wong's "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi," in Liu and Ivanhoe, *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi*, pp. 193–94, does not realize that Mengzi's statements on the relationship between *Zhi* and *Qi* are normative claims cited by Mengzi as part of his criticism of Gaozi's dictum and thus are not advice on how one should go about cultivating either.

[76] The 2A2 version of "Courage is the filling of the body" has a close parallel in the thirty-seventh book, "Xinshu xia" 心術下, of the *Guanzi* 管子, viz. 氣者，身之充也. See *Guanzi* 管子 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 1990), p. 647. It is impossible to determine whether one occurrence was the source of the other or both derived from a third occurrence.

it as Mengzi's paraphrase of the second half of Gaozi's performative utterance—that is, as the climax of Mengzi's commentary on Gaozi's words, "what I do not get from the Heart, I do not seek from Courage."[77] But Gongsun Chou finds this fourth statement a *non sequitur*. If his Courage obeys the commands of Ambition, providing what is required to realize it, Gongsun Chou asks, why does Mengzi say Gaozi reined in his Ambition and add emphatically that he did not disrupt his Courage?[78] Gongsun Chou's question forces Mengzi to back up and insert into his metatext two further explanations, an anticlimax that provides additional underpinning for this fourth, climactic statement. Gongsun Chou's question also serves a rhetorical purpose: it underscores the importance of the two "new" explanations that follow it.

The first explanation identifies two contrasting normative processes, one benign and the other malignant, that form a cycle: "When Ambition is contained it moves Courage; when Courage is contained it moves Ambition" 志壹則動氣氣壹則動志也. Echoing the "binding" that provides the restraint in Zengzi's heart, the term "contained" 壹, or "kept in a container," refers in the first of the processes to the positive step of keeping Ambition within bounds. Such containment generates its opposite, "movement" 動: prudently preventing excesses of aspiration enables Courage to "flow freely," a normative progression that recalls the constraints in Zengzi's heart that guarantee his Enlarged Courage. But Courage being "contained," as described in the second process,[79] generates the opposite effect with regard to Ambition and causes it to become unhinged and unbounded, thus distorting it into recklessness and impetuousness.[80]

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[77] Both Zhao Qi and Zhu Xi fail to grasp the nature of Mengzi's fourth statement and the significance of the possessive pronoun that occurs in it. Instead, they interpret the statement as still another normative description of the behaviour of *Zhi* and *Qi* meant to contradict Gaozi's utterance.

[78] Appendix III.C.

[79] Mengzi's use of the term with regard to the containment of Courage was probably meant as an echo of his previous description of Courage as the filling of the body. The term *ti* 體, "body," is cognate with its etymological root *yi* 壹, "contain/container."

[80] Chen Zushou provides a memorable summary of the differences between the first and second parts of Mengzi's epigram: "Ambition should be contained but Courage should not; Courage should move but Ambition should not." This passage is excerpted from

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The second, malignant, process identified by Mengzi serves as the normative background for understanding the line that immediately follows it: "Now, those instances of tripping while moving were due to Courage [being contained] and thus, inwardly, moving his heart."[81] The presence of the possessive pronoun *qi* serves again as a marker that the line is not simply another normative description of the inner workings of the heart common to all, but instead meant to depict something that happened to Gaozi's. However, the description of stumbling while moving does not refer to Gaozi's physical acts; rather, it is metaphorical for a failure of his Ambition: moving quickly toward a goal but unexpectedly

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(*Note 80—Continued*)

a longer one quoted at *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 214. The passage that Jiao Xun cites he appears to have stitched together from disparate comments found in the Xia Yunyi edition of Chen's commentary. The excerpt quoted by me is found in volume 4, 2.7a, lower register commentary marked *ding* 訂. The Chinese text reads: 故志可壹而氣不可壹。氣可動而志不可動. Mao Qiling, also quoted by Jiao Xun, says the same thing though not quite as succinctly as Chen Zushou. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 214, and *Yijiang jian*, 9b. Mengzi's implicit warning not to contain Courage is a departure from the teachings on *Qi* found in the *Guanzi*. In its forty-ninth chapter, "Neiye" 内業, a text closely related to chapter 37, speaks of "rolling *Qi* into a ball" 摶氣. See *Guanzi*, p. 778.

[81] My translation of 今夫蹶者趨者 follows the explanation common to the commentaries of Zhao Qi, Zhu Xi, and Chen Zushou: 行而蹶者. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 213, *Mengzi jizhu* 3.231, and Chen Zushou, *Jinshengju sanke canbu Sishu ranxi jie*, 2.7a. Following glosses found in Wang Fuzhi's 2A2 essay, Li, "*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang de yili jiegou," p. 29, equates *jue* 蹶 with *tao* 跳, "leap." Li paraphrases the line to mean that the *Qi* will concentrate in the body when one is "leaping and running." But Li's paraphrase reverses the sequence identified by Mengzi: it is the concentration of *Qi* that is the cause of the erratic movements, not the other way around. Alan Chan's "A Matter of Taste: *Qi* (Vital Energy) and the Tending of the Heart (*Xin*) in *Mencius* 2A2," in Alan K. L. Chan, ed., *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), pp. 42–71, from the outset fails to realize that Mengzi's characterization of *qi* as an unruly influence that would disturb the heart only applies to the cultivation of fearlessness captured in Gaozi's dictum and that Mengzi intends for Gongsun Chou to understand that Gaozi's methods stand in sharp contrast to his own nurturing of a Flood-like *Qi* in which Courage is made docile by the gentle influences of Righteousness. There are of course numerous other points made by Alan Chan that can be profitably read against the arguments found in my study.

stumbling.[82] That the stumbling of Ambition is "due to Courage" must refer to the constricting blockage of Courage, as described in the immediately preceding passage, normatively causing Ambition to be moved. And this behaviour, Mengzi tells us, was tantamount to Gaozi's heart having moved.[83] That both his sixth and fourth statements in Mengzi's metatext describe what Gaozi did suggests that they be read as a pair, the sixth preceding the fourth because Mengzi added it in order to set the stage for the latter. (Mengzi's insertion of the fifth and sixth statements in his metatext must have satisfied Gongsun Chou, for he does not ask for further clarification of how Mengzi's description of Gaozi's interior acts follows from the normative interactions of Ambition and Courage.) The odd notations on Gaozi's inner workings found in the sixth and fourth comments in Mengzi's metatext—Gaozi's Ambition faltered, causing him to take firm hold of it while not disrupting his Courage—seem to isolate a particular occurrence when Gaozi was compelled by his fright to reflect on the consequences of vaulting Ambition and to act. This can be regarded as Gaozi's moment of introspection, comparable to Zengzi's and Mengzi's own.

Turning again to 6B15, we find within the passage Mengzi's explanation of how others have accomplished self-reformation when circumstances "moved their hearts and hardened their natures":

> Only after persistently transgressing bounds is one able to reform. Being distressed in mind and perplexed in his thoughts, does he then arise to vigorous reformation. Only when things have been evidenced by the flush on a man's face and set forth in the sounds that burst from his mouth, does he understand.
>
> 人恆過然後能改困於心衡於慮而後作徵於色發於聲而後喻 [84]

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[82] Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu* 3.231, understands Mengzi's language here as metaphorical. Compare Mengzi's language with Shakespeare's metaphorical portrayal of overreaching ambition in *Macbeth*, Act I, Scene 7: "I have no spur / To prick the sides of my intent, but only / Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself / And falls on th' other."

[83] Mengzi reverts to naming the heart rather than Ambition to make clear that he is describing Gaozi's heart having been moved and the subsequent recuperative steps taken by Gaozi to achieve an Unmoved Heart.

[84] See my earlier discussion of the opening of 6B15 in which Mengzi identifies the historical paragons "plucked" 舉 from out of difficult circumstances and rewarded with

(*Continued on next page*)

Gaozi's case is an example of this: he had come to understand the transgressions of his Ambition because it had stumbled while vaulting toward a goal and, as a consequence, he took a firm grip on it and undid whatever damage his recklessness and impetuousness had caused to his Courage.[85] Mengzi's normative statements and his explanation of the performative significance of the second half of Gaozi's utterance have the effect of transforming Gaozi's words into a sort of *apologia* for what transpired during a moment of self-reformation. Did such a moment actually occur for Gaozi? Mengzi must have genuinely believed that it had and that he had uncovered the proof of it in Gaozi's phrases: an account of the normative but fraught interaction of Ambition and Courage, capped by a dramatic story of how Gaozi almost succumbed to but then forcefully recovered from the perils of a heart that moved.

Zhao Qi, Zhu Xi, and others, directly or indirectly influenced by Zhu Xi's interpretation of 2A2, tell stories different from this one. Taking Mengzi's comments not as explanations of Gaozi's four phrases but rather as Mengzi's own prescriptive advice that Gaozi's utterance proves he failed to follow, Zhao Qi claims when Master Gao did not get from others the "good words" 善言, that is, the verbal gestures of respect he expected to receive, he would furiously take his revenge on those who insulted him without bothering to consider whether their intentions might have been good; and when Gaozi knew that another person harboured "evil intentions" 惡心 toward him, he would not be distracted by that individual's

(*Note 84—Continued*)

high positions by rulers who recognized their virtues. The "reformation" 改 of which Mengzi speaks here refers to the self-cultivation practised by these paragons after their hearts were moved and their endurance tested. I take Mengzi's awareness and understanding of this pattern in the careers of these historical figures to be a reflection of his having experienced such reformation himself.

85 The successful cure adopted by Gaozi—that Ambition should be contained and confined—is consistent with Mengzi's 7B35 advice: "To nurture the mind nothing is more effective than to make few the desires" 養心莫善於寡欲. Li ("*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang de yili jiegou," p. 29) proposes a possible mechanism by which reducing desires contributes to restraining Ambition. He conjectures that by reducing desires one would prevent a surge in the *Qi* they require that might, in turn, move the heart. My reading of 2A2 suggests, however, that it is not an excess of *Qi* that is problematic but rather its diminishment.

"pleasant demeanour" 善辭氣.[86] Zhu Xi also understood Mengzi's metatext as consisting of Mengzi's own prescriptive advice offered to counter what Zhu took to be the misguided intent of Gaozi's utterance. Contrary to Zhao's reading, however, Zhu assumed that the Words, Heart, and Courage to which Gaozi referred were his own. He found in what Gaozi said evidence that Gaozi was ultimately indifferent to Words and Courage, and attempted only to preserve the isolation, sanctity, and stillness of his heart.[87] Zhu Xi's provocative portrait of Gaozi was sufficiently compelling that it also inspired Mao Qiling to dwell on what they both took to be Gaozi's deep-rooted and uncompromising aversion to both introspection and the cultivation of Courage. In Mao's words, Gaozi forbids himself from considering either what his heart does not get from words or what he hoped to get from his heart but failed to do so. Rather than subject his heart to such scrutiny, "Gaozi merely embraces this stupid square inch and claims of it that it has not been moved."[88] Comparing Gaozi with others mentioned in 2A2 in order to point out Master Gao's failings, Jiao Xun concludes that, while Meng Shishe possesses Courage but no Ambition, and Zengzi and Mengzi possess both, Gaozi has neither.[89]

These readings of Mengzi's metatext all share in common the view that Mengzi's various normative statements in regard to Ambition and Courage were Mengzi's refutations of what he understood as the meaning of Gaozi's four phrases. They thus exclude Gaozi from normative behaviours that Mengzi appears to ascribe universally to everyone else—an apparent reflection of hostility toward Gaozi's thought in the commentarial tradition that exceeds anything that Mengzi himself says of it in 2A2 or his 6A1–4 discussion with Gaozi on human nature. Moreover, all of these other interpretations of Mengzi's metatext also regard the

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[86] See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 210. Zhao Qi's interpretation of Gaozi's utterance renders Master Gao a bully in the mould of Beigong You. Finding Zhao Qi's interpretation "farfetched" 牽強, Li ("*Mengzi* zhiyan yangqi zhang de yili jiegou," p. 14) points out that not only do the three terms *Yan*, *Xin*, and *Qi* have specialized meanings in the passage that Zhao fails to appreciate but also that they refer to Gaozi's own Words, Heart, and *Qi* not to those belonging to some anonymous other.

[87] *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230.

[88] For Mao Qiling's argument, see *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 211, and *Yijiang jian*, 7a.

[89] *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 214–15. For Mao and his comments on the *Mengzi*, see above, note 4.

fourth and sixth metatext explanations that Mengzi provided Gongsun Chou as normative standards to which Gaozi failed to adhere.[90] Such an understanding ignores both the significance of the possessive pronoun *qi* as a marker of how Mengzi intended the two statements as descriptive of Gaozi's interior acts as well as the proof they provide that the normative statements that immediately surround them in Mengzi's metatext must also govern the Ambition and Courage of Gaozi.[91] If it was Gaozi who restrained his Ambition and did not disrupt his Courage, his inner workings must have been governed by the norms set forth by Mengzi. Reading the metatext as consisting of both normative standards from which Gaozi was not excluded and descriptions of what Gaozi did in reaction to them leads to the conclusion that, according to Mengzi, Gaozi's Unmoved Heart was the result of his having ultimately heeded both his Heart and his Courage.

Mengzi says, in 6B15, that the evidence that usually prompts reform after persisting in one's transgression is either a look upon one's face or some sound "bursting forth" from his mouth, things that the self and others present would be aware of and understand. Was there something in Gaozi's words or the way he uttered them that led Mengzi to construct his metatext as a narrative of Gaozi's reformation? In his 7B37 remarks on a passage in the *Analects* of Kongzi, Mengzi observes that the proof of enlarged Ambition (Gaozi's ailment) is to speak "in a pretentious, self-satisfied manner" 嘐嘐然. In his commentary on Mengzi's fifth observation, Zhao Qi defines the unwanted "containment" 壹 of Gaozi's Courage as marked by the sound of "gagging" 噎—in other words, Gaozi choking on his own aspirations. Taken together, these passages might suggest that something in how Gaozi uttered his sixteen-word teaching signalled to Mengzi some failure in Gaozi's Ambition and led him to describe its stumbling metaphorically. If so, we might

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[90] Zhao Qi takes the statement to mean that Gaozi ought to restrain Ambition and not disrupt the *Qi*, but instead wrongly accosts others with excessive displays of the *Qi* of joy and anger. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 213. Zhao's paraphrase is noteworthy because he interprets *Qi* not as Courage but as a range of emotions. Zhu Xi transforms Mengzi's description of how Gaozi restrained Ambition without disrupting *Qi* into a universal self-cultivation mantra for achieving inner peace (that had nothing to do with Gaozi's benighted practices). See *ZZYL* 1239 (Pan Shiju 潘時舉). Wang Fuzhi, *Du Sishu daquan shuo*, 8.533, strongly criticized Zhu's approach to the text.

[91] The foregoing is a summary of the views of the various commentators mentioned that does not include all of the details and nuances of their arguments.

conclude that his interpretation is based on Mengzi having actually witnessed Gaozi uttering the words that he would later quote. Or, perhaps, it is based on his gaining sympathetic insights into the thwarted ambitions of another after learning of Gaozi's words second-hand, a skill Master Meng practised to great effect at the court of King Xuan. Whether he learned of it first- or second-hand, Mengzi's interpretation of Gaozi's utterance provides crucial background to what Mengzi meant when he said to Gongsun Chou, "I understand words."

Conclusion

That an instance of fright induced a corrective reaction is not unusual in itself. Some of its various forms are expressed in the performative utterances of Beigong You, Meng Shishe, and Zengzi. What is unusual is that in a discourse almost as lengthy as his explanation of his own practices, Mengzi deconstructed with careful precision the causes of Gaozi's fright and what he did to address them, multiplying the eight words that form the second half of Gaozi's utterance into a metatext more than fifty words long. Why would Mengzi have bothered to articulate and transmit an apologia on Gaozi's behalf? From at least the time of Zhu Xi, their exchange recorded in *Mengzi* 6A1–4 has been characterized as a dispute between adversaries that Master Gao lost. Dwelling on Mengzi having labelled "unacceptable" the first half of Gaozi's 2A2 utterance, Zhu Xi says of Gaozi's argumentation in sections 6A1–4 that, when Gaozi's words did not achieve his purposes, he would discard them but refuse to seek in his own heart the reasons for his failure.[92] Responding to Zhu Xi, Wang Fuzhi defended Gaozi's argumentation as strong and coherent, and rejected Zhu's use of 2A2 as grounds for criticizing it.[93]

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[92] *Mengzi jizhu* 3.230: 告子謂於言有所不達。則當舍置其言。而不必反求其理於心. Zhu Xi says something similar of Gaozi's argumentation at *Mengzi jizhu* 11.327: "From the beginning of this scroll through its fourth section, Gaozi's disputations are repeatedly quashed and he repeatedly alters his argument to achieve victory, never learning that he might turn inward and find within himself reasons for doubt. This is precisely his so-called 'not getting from Words and not seeking from his Heart' and is the reason that he ended up in a muddle unable to grasp what is correct." In the *ZZYL* passages that relate to their exchange, Zhu Xi says that Mengzi "disputed" 辨 Gaozi's various propositions. See, for example, *ZZYL* 59.1379 (Lin Zimeng 林子蒙).

[93] Wang Fuzhi, *Du Sishu daquan shuo*, 8.531: If one says that when Gaozi made a mistake in his own words but did not reflect on that and seek to confirm their correctness, then

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Although Zhu Xi and Wang Fuzhi offer mutually contradictory assessments of Gaozi's performance as a disputer, both agree that Gaozi was Mengzi's adversary and their encounter a debate. But the characterization of Gaozi as Mengzi's opponent appears to have been an invention of Zhu Xi, created to serve as background and precedent for his own deeply adversarial relationship with Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1193), a major Song-dynasty thinker and one of Zhu Xi's chief rivals.[94] Although Lu Jiuyuan regarded himself as teaching the philosophy of Mengzi,[95] Zhu identified Gaozi and his thought as ancestral to Lu and, in his reading of 2A2, Zhu used Gaozi as a surrogate in his attacks on Lu. Radically

(*Note 93—Continued*)

this is to render him nothing more than an impulsive and impatient ignoramus. How then could he have achieved an unmoved heart before Mengzi did? Or there is the claim that his references to "willows" and "spouting water" are examples of his frequently changing his explanations and proof that he "did not seek from his heart." Such claims are ignorant of how his three explanations of human nature used different analogies, but all were based on a single point of view. It was not the case that when his reference to "willows" did not work, he then followed the flow of his lips and tongue and substituted a reference to "spouting water." For Wang and his study of *Mengzi*, see above, notes 4, 45, and 90.

[94] For Lu's biography, see *Songshi* 宋史, 434.12879–82. Lu's collected works, the *Xiangshan ji* 象山集, is described at *Siku quanshu zongmu* 四庫全書總目, 160.3356. Lu's *nianpu* 年譜, compiled by his disciple Yuan Xie 袁燮, is described at *Siku quanshu zongmu*, 60.1333. Hoyt Tillman, *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), chapters 8 and 9, presents an extremely useful summary of Lu's thought and of the points of difference (and agreement) between Lu and Zhu Xi. See also Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Lu Xiangshan's Ethical Philosophy," in John Makeham, ed., *Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 249–66. Zhu Xi to the contrary, Lu identified himself as an heir to Mengzi, not to Gaozi. Tillman, *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy*, p. 200: "Lu regarded himself as teaching the philosophy of Mencius. In conversations with his students, he reminisced that his understanding of Confucianism was based on self-attained enlightenment while reading the *Mencius*." But in the *ZZYL*, Zhu Xi characterizes Lu as someone more interested in the heart than in words and he agrees with a follower that Lu's indifference to books and writing was something he had in common with Gaozi. See *ZZYL* 52.1235 (Yang Zhi 楊至). In fact, Lu criticized Gaozi for searching in books for the principles of righteousness. See *ZZYL* 52.1264 (Liao Deming).

[95] Tillman, *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy*, p. 200.

intent on equating the two, Zhu remarked when Lu Jiuyuan passed away: "Alas! Gaozi has died."[96]

Writing a few decades after Wang Fuzhi's comments, but with Zhu Xi's assessment of Gaozi's argumentation very much in mind, Hu Xu 胡煦 (1655–1736) pointed out that an argument need not be adversarial. Hu regarded the scroll 6A dialogue as an episode of pedagogy in which Master Gao, unequivocally a disciple and follower of Master Meng, put forth challenging propositions on human nature as a means to provoke his master to offer corrective instruction; and, through that pedagogical method, Gaozi came, step by metaphorical step, to fully understand that "human nature is good." Hu Xu concluded:

> Those who earnestly pursue the study of human nature like Master Gao are rare. Master Gao's talents are immeasurable and so why, on the contrary, consider it to be the case that Mengzi refuted him![97]

Hu Xu probably underestimated the depth of Gaozi's commitment to the propositions he declaimed in 6A and was overly optimistic about Gaozi's ultimate conversion to Mengzi's views on human nature. Mengzi's allusion in 2A2 to Gaozi's 6A4 argument that "Righteousness is external" suggests that Mengzi did not regard the latter as simply an *ad hoc* rhetorical device to gain instruction from him in an isolated moment. Moreover, Mengzi's condemnation of the dangers that would arise from adopting Gaozi's words, found in the final lines of the 650-word part of 2A2 on which my study has focused, discloses a hostility on Mengzi's part that cannot be obscured with references to the complex ways that teachers and their disciples may have argued and interacted in antiquity. And yet, other evidence bolsters Hu Xu's claim that Gaozi was at some point Mengzi's disciple. In his commentary on their 6A dialogue, Zhao Qi says, among other things, that Gaozi "once studied with Mengzi"—meaning that his discipleship had existed but

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96 *ZZYL* 124.2979 (Hu Yong 胡泳): 象山死。先生率門人往寺中哭之。既罷良久曰。可惜死了告子. "When Xiangshan (i.e., Lu Jiuyuan) died, the Master led his followers to the temple where they cried for Lu. After the rites were finished and a long time had passed, he said, 'Alas! Gaozi has died.'" See also Tillman, *Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy*, pp. 201 and 285 note 51.

97 Jiao Xun, *Mengzi zhengyi*, pp. 785–86, quotes these passages from Hu's *Goudeng yuezhi* 篝燈約旨. For a biography of Hu, see Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 333.

ended—and that his given name was Buhai 不害.[98] It is possible that Zhao Qi is equating Gaozi with Haosheng Buhai 浩生不害, an otherwise unknown figure who politely poses two questions to Mengzi as might a disciple in a barebones exchange recorded in 7B35.[99]

If Gaozi were an adversary and one he had come to regard with hostility, would Mengzi have recast the second half of Gaozi's utterance as an *apologia* and, in the process, articulate a detailed explanation of Gaozi's missteps and eventual success despite them? He might have done so for the sake of casting in the clearest possible light how his methods for achieving an Unmoved Heart differed from Gaozi's. But it is also possible that, although he otherwise voices strong disapproval of Gaozi's ideas, Master Meng has, in the context of teaching Gongsun Chou, chosen to defend an erstwhile disciple who got some things right in the end. In either case, we can learn from a careful reading of both Mengzi's reflections on his own self-cultivation philosophy as well as his insights into Gaozi's words that for Master Meng, if offered a high position in the kingdom of Qi, any trepidation he felt would quickly dissolve, replaced by Courage guided by the restraints of an abiding Righteousness, not by transgressive Ambition.

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[98] *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 785. Jiao Xun notes that Mao Qiling regarded as mistaken Zhao Qi's identification of Gaozi as Mengzi's disciple. Su Shixue 蘇時學 (fl. 1865) and Sun Yirang, both noted Qing-dynasty authorities on the text of the *Mozi*, accepted at face value Zhao Qi's claim that Gaozi studied with Mengzi and, aware of the chronological issues involved, rejected the argument that the Gaozi mentioned in the *Mengzi* should be identified as the Mohist disciple who appears in the text of the *Mozi*. For their arguments, see *Mozi xiangu*, 12.426. In the introduction to his *Mencius* translation, James Legge includes Gaozi in a list of Mengzi's disciples on Zhao Qi's authority. But he adds: "This Kaou [=Gaozi] can hardly be said to have studied under Mencius; he only argued with him." See James Legge, *The Chinese Classics, Volume II* (*The Works of Mencius*) (London: Trübner & Co., 1861), p. 81.

[99] They both have the same given name; *sheng* 生 and *zi* 子 both mean "Master"; *gao* 告 is quite possibly an abbreviated form of *hao* 浩, or the latter a scribal slip for the former, errors made possible by the fact that both names were near homophones in Old Chinese. Yan Ruoqu rejected connecting Haosheng Buhai with Gaozi. See *Mengzi zhengyi*, p. 785.

Appendix: A Translation of *Mengzi* 2A2[100]

I

A. [Gongsun Chou asked:] "If the Master were put into the position of Gentleman Councillor in Qi, and were thus able to practise his way, even though it was by this means, [our lord King Xuan] would rule as a Hegemon or True King no differently [from what earlier officials accomplished for their rulers in the past]. If this were so, then would it or would it not move [the Master's] heart?"

B. (1) [Mengzi replied:] "No. I attained an Unmoved Heart at forty." (2) "If that is so, then you, Master, have surpassed Meng Ben by a long distance." (3) "That is not difficult. Master Gao had an Unmoved Heart younger than I."

夫子加齊之卿相。得行道焉。雖由此霸王不異矣。如此則動心否乎。否。我四十不動心。若是。則夫子過孟賁遠矣。是不難。告子先我不動心。

II

A. "Do there exist methods for achieving an Unmoved Heart?" "Yes, there are. We have the Nurturing of Courage practised by Beigong You.

> 'I do not have my skin twitch,
> Nor my eyes shift.
> I take a single hair pulled out by another
> as equal to being flogged in the market square.
> What I do not accept from a coarsely clad servant,
> I do not accept from a lord possessed of ten thousand chariots.
> I regard stabbing a lord possessed of ten thousand chariots
> as equal to stabbing a coarsely clad servant.
> I do not stand in awe of the feudal lords.
> When repulsive noises [i.e., insults] come my way,
> I invariably return them in kind.'"

B. "We have the Nurturing of Courage by Meng Shishe: 'Regard defeat the same as victory. If you advance only after "calculating the strength of the enemy"

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[100] The translation is of only the first 650 characters in *Mengzi* 2A2. See above, in note 10, and the passage it comments upon.

and join in battle only after "reckoning whether victory is possible," you are one who fears the Tripartite Army. How am I, She, able to ensure victory? I am only able to ensure that I am fearless.'"

C. (1) "Meng Shishe resembled Zengzi and Beigong You was similar to Zi Xia. I do not know of the two who was worthier, but Meng Shishe preserved his Courage. (2) Once in the past, Zengzi said to Zi Xiang, 'Are you fond of Courage? I learned of Enlarged Courage from the Master [Kongzi]. If upon examining myself I find [my heart] not bound tight, although my foe is but a coarsely clad common fellow, would I not gasp in fright? But if upon examining myself I find [my heart] bound tight, then I will even march against an army of ten thousand.' (3) Meng Shishe's preserving his Courage is not the equal of Zengzi's preserving the binding."

不動心有道乎。有。北宮黝之養勇也。不膚橈。不目逃。思以一豪挫於人。若撻之於市朝。不受於褐寬博。亦不受於萬乘之君。視刺萬乘之君。若刺褐夫。無嚴諸侯。惡聲至必反之。孟施舍之所養勇也曰。視不勝猶勝也。量敵而後進。慮勝而後會。是畏三軍者也。舍豈能為必勝哉。能無懼而已矣。孟施舍似曾子。北宮黝似子夏。夫二子之勇。未知其孰賢。然而孟施舍守(約GE>氣[101]也。昔者曾子謂子襄曰。子好勇乎。吾嘗聞大勇於夫子矣。自反而不縮。雖褐寬博。吾不惴焉。自反而縮。雖千萬人。吾往矣。孟施舍之守氣又不如曾子之守約也。

III

A. "I dare ask, May I get to learn of the Master's Unmoved Heart and Gaozi's Unmoved Heart?" "Gaozi said:

> 'What I do not get from Words, I do *not* demand of my Heart;
> what I do not get from my Heart, I do *not* demand my Courage.'

B. (1) 'What I do not get from the Heart, I do *not* demand of my Courage' is admissible; 'what I do not get from Words, I do *not* demand of my Heart' is inadmissible. (2) Ambition is the leader of Courage; Courage is the filling of the body. (3) To whatever extreme Ambition reaches, Courage bivouacs there. (4) For that reason, I say, 'He took a firm grip on his Ambition and did not disrupt his Courage.'"

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[101] For the justification for this correction, see note 40 in the main body of this paper.

C. "Having said, 'To whatever extreme Ambition reaches, Courage bivouacs there,' why do you further say, 'He took a firm grip on his Ambition and did not disrupt his Courage?'"

D. (1) "When Ambition is contained it moves Courage; when Courage is contained it moves Ambition. (2) Now, tripping while moving is due to [contained] Courage which, in turn, moved his Heart."

敢問。夫子之不動心。與告子之不動心。可得聞與。告子曰。不得於言勿求於心。不得於心勿求於氣。不得於心勿求於氣可。不得於言勿求於心不可。夫志氣之帥也。氣。體之充也。夫志至焉氣次焉。故曰。持其志無暴其氣。既曰志至焉氣次焉。又曰持其志無暴其氣者。何也。志壹則動氣。氣壹則動志也。今夫蹶者趨者是氣也。而反動其心。

IV

A. "I dare wherein you, Master, are superior [to Gaozi]?" "I understand words and I am skilled at Nurturing my Flood-like Courage." "I dare ask what you mean by 'Flood-like Courage?"

B. "It is hard to explain. (1) As a form of Courage, it is the largest and strongest. (2) Nurture it with uprightness and do it no harm and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth. (3) It is a form of Courage that mates with Righteousness and joins with the Way. (4) In the absence of these, [Courage] suffers hunger. (5) It is what is nurtured by comingling with Righteousness, but Righteousness does not stealthily abduct Courage. (6) The consequence of actions not bringing gratification to the heart is starvation [of Courage]. (7) I for that reason say, 'Master Gao never understood Righteousness and therefore made it external.'

C. Since there is certainly something there, be not neglectful; be not neglectful but do not help it grow. Do not be like the man from Song:

> Among the people of Song there was one who pulled on his sprouts because he worried they would not grow. Having busied himself in doing so he returned home and told his family, 'Today I exhausted myself helping the sprouts grow.' Leaping up, the man's sons ran to see them. By the time they got there the sprouts had withered.

Few are those in the world who do not help their sprouts grow. Those who take them to be of no benefit and cast them aside are those who do not keep weeds away from their sprouts. Those who help them grow are those who pull on their sprouts. This is not only of no benefit it also harms them.

敢問。夫子惡乎長。我知言。我善養吾浩然之氣。敢問。何謂浩然之氣。曰難言也。其為氣也。至大至剛。以直養而無害則塞于天地之間。其為氣也。配義與道。無是餒也。是集義所生者。非義襲而取之也。行有不慊於心則餒矣。我故曰。告子未嘗知義。 以其外之也。必有事焉而勿(正心GE>忘。[102] 勿忘而勿助長。無若宋人然。宋人有閔其苗之不長而揠之者。芒芒然歸謂其人曰。今日病矣。予助苗長矣。其子趨而往視之。苗則槁矣。天下之不助苗長者寡矣。以為無益而舍之者不耘苗者也。助之長者揠苗者也。非徒無益而又害之。

V

"What do you mean when you say, 'I understand words'?"

> "Biased statements—I recognize his being blocked;
> excessive statements—I recognize his being trapped;
> perverse statements—I recognize his being detached;
> deceptive statements—I recognize his being impoverished.

What is born in his heart will do injury to his rules; and what issues forth from his rules will interfere with his conduct of affairs. Were another sage to arise he would surely heed my words."

何謂知言。詖辭。知其所蔽。詖辭。知其所蔽。淫辭。知其所陷。邪辭。知其所離。遁辭。知其所窮。生於其心。害於其政。發於其政。害於其事。聖人復起。必從吾言矣。

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[102] Transmitted versions of the beginning of this line read 必有事焉而勿正心. In part because an injunction against *zheng xin* 正心, "rectify the heart," contradicts a teaching in the *Daxue*, most traditional interpreters parse the line so that *zheng* 正 ends the sentence and *xin* 心 begins the following one. I adopt D. C. Lau's economical solution: the graphs 正心 in the vertical column text are a scribal error for 忘. See note "d" in the Textual Notes appendix to Lau's *Mencius* (1970).

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Righteousness, Ambition, and Courage: The "Unmoved Heart" of *Mengzi* 孟子 2A2 Revisited

(Abstract)

Jeffrey RIEGEL

The first 650 words of *Mengzi* 2A2 convey Mengzi's lessons to a follower on various ways to cultivate Courage. The lessons take the form of Mengzi's quotations from the teachings of others (as well as his own) and Mengzi's explanations of them. The latter, identified herein as a metatext, serve to define and elaborate upon the many difficult and abstruse terms found in 2A2. The crux of the passage is Mengzi's quotation of a sixteen-word pair of couplets he attributes to Gaozi, a figure who also appears in *Mengzi* 6A1–4. Mengzi's explanation of the passage discloses the fraught relationship between Courage and Ambition that appears to have troubled Gaozi in his attempts to remain courageously undeterred in the face of a challenge. Mengzi contrasts Gaozi's predicament with the happy relationship between Courage and Righteousness that is the foundation of his own method for cultivating Courage. Mengzi's close and almost sympathetic attentiveness to Gaozi's words occasions a re-examination of the relationship between the two thinkers.

Keywords: *Mengzi* nurturing Courage Ambition Righteousness unmoved heart

義、志、氣：
重釋《孟子．公孫丑上》之「不動心」

（提要）

王安國

《孟子．公孫丑上》(2A2)章開章的650字，記述孟子向一位弟子傳授「養勇」之法。這些教誨主要以兩種形式呈現：一是孟子援引他人(及其自身)的言論；二是孟子對這些言論的闡釋。本文將後者定義為一種「後設文本」(metatext)，旨在界定並解讀2A2章中出現的諸多艱深晦澀的概念。這節的核心內容，在於孟子引自告子的一組共十六字對句——告子亦有出現於《孟子．告子上》(6A1–4)諸章。孟子對這段引文的解讀，揭示了「勇」與「志」之間充滿張力的複雜關係；這似乎正是困擾告子的癥結所在，致使他在面對挑戰、試圖堅守「勇」而無懼時感到困難。孟子將告子所處的這種困境，與「勇」、「義」之間和諧圓融的關係鮮明對照；而後者正是孟子自身「養勇」方法論的基石。孟子對告子言論所展現的這種細緻入微且近乎感同身受的關注，促使我們重新審視與考量兩位思想家之關係。

關鍵詞：《孟子》　養勇　志　義　不動心